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 This dissertation analyzes the social and political history of Haitian peasants and the 
formation of the brutally repressive Duvalier dictatorship. It establishes that the rise of the 
dictatorship was the result of a political trajectory shaped by historical processes. In post-
emancipated Haiti during the nineteenth century, thousands of peasants, who were formerly 
enslaved,  joined the military and participated in insurrections to achieve high status and social 
mobility. These traditions of militarism and popular revolt also undermined the state's monopoly 
over force and checked its authoritarian tendencies. However, these militaristic traditions were 
curtailed and stamped out by US intervention (1915-1934). U.S. forces employed tactics of 
disarmament and imposed a repressive penal system that disempowered Haitian peasants.  
 This dissertation argues that decades of peasant marginalization from power eventually 
led to the rise of the Duvalier dictatorship in the twentieth century. After coming to power in 
1957, François Duvalier remilitarized and rearmed peasants in exchange for their loyalty. This 
study shows how the dictator Duvalier, in particular, created a civil militia infamously known as 
the tonton makouts whose members formed the arm of state repression. Thousands of previously 
ostracized peasants enlisted into the dreaded makout militia to access status and political power. 
The support of an armed peasantry helped Duvalier repress the political opposition, allowing the 
regime to stay in power for almost three decades. In the same breath, this dissertation reveals that 
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experience in the militia and the regime’s peasant councils politicized peasants over time. After 
being politicized, peasants participated in a major popular revolt in 1986 that was the first since 
the U.S. invasion. The popular revolt, which paradoxically included many makouts, led to the 
overthrow of the Duvalier regime and eventually to the truly democratic elected presidency of 
















            










Abitan pa vle plante—abitan 
Tout abitan nan politik,—abitan 
Si yo pa plante, Pòtopwens pap manje, 
Si yo pa plante, moun lavil pap manje 
 
Peasant doesn't want to farm—peasant, 
All peasants are in politics—peasant, 
If they don't farm, Port-au-Prince won't eat 
If they don't farm, city people won't eat. 
 
–The 1968 song "Habitant" by l'Orchestre Tropicana d’Haiti 
 
 During the brutal Duvalier years, the peasant Hermain Étienne lived and farmed in the 
southern Haitian coastal region of Grand Goâve. One day in 1963, Étienne was arrested by a 
local chef de section (rural police chief) and detained against his will in Grand Goâve’s military 
barracks.  The chefs de section and rural police formed the lowest rung of the national military 
that the U.S. installed years ago during its occupation of Haiti (1915-1934). In those days, U.S. 
forces established a military-rural police structure to suppress peasant traditions of popular 
insurrection. After the U.S. withdrew from Haiti, peasants continued to experience decades of 
violent repression, abuse, and arbitrary arrests at the hands of Haitian soldiers and police chefs.  
However, by the time of Étienne’s arrest, the populist dictator François Duvalier was in power 
and his regime, though brutally repressive, espoused a pro-peasant ideology that promised 
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political equality and fair justice for ostracized peasants.  Étienne took the regime’s words 
seriously and sent a letter of complaint to the leading general of the Haitian army regarding his 
treatment by one of Grand Goâve’s abusive chefs.  The letter drew from Duvalier’s pro-peasant 
populist discourse to compel the regime to keep up with its words.  
 "You know better than I that the Duvalieriste Revolution was made in the Interest of the 
mass peasantry," wrote Étienne. He went on, "this revolution continues and will continue until 
something good happens for the eternally crushed of the backcountry."  Étienne was pointing out 
that police practices of abuse against peasants were antithetical to Duvalier's pro-peasant 
populism.  And yet, “Monsieur le Général voila, how peasants of this place are treated.”  Étienne 
demanded, “an inquiry made to make Justice to whom Justice is due.” Étienne’s request for 
justice was delayed. Yet after various peasants from Goâve made other complaints to military 
headquarters, the local chef de section was eventually discharged from the rural police.1  
  Étienne’s letter in many ways contradicts the predominant view in scholarship that has 
imagined peasants as a class that steered clear of politics in fear of brutal repression under the 
Duvalier regime. For far too long, the Duvalier regime and Haiti have been racialized and 
exoticized in ways that portray the period as a moment in which an extraordinarily autocratic 
black government ruled over nonpolitical, non-literate, passive, and poor black subjects. Richard 
Turits, a historian of the Caribbean, points out, "such depictions, however, suspiciously 
reproduce a long European tradition of projecting the most extreme forms of political despotism 
and otherness onto non-Western societies and imagining beyond the edges of the European 
universe passive or irrational peoples who mysteriously accept intolerable regimes."2  Instead, 
                                                
1 Cultivateur Duvalieriste Hermain Étienne to Chef d’Etat Major, 28 August 1963 in the police dossier of Rinvil 
2 Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in the Dominican 
History (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 4. 
            
             
 3 
Étienne's passionate letter captures the political literacy and volition of peasants striving to turn 
Duvalier's pro-peasant ideas into reality. Previously pushed to the margins of power by the U.S. 
occupation, by its native forces, and by subsequent Haitian governments, Étienne (who signed 
the letter as a "Duvalieriste cultivator") and other peasants supported the Duvalier regime with 
the expectation that they would be finally reintegrated into national politics. Indeed, the Duvalier 
government would carry out various populist programs to win the hearts and minds of the rural 
masses. Duvalier's populist project, however, eventually placed peasants in a morally ambiguous 
position that required them to violently defend the regime from political attacks in exchange for 
the recognition of their rights and access to political power.  
 Duvalier’s most significant populist project included the creation of a violent militia 
infamously known as the tonton makouts.  This dissertation reveals that Duvalier recruited 
mainly from the ostracized peasant classes to organize his dreaded makout militia.  Peasants who 
joined were not paid for their services and, therefore, enlistment was on a voluntary basis. 
Hence, the militia was officially christened Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale or Volunteers of 
National Security (VSN). Without offering any monetary rewards, Duvalier expected the militia 
to protect the position of the regime. In return, the Duvalier government recognized the rights 
and political privileges of its makout members.  
  Many ostracized peasants became makouts or regime loyalists to renegotiate their 
disempowered status.  After experiencing decades of political marginalization, many became 
attracted to the makout militia as a means to achieve self-realization in the Duvalier years.   
“Perhaps the most significant result of Duvalier's revolution,'" observed the historian David 
Nicholls, "will turn out to be the sense which was given to the mass of the peasants that they 
were really citizens and that what they did was important.” He continued, “If people are told 
            
             
 4 
often enough that they are important, they may begin to believe it."3  Many peasants bought into 
the promises of the regime and joined the makout militia to defend their individual and 
communal interests. Peasants formed the bulk of Duvalier’s unpaid militia; they were what 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot referred to as "a consenting army of volunteers…because for the first 
time they were becoming citizens––acknowledged members of the nation.”4  Thus, peasant 
motives for becoming a dreaded makout were tied to achieving self-determination in an 
oppressive and undemocratic political system.   However, state practices of denying political 
recognition to peasants and violating their sense of rights did not begin with Duvalier. Rather, 
persistent forms of undemocratic practices emerged out of U.S intervention.   
  This dissertation argues that less flexible forms of authoritarian governance, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, were not historically intrinsic to political practice in early Haitian history. 
Instead, nineteenth-century Haiti was revolutionary and egalitarian because of its martial culture. 
In the colonial period, Africans were enslaved and forcibly brought to the French colony of Saint 
Domingue to labor on coffee, indigo, and sugar plantations. In 1791, these enslaved Africans 
launched what came to be known as the Haitian Revolution that culminated in emancipation and 
national independence.  Even though early Haitian leaders betrayed the aspirations of the freed 
masses by passing laws such as vagabondage (vagrancy) and corvée that compelled them back to 
plantation labor, this dissertation reveals a portrait of everyday life in nineteenth-century Haiti 
where recurring popular revolts prevented the enforcement of these post-emancipation laws bent 
on reviving the plantation economy devastated by the Haitian Revolution. To be sure, Haitian 
                                                
3 David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1979), 237.  Elsewhere, however, Nicholls has asserted quite the contrary.  
4 Trouillot distinguishes the militia from the Tonton Makouts. He writes,  "the Haitian language distinguishes 
between a tonton makout, a member of the secret police, and a milisyen, a member of the civil militia.” See Michel-
Rolph Trouillot, Haiti, State Against Nation: Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1990), 189-190.  
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law remained undemocratic during the era of revolutions. Some scholars have mistakenly 
interpreted these laws to prove that the Haitian masses went from “revolutionary slaves to 
powerless citizens.”5  However, Haitian laws reflected state visions rather than practice. In 
reality, everyday life in nineteenth-century Haiti included recurring popular revolts that 
prevented the enforcement of post-emancipation laws and checked the authoritarian tendencies 
of the Haitian state.  
 Indeed, the rural population was well armed and participated in uprisings that kept a 
predatory and undemocratic Haitian state at bay. In fact, political rights and self-determination 
were expressed through the popular use of guns, swords, and machetes. “Constitution is paper, 
bayonet is iron” went one nineteenth-century Haitian proverb.  In Haiti: The Aftershock of 
History, the historian Laurent Dubois shows that more Haitians were armed and in the military 
than there were registered voters.6  Avoiding institutional means of power that already excluded 
them, many peasants preferred to carry iron—that is, the means to actual power. But all that 
would change in the twentieth century. In 1915, President Woodrow Wilson ordered the U.S. 
Marines to invade Haiti and suppress traditions of peasant insurrections. U.S. forces also 
imposed coercive methods of control that sowed into Haitian political culture the sinews of 
authoritarianism.  And the way that U.S. forces imposed control eerily resembled the treatment 
of blacks in the post-emancipated US South.  
 The dissertation shows how the U.S. occupation drew on domestic practices of anti-
black racial repression to suppress traditions of armed insurgency in Haiti. The occupation was 
                                                
5 See, Alex Dupuy, Revolutionary Slaves to Powerless Citizens: Essays on the Politics and Economics of 
Underdevelopment, 1804-2013 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014).   
6 By 1867, out of a population of 700,000 people, 20,000 were enlisted in the national army—and these numbers do 
not even include unofficial armed groups. Registered voters roughly numbered a meager nine hundred by 1870. See, 
Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershock of History, New York: Metropolitan Books (2012), 170. 
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led by Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller who was born into a Tidewater Virginian slave-owning 
family and was a former corporal of the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues militia, which possibly 
oversaw racial violence in Virginia from the end of Reconstruction to the beginning of Jim 
Crow.  Groomed in a southern society that viewed free black mobility as detrimental to the 
plantation economy and political stability, Waller was charged with suppressing traditions of 
insurrections that led him to confront the legacies of the Haitian Revolution.  And he did so with 
domestic views in mind that disdained the idea of armed black people. Regarding Haitians, 
Waller once remarked, “you can never trust a nigger with a gun.”7 He imagined that Haiti had 
many of them.  
 So, Waller carried out a program of social control that made Haiti look like the Jim 
Crow South.  He ordered the creation of a native centralized constabulary force and prisons 
throughout the countryside. Under Waller, these forces enforced previously dormant post-
emancipated laws such as vagrancy and corvée to extract involuntary labor from peasants and 
coerce them to build more prisons and labor camps.  U.S.-created prisons and camps detained 
thousands of insurgents and ordinary peasants who were transformed into convict laborers in 
chain gangs that were sometimes leased out. These U.S. measures functioned to control the 
population and hold still a rebellious society. Previously free, Haitian peasants under U.S. 
occupation now shared the experience of racial repression and restricted mobility with other 
freed African-descended people in the Black Atlantic.   
After the withdrawal of U.S. troops and in the post-invasion period (1934-1957), peasants 
continued to endure decades of imprisonment by the rural police who functioned under the 
authority of the national military – a direct predecessor of the U.S. created constabulary force.  In 
                                                
7 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1995), 103. 
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the same breath, the post-invasion era also produced an African-based consciousness and pro-
peasant ideologies that swept the nation. As a young intellectual during the occupation period, 
François Duvalier was inspired by these ideologies that later became the basis of his regime's 
populism and gave him the idea to rearm and remilitarize the rural population in exchange for 
their loyalty. These peasants, as we shall see, formed the bulk of Duvalier’s infamous and 
dreaded tonton makouts but was a perverse solution to the problem of freedom reinvigorated by 
the U.S. invasion.8 This dissertation is an examination of how the formation of the brutally 
repressive Duvalier dictatorship was a response to a post-emancipation crisis reinvigorated by 
U.S intervention. In reality, the regime also relied on the militia for its own designs. 
 François Duvalier and subsequently his son Jean-Claude deployed the militia to curb the 
powers of the U.S. backed Haitian military and to violently repress political opposition during 
their respective rule between 1957 and 1986. With the help of the militia, the Duvalier regime 
consolidated political power and governed brutally for almost three decades.  Traumatized by 
state terror, the Haitian populace secretly gave the militia its notorious name: tonton makout.  
The term refers to a straw-sack carrying old peasant man in rural legend that abducted wayward 
children from unsuspecting parents – a fitting name given that some Haitians heard of the 
peasant militia whisking away friends, relatives, and neighbors that were never seen again.  
Tonton makout tactics of terror made the Duvalier dictatorship one of the most repressive in 
Caribbean history. 
 Until now, there has been no extensive or empirically based historical analysis of the 
tonton makout militia.  I spent eighteen months traveling throughout the ruggedly mountainous 
and underdeveloped Haitian countryside in search of rare primary sources located in local state 
                                                
8 In his study on Jamaica, the historian Thomas Holt refers to the practice of post-emancipated societies curbing  the 
freedoms of freed people of African descent as the "problem of freedom." See Holt, The Problem of Freedom. 
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bureaus. Upon arriving at faraway destinations, I often confronted the reality that many primary 
materials were nonexistent or disfigured passed the point of legibility. Still, after attempting to 
visit as many local institutions in each geographical zone as traveling would permit, I 
collected—often by piecemeal fashion—thousands of police reports, court proceedings, 
government correspondences, and even peasant letters to the state that were fortunately 
preserved.  These primary materials illuminate the obscure local activities of tonton makouts in 
the Duvalier years.   
 I also hiked up mountains and interrupted peasants laboring in their small gardens from 
sunup to sundown so that they could share memories that some spoke nostalgically about, while 
others wanted to forget.  Nevertheless, listening to their complicated peasant memories added 
more nuanced dimensions as to how scholars have conceived of state-peasant relations during 
the Duvalier period. Traveling throughout the far reaches of the Haitian countryside, I created a 
dense evidentiary base that comprises oral histories and rural archival materials. These archival 
materials have never been utilized in prior studies of Haitian history because many scholars 
believed that they did not exist. Oral histories by rural denizens have never been collected before 
because scholars assumed that peasants were apolitical and marginalized from national politics in 
the Duvalier years. They have asserted, without much evidence, that the Duvalier regime 
dispatched small groups of makouts to suppress a nation largely comprising peasants.9  Nicholls 
sneered at such claims, “Accounts of Haiti under Duvalier as a country in which five million 
ignorant discontented and rebellious were forcibly held down by a handful of ‘cutthroats’ are the 
                                                
9 For example, Mats Lundahl wrote, “under the Duvaliers…peasants continued to be removed from political life, 
living in comparative isolation.”  Mats Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1979), 350. Robert L. Rotberg problematically states, “This attitude, if it may truly be attributed to the 
majority of Haitians—and whether it is termed an intelligent learned response (a laboratory rat avoids pressing the 
levers which produce shocks), a system-inducing coping mechanisms, submissiveness reminiscent of slavery, apathy 
produced by nutritional deficiencies, or sheer political atrophy—helps explain why Duvalier has survived so long...” 
Robert L. Rotberg, Haiti: The Politics of Squalor (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971), 365. 
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product of wishful thinking and bed-time reading rather than the conclusion of careful academic 
research.”10  
 Indeed, the research findings of this dissertation reveal that makouts were not small bands 
of “cutthroats" holding the nation hostage. Instead, oral sources reveal the dimensions of the 
tonton makouts as a vast paramilitary body that attracted tens of thousands of peasants with the 
promise of political recognition, prestige, and mobility. In the era of the makouts, as the peasant 
Adonat Touchard mentioned in an oral interview,  “everyone was chef then" (tout moun te 
chèf).11 This dissertation is a reinterpretation of the Duvalier regime and makouts that divulges 
an unconventional story of complicity which is the result of my archival trails and oral voices.   
 These primary sources also illuminate complexities of how makouts activities drove the 
power of the regime in opposing directions that simultaneously sustained and disrupted 
government control. On the one hand, makouts formed a type of social base that helped provide 
“consent” to the regime as well as repression for it.  On the other hand, makouts were involved in 
anti-state activities that protected peasants from rapacious armed tax collectors, elite groups, and 
abusive rural police agents. The social scientist Elizabeth J. Perry tells us, “militias have been 
touted as instruments of state-breaking and implements of state making.”12  Indeed, makouts 
operated at odds with the Duvalier regime and, ultimately, they helped topple it. 
 By the mid 1960s, the Duvalier regime began to move against independent militia 
activities. Most importantly, the regime appropriated ideas of community organization from 
foreign development policymakers and installed grassroots “community councils” throughout the 
nation to reorient peasants away from independent forms of makout violence. The regime 
                                                
10 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 215. 
11 Interview with Adonat Touchard in Torbeck, 2014.   
12 Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution, Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State 
(Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 6.  
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organized peasant councils to provide labor in development projects in exchange for foreign food 
dumping.  In addition, peasant councils mobilized their rural communities to solve local 
problems.  After Duvalier died in 1971, his son Jean-Claude became president and continued 
with the policy of trying to transfer makouts into the more benign peasant councils as a way to 
curb the militia’s independent activities.  Under Jean-Claude, there were also growing signs of 
rapprochement between the regime and the national military.  
 Jean-Claude actually revived government support for the demoralized national army 
whose hierarchies previously underwent frequent purges and reorganization during his father’s 
rule. However, Jean-Claude revitalized the national army while publicly denouncing makouts 
actions. State department cables disclose that the U.S. government offered to resume support for 
the regime on conditions that the regime privileged the national army over the makout militia.   
This realignment of power structures, banishing makouts to the status of voluntary peasant 
laborers and reviving the vigor of the once defunct U.S. backed military, led to the regime’s 
downfall. 
 Initially, peasant councils along with makouts followed the conservative politics of the 
regime, but they eventually began to mobilize against the Duvalier state. The regime intended to 
transfer peasant support away from makouts and into the more benign councils. Instead, makouts 
and councils fused into a political movement that overthrew the regime. In sum, this dissertation 
analyzes how the Duvalier regime created the makouts to defend its interests, but how the militia 
eventually overthrew the regime. Once again, Nicholls keenly observed, “the unintended effects 
of these projects may turn out to be more radical than their patrons have calculated."13 These 
                                                
13 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 246. 
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groups finally put their heads together (one peasant council actually morphed into an activist 
group called Tèt Ansanm) and in 1986, rose up against the regime and overthrew it. 
 Other scholars assert that economic crises and ill advised policies of the 1980s sparked 
this democratic movement, popularly referred to as the dechoukaj (uprooting). Some of these 
policies included a vast state-sponsored campaign that eliminated the native porcine population 
(the creole pig) that consequently devastated the peasant economy. However, the reason why the 
campaign was so systematic was partially because peasants and peasant-based organizations 
were lured by the regime to carry out the porcine elimination plan. In other words, peasants were 
themselves the tentacles of the state that eliminated pigs.  
 The peasant Lemanoit “Zo” Pierre of Lacoma, who was a member of the councils and 
activist group Tèt Ansanm, attempted to explain, “the Duvalier regime plotted with the U.S. 
government to kill the creole pigs… They killed many pigs.” Also participating in the interview, 
another peasant interjected, “But we Haitians are a bunch of assassins, everyone accepted (the 
pig elimination program). It was the owners that turned in their pigs.” A disagreement soon 
followed. Zo returned, “they accepted but what were they supposed to do when the state passed 
its laws, the parliament signed the law. In those times there was no democracy; it was the 
makouts that were in charge. Do you think we could say anything to them?”14 This debate 
reveals the complexities of coercion and consent that were tied the pig elimination program and 
the hegemony of the regime.  But peasants, including Zo, were part of the regime’s state-
sponsored organizations that responded to the regime's realignment and subsequently overthrew 
it.  The political scientist Theda Skocpol asserts that what makes peasants revolutionary "has not 
only grown out of capitalist agrarian commercialization. Such revolutions have emerged more 
                                                
14 Interview with Lemanoit “Zo” Pierre and another unnamed peasant, 27 November 2013, Lacoma, Jean Rabel. 
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invariably out of occasionally favorable political situations, shaped in large part by the interstate 
dynamics of the modern world-capitalist era."15  
 The 1986 peasant uprising that unseated the Duvalier regime led to democracy in Haiti, 
but the U.S. backed military disrupted the process.  Grassroots peasant organizations, which 
were rooted in the peasant councils and makouts, led the way in pushing for democratic 
representation in post-Duvalier period. Finally, in 1991, the leftist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
was democratically elected as president. However, the national military, which was secretly 
supported by the C.I.A., led a coup against Aristide and violently suppressed the grassroots 
organizations in the countryside.   When Aristide returned to power years later, the democratic 
movement in Haiti was subdued. Yet, as a signal to the efforts of past movements, Aristide 
finally abolished the U.S. created military and rural police.  
 Finally, it is worth mentioning a striking irony regarding the short-lived popular 
democracy of the post-Duvalier period; it spawned out of the regime’s repressive designs to 
organize the peasant masses into an armed citizenry for its own purposes. And yet peasants and 
makouts were behind the regime’s downfall.  This should not be surprising given the nature of 
the tense relationship between armed citizens and governments. Though often depicted as 
“thugs” and “cutthroats” in the literature, the creation of the makouts and their anti-state 
activities were the byproduct of modern state practice. Perry observes, “the concept of an armed 
citizenry, whether justified as an instrument of state power (à la Machiavelli), as a vehicle of 
class revolution (à la Marx and Lenin), or as guarantee against tyranny (à la Jefferson) has 
occupied a central place in modern political theory.” But she reminds us, “The practical 
consequences of these conceptions, however, have often strayed far from the ideals of their 
                                                
15 Theda Skocpol, "Review: What Makes Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics 14 (1982): 373.  
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proponents.”16 If not entirely absorbed into the mechanisms of power to be completely 
disciplined, armed citizens have always been dangerous to governments and ultimately proved to 
be so in the case of the Duvalier regime.
                                                
16 Perry, Patrolling the Revolution, 16. 
            











   Chapter One 
 
The Twilight of Popular Revolutions: The Suppression of Peasant Resistance during U.S. 
Occupation in Haiti (1804-1934) 
 
 “My officers and soldiers…are fighting a thief, a traitor, a convict, a renegade who wants 
to give up our customhouse to the Americans,” the rebel leader Dr. Rosalvo Bobo wrote to his 
armed followers camped in Vallières, months before the U.S. invasion. Bobo's letter warned that 
"this thief" – Haitian President Vilbrun Guillame Sam – negotiated a deal to grant the United 
States control over Haiti’s customs houses – and thus over its main revenue.1  In his efforts to 
overthrow and replace the president, Bobo rallied rebel soldiers and armed peasants that 
belonged to a northern organized insurgent group called caco2 that often toppled governments. 
Thus, Bobo hoped to mobilize a caco revolt by which reconnaissance, money, arms, and 
ammunitions were secretly circulated across the north and among rural men plotting to remove 
the sitting president. 
 However, rival forms of popular uprisings surpassed Bobo’s rebellion.  On July 28, upon 
hearing news that 162 political prisoners were executed under the president's order, a 
spontaneous street mob chased President Guillaume Sam around the capital and into the French 
                                                
1 Rosalvo Bobo to Baez Bernard, 28 May 1915, Box 5, Bobo letters in folder Caco Correspondence, Gendarmerie 
D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
2 Historians argue that the word caco derived from the name of a fierce bird called Taco in Haitian Kréyòl. Caco in 
Spanish and Latin means "thief." Given that caco insurgents operated near the Dominican border, the label may also 
have a Spanish etymology. In Hinche, a town near the Dominican border, the term still means  "thief." Interview 
with Bazelais Jean Baptiste, March 2010. 
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embassy where he fell victim to popular justice.  “It has reached me that Vilbrun Guillaume was 
killed in Port-au-Prince. I have written for confirmation on the news,” wrote a surprised Bobo to 
his caco followers a day after the president's death.3  The execution of a Haitian president by a 
spontaneous mob indicated that popular insurrections were overwhelming the Haitian state, 
splintering its monopoly over force.  Even political elites affiliated with the insurgent culture, 
including Bobo who held degrees from Paris and London, could not control the whirlwind of 
popular uprisings and only hoped to capitalize on its results. Bobo desperately wrote to cacos, 
"spread the news... act without delay."4 A power-losing elite was just one measure of how 
popular sovereignty prevailed in Haiti. This was the case because recurring popular uprisings 
convulsed the Haitian state and sometimes consumed political elites that included President 
Guillaume Sam.  But on the day of the president's death, the United States Marines invaded and 
occupied Haiti not only to squelch Bobo's political ambitions, but also to suppress egalitarian 
traditions of popular revolts that was rooted in the legacies of the Haitian Revolution.  
 The U.S. built and led a native constabulary force that disarmed and demobilized the 
rural population.  Without their weapons and insurgent culture of mobilization, peasants became 
vulnerable to state repression that continued after U.S. troops withdrew from Haiti.  Although 
scholarship overemphasizes the role of a U.S.-created army sustaining authoritarianism in 
Caribbean countries, this chapter rather suggests that the process of disempowering the 
population was also significant to the consolidation of state power and authoritarianism in Haiti. 
In other words, U.S. intervention and its native army liberated the Haitian state and political 
                                                
3 Rosalvo Bobo to General Octavien Pierre and Baptiste Renair, 29 July 1915, Box 5, Bobo letters in folder Caco 
Correspondence, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
4 Ibid. 
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elites from the constraints placed upon them by popular uprisings.  The suppression of armed 
popular sovereignty was a function of making authoritarianism in Haiti during the occupation. 
 Before the U.S. invasion, Haiti was a revolutionary nation where former enslaved 
Africans and their descendants revolted to protect their ideas of freedom. The nation of Haiti 
emerged out of the ashes of a successful slave revolution and experienced, thereafter, recurring 
popular revolts throughout its nineteenth century existence.  “When a country has secured its 
liberation by armed struggle,” the historian David Nicholls remarked about early Haiti, “a 
tradition of violence frequently persists into the independence period.”5  Between 1791-1804, 
enslaved people of African descent rose up and led a transformative revolt in the French colony 
of Saint Domingue that culminated in emancipation and in national independence. Now free 
from slavery and colonialism, rebel leaders named their independent nation, Haiti, which was the 
island’s original designation given to the land by its decimated indigenous inhabitants.  Thus, the 
war of independence and the naming of Haiti were revolutionary acts of freedom and redemption 
for those brutalized by European colonization and enslavement. And the traditions of revolt 
continued into the independence period.  
 Even when early Haitian leaders attempted to pass laws such as vagabondage (vagrancy) 
and corvée that compelled the freed population back to harsh plantation labor, the freed 
population participated in popular revolts that weakened the state and thwarted elite visions to 
restore a plantation economy based on involuntary labor.  In a twist of fate, the revolutionary 
wars of the nineteenth century helped former enslaved Africans and their descendants build a 
peasant society that countered the plantation model envisioned by Haitian elites. And finally, by 
the late nineteenth century, elites conceded to small farming as the prevailing form of economic 
                                                
5 David Nicholls, Haiti in the Caribbean Context: Ethnicity, Economy, and Revolt (London: Macmillan, 1985), 170. 
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production established by popular insurrections. Put simply, the freed masses succeeded over 
time in planting their aspirations.   
 Drawing upon historical materials at the Haitian National Archives that have never been 
utilized in a study until now, we can see how elites changed their tune about independent 
farming labor. On 1 May 1888 during national holiday of Agriculture Day, for example, the 
Torbeck magistrate declared to peasants that they were “dignified citizen cultivators” who should 
continue “to give yourself courage to the cultivation of the land of your fortune and… definitely 
the object of the abolition of slavery.”6  In the northern region of Pilate, the local magistrate 
chose to celebrate Agriculture Day by crowning peasants Linpha Telfort, Oslin Ratis, Asilien 
Jean, Dosous Louis, Presimé Bastien, Botexte Fils, Lexandre Jean, and Metellus Hisidor for their 
exceptional hard work as independent small farmers.7  Imagine, the previously outlawed practice 
of small farming was now worth a crown! This was the free world that revolutions and revolts 
made in nineteenth-century Haiti and was itself an unprecedented feat in the Black Atlantic.  
 Perhaps the African American intellectual W.E.B. Du Bois, who was also of Haitian 
descent, had this in mind when he asserted that Haiti was inhabited by “the happiest and most 
contented peasantry in the world, after raising…from a veritable hell of slavery.”8  To be sure, as 
this chapter will demonstrate, an armed society was not without problems. Peasants complained 
about vigilantism, banditry, and other forms of popular violence that were linked to an armed 
and insurrectional society. Du Bois still had a point though maybe beyond his civic taste. Indeed, 
Haiti was dangerously egalitarian, but peasants enjoyed the freedom of mobility and independent 
labor.  
                                                
6 Le Magistral Communal de Torbeck to Secrétaire l'État, l'Intérieur, 7 May 1888, in folder 13235, Archives 
Nationales d’Haiti, Port-au-Prince.    
7 Pilate, Le Conseil Communal de cette Commune to Secrétaire l'État, l'Intérieur,13236, ANH, PauP 
8 W.E.B. Dubois, The Negro (New York: Cosmo Inc., 2010 but originally published in 1915), 106. 
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 Meanwhile, other people of African descent all across the Americas were repressed by 
post-emancipation laws bent on denying them freedom. In post-emancipated Cuba,9 Brazil, 
Jamaica, and the United States, African-descended people were menaced by vagrancy laws, 
jailing, or harsh police tactics that served to limit their mobility and reattach them to plantation 
labor.10  In nineteenth-century Haiti, on the other hand, traditions of popular revolt arguably 
fostered one of the freest post-emancipated societies (including the neighboring Dominican 
Republic) for black peasants. But all would change in the twentieth century during U.S. 
intervention.  In 1915, hours after President Guillaume Sam was violently deposed and murdered 
by popular revolt, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson ordered the U.S. Marines to occupy Haiti and 
suppress popular traditions of insurrections. U.S. forces would imposed coercive methods of 
control that sowed into Haitian political culture the sinews of unrestricted authoritarianism.  And 
                                                
9 Rebecca Scott discusses vagrancy in her book on Cuban slave and post-emancipation society. She shows us that 
Cuban planters contemplated employing vagrancy laws to compel former Afro-Cubans back to plantation labor. 
However, she shows us, “In the end, no comprehensive plan for the repression of vagrancy was developed.” This 
still shows us that vagrancy, as the preferred law to control black labor, was part of a global trend in post-
emancipated societies.  Rebecca Scott, Slave Emancipation in Cuba: The Transition to Free Labor, 1860-1899 
(Pennsylvania: The University of Pittsburg Press, 1985), 219-222. 
10 All across the Atlantic, post-emancipated laws restricted black mobility through the enforcement of vagrancy laws 
and incarceration. Scholars on the African American studies have been pushing the field of history to consider 
incarceration as the replacement of slavery. See, Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, 
Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010). On U.S. South 
vagrancy, see David Oshinsky, Worse Than Slavery: Parchman Farm and Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (New York: 
Free Press Paperbacks, 1996), 21-33, and 74-78. On a compressive study on convict leasing of African American 
women in the south, see Talitha L. Leflouria, Chained in Silence: Black Women and Convict Labor in the New 
South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina University Press, 2015).  The topic of vagrancy law as a legal 
tool to restrict the mobility and independence of freed blacks has also been covered in some studies on the 
Caribbean and Latin America. On Brazil, see Martha Knisely Huggins, From Slavery to Vagrancy in Brazil: Crime 
and Social Control in the Third World (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1984). On Cuba, see the above 
note. On vagrancy in post-emancipated Jamaica, see Thomas Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and 
Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1992), 218. African-descended 
people in the Dominican Republic experienced freedom equivalent to Haitians in the nineteenth century. However 
when the U.S. invaded in 1916, vagrancy laws were promulgated in the Dominican Republic "but it was strictly 
enforced for the first time [years later] by the Trujillo state." See Richard Lee Turits, Foundations of Despotism: 
Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and Modernity in the Dominican History (California: Stanford University Press, 
2003), 92-93. 
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they did so by utilizing penal forms of control in Haiti that eerily resembled the treatment of 
blacks in the post-emancipated U.S. South.  
 As the U.S. occupation was underway in Haiti, African Americans living in the United 
States were disproportionately arrested at high rates; starting in the late nineteenth-century blacks 
constituted 30% of the prison population, while only making up 12% of the general population.11  
The U.S. legal system enforced minor laws such as vagrancy to target African Americans for 
arrest and, when convicted, forced them to perform unfree labor. Discriminately jailing blacks 
(alongside racial segregation) was a practice of U.S. racism or what we have come to know as 
Jim Crow.  These racialized practices of control were likely incorporated into U.S. imperial 
projects in the Pacific and Caribbean and functioned as tools to discipline and control occupied 
subject populations of non-European descent.   
 Drawing upon never-before-used legal records hidden in small courts scattered 
throughout the Haitian countryside and combining them with rare military reports from the U.S. 
National Archives, this essay demonstrates how U.S. intervention in Haiti actually looked like 
the penal side of U.S. Jim Crow.  Beginning in 1916, after seizing constitutional control and 
handpicking the Haitian president, U.S. forces decreed the creation of a centralized constabulary 
force and the construction of prisons throughout the countryside.  These U.S.-led forces revived 
the practice of enforcing previously dormant post-emancipated laws such as vagabondage 
(vagrancy) and corvée to extract involuntary labor from Haitian peasants, coercing them to build 
more prisons and labor camps.  U.S.-created prisons and prison camps that detained thousands of 
insurgents and ordinary peasants who were transformed into convict laborers in chain gangs.  
Similarly to the racist practices in the U.S., some Haitian peasants performed labor on prison 
                                                
11 Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness, 3-4. 
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farms. U.S. intervention, thus, amounted to post-emancipation crisis that peasants spent the 
previous century fighting off.  
 Under occupation, however, many peasants were getting locked up in the same fashion 
as blacks in the U.S. – so much so that rumors were generated among the U.S. public that 
Washington deliberately recruited southern soldiers to impose a Jim Crow-style government in 
Haiti.  Cries of "slavery in Haiti" circulated in the U.S. press.12  Not necessarily hyperbole, the 
invocation of slavery in the U.S. press was meant to point out that the occupation resembled the 
post-emancipation crisis in the U.S. South. Instead of allowing U.S. blacks to be freely mobile 
and select their own forms of labor after emancipation, southern states enacted and enforced laws 
that criminalized these freedoms. The U.S. press witnessed the same phenomenon in occupied 
Haiti that conjured up in their minds the horrors of slavery and its afterlife.  
 Haitian peasants felt the same way. U.S. repressive measures reminded many Haitians of 
enslavement. After defeating French colonialism and slavery to live a life of freedom, Haitians 
were once more confronted with a colonial power led by the U.S. that sought to impose unfree 
labor and racial repression.  Facing these atrocities, over forty thousand Haitians fled the 
country, while many others turned to traditions of armed resistance to fight back.  During later 
Senate hearings, U.S. officers testified that “bandits” numbered 2,000 strong, but newly 
discovered U.S. intelligence reports divulge that close to one hundred thousand peasants actually 
surrendered. Ultimately, U.S. soldiers violently put down the armed struggle and continued with 
practices of forced labor and jailing as methods of social control, which, in turn, disarmed 
peasants and eliminated rural traditions of organized insurgencies that had previously checked 
state power.  
                                                
12 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1995), 111. 
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 In the remaking of authoritarianism in occupied Haiti, the role the U.S. played in 
weakening popular sovereignty was as equally important to building a native army beholden to 
the central government and U.S. interest.  Yet much scholarly attention has been given to the 
army as the main component of authoritarianism, while ignoring the process of popular 
disarmament as also a function of making authoritarianism. As this chapter will show, however, 
the population previously played a major role in restraining the authoritarian tendencies of the 
Haitian state. But U.S. invasion liberated the state from the menace of popular sovereignty. Thus, 
twentieth-century Haitian authoritarianism was the result of U.S. intervention that employed 
post-emancipated methods of control to eliminate traditions of popular resistance. And these 
defiant traditions were rooted in the legacies of Haitian Revolution. 
A Nation of Peasant Generals 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, revolutionary wars in Haiti forged a militaristic 
society where insurrections checked state power and created pathways to freedom and status. 
The origins of popular rebellion date back to the 1791-1804 Haitian Revolution during which 
enslaved Africans successfully revolted and achieved emancipation and independence from 
France.  Haiti was the first black republic in the Atlantic and the first nation in the world to be 
the result of slave revolt.  The Haitian Revolution not only produced an exceptional case of black 
national sovereignty, but also a special situation in which a cadre of Haitian generals, who were 
formerly enslaved, governed a freed population accustomed to fighting for freedom.13  For 
instance, Haiti's first two heads of state, Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henri Christophe, were 
formerly enslaved but became generals during the Haitian Revolution. The path from slave to 
                                                
13 Johnhenry Gonzalez, "Defiant Haiti: Free-Soil Runaways, Ship Seizures and the Politics of Diplomatic Non-
Recognition in the Early Nineteenth Century," Slavery & Abolition: A Journal of Slave and Post Slave Studies 36, 
no. 1 (2014): 3-4. 
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general eventually became the aspiration of the masses in a society born out of wide-scale 
revolutionary war.  Decades later, thousands upon thousands of Haitians would claim the status 
of general.  Yet in the early period of independence, only a selected few were generals. And 
initially, the freed masses looked for direction from these revolutionary generals who bestowed 
upon them dialectics of paternalistic affection and proto-forms of black consciousness.   
 Because they also experienced the system of slavery, many early leader-generals 
bemoaned how the freed masses previously suffered under the conditions of slavery. They often 
affectively referred to the masses as “malheureux” or unfortunate.14  Leaders insisted that 
national independence would bring freedom to the malheureux who were largely people of 
African descent that were long identified as “noire” or “black” in the colonial period.  In order to 
elevate the category of blackness from its previous colonial status as an indicator of racial 
inferiority that was once unworthy of citizenship in a modern nation, the first constitution in 
1805 went a different route and decreed that Haitians would “henceforth only be known 
generically as blacks.”15 To be sure, the category “black” was not racially exclusionary and, in 
fact, included people of mixed-race backgrounds and even whites that, after fighting on the side 
of enslaved rebels during the Haitian revolution, continued to reside in Haiti.  Nonetheless, by 
making it law so that all citizens must be considered black, the early state was attempting to give 
political recognition to the freed black masses and assert that they, too, were worthy of 
citizenship in an Atlantic world that continued to mark black bodies as living commodities that 
should be merely driven to agonizing labor.  Nonetheless, while espousing a discourse of 
paternalistic empathy and racial solidarity toward the freed population, many early leaders went 
                                                
14 Jean Alix René, “Le Culte de l’égalité: Une Exploration du processus de formation de l’État et de la politique 
populaire en Haiti au cours de la première moitiés du dix-neuvième siècle, 1804-1846” (PhD diss., University of 
Concordia), 53, 65, 72, and 82. 
15 Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012), 43. 
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against principles of freedom conceived by the masses and sought to employ forms of 
involuntary labor to rebuild the plantations that had been ruined by the revolutionary war.  Put 
simply, Haitian leaders endeavored to revive the plantation economy with forced labor. 
 In so doing, Emperor Dessalines (1804-1806), King Christophe (1807-1820), and 
President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-1843) devised policies to divide Haitian society into mainly 
two halves: a military caste that benefited from plantation economy and cultivateurs who 
provided the bulk of labor. Generals became large landowners; low ranking soldiers policed 
plantations; and the non-military population was pushed into the status of cultivateurs or laborers 
forced to work on plantations owned by the military elite.16  Although lamented as malheureux, 
the military elite saw the freed population as cultivateurs who performed plantation labor that 
eerily resembled their earlier colonial status as enslaved laborers.  For example, cultivateurs 
were legally prohibited from leaving plantations to which they were assigned.  If so, the so-
called malheureux would be arrested, according to early Haitian laws, as vagrants – “sans aveu” 
or “divagants” under the rule of Dessalines and Christophe; and as “vagabond” under Boyer.17  
However, elite attempts to stratify society and enforce labor laws ultimately failed for two 
important reasons. 
 First, state labor policies had a gender problem that generated resistance.  The Haitian 
Revolution had decimated the population in ways that left a larger proportion of women who 
survived the revolutionary war than men by the time of independence.  Many of the remaining 
men were conscripted into the national army. Thus, a high number of women were forced into 
                                                
16 The first head of state and Emperor Jean-Jacques Dessalines decreed half of a plantation to lieutenants, one full 
plantation to captains, two plantations to battalion chiefs, three plantations to colonels, and five plantations to 
generals. See Jean Alix René, “Le Culte de l’égalité: Une Exploration du processus de formation de l’État et de la 
politique populaire en Haiti au cours de la première moitiés du dix-neuvième siècle, 1804-1846” (PhD diss., 
University of Concordia), 110. 
17 René, “Le Culte de l’égalité,” 103-104. 
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the status of cultivateur. One contemporary French traveler observed, "the men forming the 
lesser part, the land was generally cultivated by women."  Some of these women tried to escape 
forced labor by deploying various strategies.  Many attempted to enter the profession of 
marketing or machann (Fr: marchande) that disqualified them as cultivateurs and allowed them 
to escape plantations.  Dessalines, however, passed a law in 20 January 1804 that required a 
license for commercial vendors making it difficult for women to mask themselves as market 
women as a way to escape the status of cultivateur. Other women attempted to marry themselves 
out of forced labor, but Dessalines and Christophe sent out directives to military officers 
discouraging them to wed women “cultivatrice” because conjugal acts of resistance released 
women from labor obligations.  In 1805, Christophe, who was at that juncture a leading general 
in Dessalines’s government, chastised an officer asking whether soldiers could marry women 
laborers, "Did you consider, monsieur, that if we permitted for soldiers...to marry plantation 
cultivatrices that would kill agriculture, and I am surprised that you asked me this."18 But women 
laborers continued to strike up intimate relationships and form kin ties with soldiers and generals 
that disrupted the designs of political leaders to revive a plantation economy.  
 The second point to consider was the following:  the early Haitian state devised a 
contradictory policy of nationwide conscription that militated against efforts to compel labor.  
Haitian leaders, in fear of European recolonization, continuously armed and conscripted the very 
tiny number of male cultivateurs it forced to labor.19  The economist Mats Lundahl estimated 
that "between one-tenth of the male population and one-tenth of the total population" constituted 
                                                
18 Rene, 120 and 122. 
19 In 1818, for example, the Haitian government decreed that all male plantation laborers must be conscripted into 
the national guard, but eight years later enacted vagrancy laws to restrict the mobility of these laborers to 
plantations. René, “Le Culte de l’égalité, 103-104, and 122. 
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the national military under Dessalines' rule.20  Militarizing society was good policy in terms of 
thwarting European designs to recolonize Haiti; in 1826 the British consul Charles Mackenzie 
admitted, “I am disposed to think that no invading European force can ever succeed in 
conquering Haiti.”21 However, the state’s policy of arming cultivateurs and the population 
created an over-militarized male society that entrusted them to police the labor of their male and 
women kinfolk who were all pushed into the disadvantaged status of cultivateurs. These 
contradictions were the result of the Haitian state overlooking the reality of kin ties and solidarity 
as it scrambled to revive the plantation economy along gender lines.  With only elite-based ideas 
of national duty in mind, the Haitian state commanded the army to ensure the function of 
plantation labor.  
 Yet for ordinary Haitians, nationalism was not merely the product of state declaration and 
discourse but also had a morally-based aspect that was forged by the experience of enslaved 
Africans fighting side-by-side in the Haitian Revolution for a common cause: their freedom. The 
Haitian state could not cut through this war-tested solidarity of their so-called malheureux. 
Rather, political leaders confronted unified forms of popular resistance from soldiers and 
cultivateurs alike. For example, soldiers, without authorization, brought non-militarized male 
cultivateurs into the army to avoid plantation work. In response, Christophe passed decrees that 
outlawed unauthorized enlistment of cultivateurs into the army that liberated them from forced 
work. But it was the Haitian state that originally created this dangerous precedent with its 
policies of mass conscription.  
 In no time, soldiers and laborers bonded together to run away and revolt.  Christophe 
received a report on 30 January 1805 that showed how, rather than perform military duties which 
                                                
20 Mats Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 375.   
21 Nicholls cites Mackenzie’s correspondence. Nicholls, Haiti in the Caribbean Context, 171 and 259 n16 
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included enforce vagrancy laws, “there is an infinity of soldiers and cultivateurs who found 
refuge in l’Isle de Mancenille, to remove [themselves] from service and work.”  Mancenille was 
previously a hiding place for enslaved rebels during the Haitian Revolution.   Under 
independence, Haitian soldiers were returning to slave hideouts to resist the Haitian state.  
Hiding in the northern chain of mountains between the regions of Dondon and Vallières, also a 
former slave hideaway, were “thirty deserted soldiers,” learned Christophe.22  In the fall, 
Christophe was dealing with a soldier-cultivateur revolt in the mountains of Vallières.  A century 
later peasant insurgents would continue to find refuge in Vallières – as peasant insurgents did 
during the popular rebellion that eventually led to the death of President Guillaume Sam and was 
followed by U.S. invasion.  These traditions of organized popular revolt began in the Haitian 
Revolution, continued throughout the nineteenth century, and confronted twentieth-century U.S. 
imperialism during the occupation. U.S. forces would revive post-emancipated laws to combat 
popular traditions of revolt that, up until then, thwarted state plans of compelling labor.  Before 
the U.S. invasion, however, peasants were successful in keeping the state at bay by taking over 
the military as an institution of national security and transforming it into an organization of 
popular insurgency.  
The military became an autonomous umbrella network that organized soldiers and 
cultivateurs for uprisings against the state. Indeed, the lines between the special status of soldier 
and an armed cultivateur became blurred and armed insurrections continued to be the medium 
for achieving freedom during the independence period. Together, they embroiled themselves in 
the many insurrections and civil wars that erupted in the early period.  These wars weakened the 
Haitian state and its hopes for reviving a plantation economy were never fully realized.  Instead, 
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over time, ordinary soldiers and cultivateurs moved towards self-sufficient small farming and 
participated in recurring revolutions to improve their political and economic status.  Above all, 
arms and warfare would be associated with freedom that brought down governments seeking to 
revive the plantation economy and forced labor. 
 Dessalines, Christophe, and Boyer along with their post-emancipation plans had all 
succumbed to popular revolts comprising the admixture of soldiers and cultivateurs. However, 
President Alexandre Pétion, who remained the only early Haitian leader-general to live out his 
rule without losing power to popular revolts, declared in a speech, “May the weapons given to 
the people for them to defend their liberty be turned against my own breast if ever I conceive of 
the impious and audacious idea of attacking their rights.”23 The guns of his followers never 
uprooted Pétion because he eventually pursued a policy of breaking up plantations and 
redistributing land to soldiers who constituted Haiti’s first official peasantry.  While Dessalines 
was assassinated during a revolt and Christophe took his own life as rebels marched upon his 
palace, Pétion died peacefully in his sleep in 1818 after a long reign because he gave credence to 
what Haiti would become – a free nation of armed black peasants. 
Leaving behind elite dreams of reviving the plantation economy based on forced labor, 
Haiti transmogrified into a peasant society in which rural men sought a career in farming and war 
against undemocratic governments to obtain status.  To be sure, women also took part in revolts; 
during the insurrection against Boyer in the 1840s, women were reported to have “dragged two 
large cannons” into the battlefield and blasted away thirty soldiers.24 However equally brave on 
the warpath, women were not legally allowed to join the military. Such gender restrictions made 
                                                
23 Dubois, 57. 
24 Mimi Sheller, Citizenship from Below: Erotic Agency and Caribbean Freedom (Durham: Duke University Press, 
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Haiti a martial society where only men would directly benefit materially from membership in the 
military and warfare. In fact, all Haitian men were soldiers and the law of the land prescribed 
them as so. "No person is worthy of being a Haitian who is not a good father, a good son, a good 
husband, and especially a good soldier," read an article in the first Haitian constitution.25  
Nonetheless, only non-conscripted soldiers enjoyed a set of privileges that initially included 
exemption from forced plantation labor but soldiers eventually expected military benefits.  
As the plantation economy fell apart in the middle of the nineteenth-century, the status of 
non-conscripted soldiers became defined by access to military benefits that strengthened the 
economic and social standing of rural men enlisted in the military.  Non-conscripted soldiers 
were promised salaries, land, free medical care, emergency financial assistance, and pensions.26  
                                                
25 Most of the soldiery, as was the case of Haitian society, comprised peasants including generals, noncommissioned 
officers, and the rank-and-file. By the mid nineteenth century, the military offered smallholding soldiers an 
opportunity to become mid-sized-owners. On early state land redistribution, see Gonzalez, “The War on Sugar,” 
134-136. 
26Ongoing research shows that a large portion of state revenues went to the social welfare of its peasant soldiery. 
"The 1848 budget indicates that almost 65 percent of total government expenditures went to the army (almost ten 
times as much as to justice, education and public worship together), to which had to be added the funds for the 
police. The next year, the figure lay around 55 percent.” Mats Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 377-379.  In the 1840s, colonels were to receive a monthly payment of 100 
gourdes; chefs de bataillon, 50gdes; Capitaines Adjudants-Majors, 32gdes; Capitaine Quartier-Maitre, 32gdes; 
Officier de santé de 3e.classe, 20gdes; Capitaines, 32gdes; Lieutenants, 24gdes; Sous-Lieutenants, 18gdes; 
Adjudants-Sous -Officiers, 10gdes; Tambour et Fifre Majors, Sergent-Major de musique; Sergent-Major des 
compagnies, 8gdes; Tambour et Fifre Maitres, 6gdes; Fourriers, 5gdes; and Caporaux, 5gdes. Rank-and-file 
constituted the less fortunate: “Soldats, 4gdes and Fifres et Tambours, 4gdes.” See, 25.e Régiment d’infanterie, 27 
March 1942, folder 13400, Guerre et Marine, ANH, PauP.  As early as the Boyer period, sources reveal that the 
government was responsible for the medical care of its soldiery. On medical vouchers, see “Etat Des Malades 
Existant ce jour à L’Hôpital Militaire de cette Ville,” 28 November 1828, folder 10884, Guerre et Marine; “Feuille 
de revue de soldate du aux officiers, sous officiers et ouvriers du Génie militaire, D’après la revue passer ce jour,” 
13 May 1849, folder 10694, Guerre et Marine, ANH, PauP. The state provided emergency assistance. Take for 
example how on 12 September 1871 when a general wrote a letter to military headquarters on behalf of the local 
commander of Cavallion. Evicted and lodged in a small-dilapidated office, the commander of Cavallion, in 1871 
found two offers where he could stay “but the owners demand a price that he cannot pay without the aid of the 
Government.” See, St. Jean Scifunion to Secretary State of the Department of War etc., 12 September 1871, 12926, 
Guerre et Marine, Archives Nationales Haiti (ANH), Port-au-Prince (PauP). By the late nineteenth century, we can 
see that soldiers still wrote to the department of war when they did not get these benefits.  On 19 August 1886, ill 
soldier Jérôme Dupaux pleaded to consider “my state of sickness and make for me what demands la justice et 
humanité,” wanting harder currency due to the fact that the medical doctor refused to accept his state voucher as a 
form of payment. Jérôme Dupaux to Secretary of War, 19 August 1886, folder 10694, Guerre et Marine, ANH, 
PauP. 
            
             
 31 
These benefits were not always forthcoming, but remained expected entitlements for the core 
soldiery.27   
Thus, the military functioned not only as an agency of insurgency but also one that 
vowed to provide social services to its vast male members.  As late as the mid-nineteenth 
century, the military was populous and comprised twenty thousand men in a nation of about 
seven hundred thousand people.28  Lundalh states, "The size of the army was double that of 
Great Britain and most other European nations calculated on a per capita basis."29   With such a 
large core soldiery, the military consumed sixty-five percent of state expenditures.30  In other 
words, the state subsidized the livelihood of thousands of soldiers who were peasants.  In fact, 
the nineteenth-century military was likely the most generous and expansive welfare institution in 
Haiti with nothing comparable to it in Haitian history after it was abolished during U.S. 
intervention. Lacking access to such state benefits otherwise, many male peasants decided to join 
the military as non-conscripted soldiers to receive official benefits to climb the social ladder.  
These military benefits created a comfortable middle class of former enslaved Africans 
and their peasant descendants. Some of Haiti’s famous later bourgeoisie writers, for example, 
were beneficiaries of military wealth.  Jean-Price Mars, who was later recognized as the founder 
of negritude, never joined the military but his education was subsidized by relatives in the 
military: these were generals and later presidents, Tirésias Simon Sam and Vilbrun Guillame 
Sam.31 We know President Guillaume Sam for the violent death he suffered by popular revolt 
that was followed by U.S. invasion, but it is noteworthy to mention that he also came to power 
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30 Lundahl, 377. 
31 Magdeline W. Shannon, Jean-Price Mars, the Haitian Elites and the American Occupation, 1915-35, (London: 
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through popular insurrection.  He was merely following the path of warfare and success carved 
out by nineteenth-century peasant insurgents that utilized their status in the military to participate 
in popular revolts to climb up the social ladder. 
                                           
Figure 1. The Young Jean Price-Mars. This image was taken prior to the U.S. intervention. It 
shows a young Price-Mars in military regalia sporting a saber. Although never officially enlisted in 
the national military, Price-Mars had familial ties to military officers and clearly associated himself 
with the militaristic culture of Haiti  
          ****** 
Many started the journey to power as humble small-farming soldiers.  Participating in 
popular revolts enabled them to become military officers and more. Throughout the nineteenth 
century, insurrections and revolutions occurred frequently and offered opportunities for ordinary 
soldiers to climb the military hierarchy. To seize power in the capital, political elites recruited 
ordinary soldiers to stir revolt, and elites promised these soldiers elevation in ranks if the 
insurrection was successful.  On the other hand, the Haitian state also recruited civilian peasants 
and soldiers to defend the status quo, with promises to distribute military rank.  The more 
revolutions fought, the more peasant soldiers were promoted to officer positions.  In 1867, 
President Nissage Saget quipped, "the only thing left to do is issue a decree making everyone 
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general.”32 Haiti became full of them. This reality was captured in the title of a sensationalized 
French travelogue about Haiti: A Nation of Generals.33   
By the late nineteenth-century, those soldiers who were not promoted complained to the 
Department of War. On 15 June 1885, the soldier Siméon Algraidre (Alfred?) wrote to superiors: 
“I come very respectable to solicit your good sincerity an officer position, I served the Homeland 
since a man but in the revolutions I gained nothing.”34 This was not an unreasonable request 
given the frequency of military promotions through revolutions. They occurred so frequently that 
Haitian officers made up almost one half of an already oversized army. And many obtained their 
post by participating in insurrections. Thus, peasant ambitions to rise up the military hierarchy 
helped fuel the recurring revolutions that brought down more than a dozen governments. To be 
sure, revolutions destabilized national politics. But revolutions also created one of the few 
mechanisms that facilitated social mobility in a nation where access to opportunities were quite 
limited.35  Indeed, insurrections expanded the material conditions of formerly enslaved Haitians 
and their peasant descendants. Soldiers and officers participated in insurrections for material 
rewards that propelled them from their status as smallholders into the rural middle class.  
In other words, years of popular revolutions turned cultivateurs soldiers into mid-sized 
landowning military officers. Some political leaders offered hard cash and land to rebel soldiers 
and cultivateurs. When President Sylvaine Salnave was overthrown by an uprising, for example, 
the succeeding government decreed that land and money would be distributed to the participants 
                                                
32Alain Turnier, Avec Mérisier Jeannis: Une tranche de vie jacmélienne et nationale (Port-au-Prince: Le Natal, 
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33 Turnier, Avec Merisier Jeannis, 20. 
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of the insurrection.36 Lacking revenue, however, the state mostly distributed land because it was 
the largest landowner in Haiti.  And by the middle of the century, the Haitian state no longer 
gave out large estates as it once did, but rather distributed mid-sized plots to officers.  On 18 
June 1896, the second in military command of the mountaintop town of Plaisance, Victor 
Thomy, could only: "pray you accord me this five carreaux [approx. fifteen acres] of land 
promised by the Government.” Though a general, Thomy wrote that he was a “malheureux” that 
deserved a land grant from the government since he served his “country faithfully.”37  Indeed, 
the Haitian army was an organization of armed malheureux searching to better their material 
lives. And even when they did, peasants who became mid-sized landowning generals continued 
to see themselves as malheureux cultivateurs and lived in peasant communities.  Thus these 
officers belonged to an expanding stratum of mid-sized landowners [or habitant propriétaire] 
that still saw themselves as part of the peasant masses. Put simply they were peasant generals.   
By the mid to late nineteenth-century, the position of a military officer was not a status 
that produced a large-landowning military elite that commanded involuntary labor of 
cultivateurs. Many generals were merely malheureux but with substantial land and status.  And 
even though owning more land than ordinary peasants, many officers labored on their farms 
side-by-side with the malheureux. This was case because officers had limited options to compel 
labor within a sufficiently armed society that prevented the enforcement of defunct post-
emancipation laws.38  Instead, officers came up with morally based methods to extract labor from 
soldier peasants that lived free from of compulsive labor laws.39  
                                                
36 Turnier, Avec Merisier Jeannis, 20. 
37 Victor Thomy to Secretary of Agriculture, 18 June 1896, folder 13167, Agriculture, ANH, PauP. 
38 By the mid nineteenth century, vagabondage, for example, remained in law but came to reflect the efforts of 
peasant resistance in revised codes under President Fabre Geffrard. Vagabondage no longer described "vagabond" 
who refused to labor on plantations. Instead, vagabond described peasants who refused to work on their own plots, 
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 Without much unfree labor to exploit on their mid-sized plots, rural generals either 
ordered low ranking soldiers to perform involuntary work as matter of duty, or provided soldiers 
with food and gifts in exchange for their labor. In one case, the peasant soldier named Cryphon 
Gracia of St. Michel de l'Attalaye wrote to the president accusing the local general named 
Gaspard of impressing him and other soldiers into corvée labor. The commander of the district 
reported back to the president that Gracia had "exaggerated" what actually occurred. Instead, the 
commander urged the president that Gracia was obliged by the local general to participate in a 
"combit," whereby local soldiers were cajoled to labor in exchange for cuts of meat and likely 
music. He wrote, “if certain militaires are known to work in his garden, it is while he hosts a 
combit…that this occasion he had killed cows.”40 Combit (or kombit) is still practiced today and 
has come to symbolize reciprocal collective action in Haiti. But very few know what this 
document suggests; that is, combit emerged out of nineteenth-century practices by military 
generals to cajole a militarized citizenry to labor.  Because compulsion was usually out of the 
question, generals relied on practices of reciprocal exchange to extract labor from armed 
peasants.  Unfortunately for generals, such moral means of engendering agricultural production 
could not achieve great surplus wealth.  
Thus, some generals sought wealth by acquiring state posts that they sometimes utilized 
for exploitation to generate additional income. The rise of so many generals, however, helped 
disrupt the concentration of power within a single person or entity and checked tyrannical 
                                                                                                                                                       
honor half-and-half sharecropping (démoitié) agreements, or farm at all. Rural codes also chastised peasants who did 
not work as vagabonds (Kr: vakabon) or sans aveu (without profession), which often, according to the law, led to 
"bad passion–laziness and theft." The intent of the law meant to control the mobility of peasants to prevent insurgent 
mobilization. But the law tacitly acknowledged independent labor and small farming by peasants. In addition, late 
nineteenth-century prison and court records have not revealed a single case in which peasants were arrested for 
vagabondage. 1864 Code Rurale, article, 108. 
39 1864 Code Rurale, article, 108. 
40 Le Citoyen Cryphon Gracia to Son Excellence le Président D'Haiti, 23 December 1899, folder 12421, ANH, PauP.  
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impulses. Put simply, a general seeking to exploit a nation of generals was a contentious task. In 
1871, for example, General Nord Isaac of Borgne arbitrarily instituted a toll on a cross ferry that 
other officers and soldiers were subjected to pay. However, many local soldiers refused and 
revolted. In a letter against General Nord, another Borgne officer complained, “militaires are so 
mistreated that they have not taken to their posts” and the situation would remain as such until 
“the Government forms a cover over our heads, a relaxed assistance against this jeopardy.” The 
complaining officer explained in his letter why the toll tax was regarded as an ignominy, “The 
general does not understand that gentlemen [hommes de bien] must be treated like men purely 
free and independent and not treat us like men of little consequence.” Mutiny and insurrection 
followed: “The gentlemen arrived forcefully with an armed offensive and told him, general 
Nord, that’s enough commanding without discipline, that’s enough fraud and no order…”41 
 Political hierarchies were subverted due to the constant influx of peasant soldiers 
becoming generals by participating in popular insurrections. And for many others who were not 
officially soldiers or officers, they still carried themselves as generals. In the late nineteenth-
century, one commander complained one day that a group of young men in his town refused to 
salute him. When he pressed them about the matter, the young men demanded the general salute 
them first!42  Popular insurrections made Haiti an egalitarian place for people of African descent 
and this tradition of revolting stemmed from the Haitian revolution. 
            ***** 
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As uprisings turned thousands of peasants into generals and democratized political 
power, roving insurgent armies also looted the state and the urban towns.43 Throughout the 
nation, insurgent armies besieged towns and left civilian casualties.  On 8 December 1881, five 
rebels, "in revolt of the constitutional Government," bombarded the town of St. Marc for thirty-
six hours leaving "many victims."44  Other peasant rebels were known for setting entire towns 
ablaze and pillaging farms.  That same year one Port-Salut mayor decried in a speech: "our 
citizens of the countryside had been without cessation turned away from agricultural work to 
steal the assistance of the state, the society menaced by these political speculators who dream of 
trouble, upheavals, disorder, pillage and ruin, to settled down with their personal wealth at the 
expense of public wealth."45  Indeed, insurgents targeted urban centers and state coffers for 
looting, but they also targeted ordinary peasants and their farms for theft, which peasants grew to 
dislike this culture of banditry associated with insurgencies.   
 Leaving their farms behind when on the warpath and thus travelling without a chief 
source for sustenance, starving insurgents often turned into bandits and targeted peasant 
communities.  Anxious and tense about roving armed bandits pillaging their properties, many 
ordinary peasants armed themselves and carried out acts of vigilantism.  One midnight in 1881, 
the peasant named Bolival of Anse-a-Veau camped out in his farm on the look out for "thieves," 
and blasted his gun at a group of three suspects entering his property, only to wound himself with 
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the flying bullet fragments.46  Bolival was only reacting to growing rumors about the specter of 
roving thieves. In the northern town in Limbé, General Servius Joseph François complained in a 
report that “thieves are today more audacious than ever.”47 Thus, Haitians had to deal with the 
reality that insurgencies protected freedoms in the Haitian countryside but also fostered popular 
terror.  
 Indeed, Haiti was a martial society that sometimes took aim at itself.   For example, 
dueling was widespread in the countryside.48  In the early twentieth century, the General Pyrus 
Rampart of Verrettes complained about the "disorder" of dueling in one local rural district. 
"Most of the inhabitants commit injury against each other with aid of their firearms," bemoaned 
the general.49  No doubt banditry, vigilantism, and dueling fostered concerns among Haitians, but 
these violent tensions partly originated from initial state designs that narrowed opportunity to 
militarism. In addition, the state preserved defunct post-emancipation laws that spurred violent 
conflict.  
Thus, peasants utilized their weapons to strike against state officials attempting to enforce 
laws that impeded on their freedoms. For instance, the state outlawed cockfights, a regular 
pastime in the countryside, because the state understood that leisure kept peasants away from 
farm work. In 1895, a police agent attempted to stop an unlawful cockfight in a rural district of 
Jean Rabel, but was violently thwarted in his actions. "Arriving at the place, he caught the 
violators in the act, and as he cried: in the name of the law; an individual stabbed him with a 
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sword," reported the local commander L. Céléstin Jeune.50  In these instances, an armed 
population often blunted state force bent on repressing peasant freedoms.  The state constantly 
confronted an armed citizenry plotting against it right up to the moment of foreign invasion. For 
instance, guns and firepower widely circulated among the population.  
Many persons were discovered with firepower, as was the case in 1901 when authorities 
arrested the woman Madame Carida Pierre Louis for possessing gunpowder and four bullets 
belonging to a Remington rifle.51  Conducting patrols in Dame Marie, one general discovered 
seventeen guns in two rural districts.52 These guns were often utilized in popular conspiracies to 
overthrow the state. Between 1896 and 1915, almost every head of state was forced out of power 
by armed insurrections.  In one dramatic case, President Cincinnatus Leconte died in his sleep 
from a mysterious explosion that destroyed the National Palace.  Firepower and insurrections 
chipped apart the Haitian state.  
 But they also terrorized the greater population. An elite figure named Gabriel Lerouge 
accompanied groups of peasant insurgents in the north called the cacos and zandolites.  He noted 
in a journal that upon arriving in La-Coupe-Michel these groups destroyed properties, stole, and 
raped women.  Furthermore on 7 August 1914, Lerouge observed forty-five homes set afire in 
the town of Terrier Rouge.53  The presence of roving insurgent armies bred fear and violence.  
Even disobedient insurgents faced violence from their own leaders.  “I will tell you frankly if any 
men are disorderly, shoot them, even two or three by my order,” one caco general wrote to 
officers under his command, as they marched south in 1915 with plans to overthrow President 
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Vilbrun Guillaume Sam and put Bobo in power.54  Guillaume Sam lost his life during the 
rebellion and the U.S. invaded Haiti.  But the fear of becoming a victim to banditry, vigilantism, 
duels, and political violence produced popular grievances that the U.S. force exploited to invade 
and usurp control in Haiti.   
 But peasants lost their guns and swords in the process that had long been associated with 
freedom since the Haitian Revolution. Nicholls remarked, “From the revolutionary period (1789-
1803) to the U.S. occupation (1915-34), large numbers of Haitians had been in possession of 
firearms, and it was only with the defeat of the cacos rebellion under Charlemagne Péralte… that 
people were generally disarmed.”55 Péralte, as we shall see, was a peasant general that was 
disenchanted by U.S. policies of suppressing the militarized culture through incarceration and 
policing the countryside.  Péralte himself was arrested and jailed before leading a major peasant 
insurrection against U.S. intervention. Péralte and traditions of popular revolt that fostered 
freedom would perish during the U.S. occupation. 
 Historians often argue that the United States perceived popular unrest in the Caribbean 
and Latin America as threatening to its geopolitical and economic interests.  U.S. forces invaded 
sovereign nations, goes this thinking, on the basis that political instability caused by uprisings 
threatened their interests. In Haiti, however, foreign interest was moderately threatened by 
uprisings and yet the momentum of U.S. imperialism spreading across the Caribbean overtook 
Haiti regardless.56  To be sure, the U.S. desired to take control of the country’s national finances 
to ensure debt payment to U.S. bankers.  Haiti’s neighbor, the Dominican Republic, was already 
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forced to sign a convention in 1907 that conceded its customs houses to the U.S.  With control of 
the Dominican customs houses, the U.S. managed repayment of foreign debt and meddled in 
Dominican affairs.  However, Haiti proved a reliable payer of debt.  
 Worried about U.S. interloping, the Haitian state strove to pay off its foreign debt so 
consistently that, as one historian points out, "payment was exemplary compared to that of other 
Latin-American countries.” 57  But the U.S. had its eyes set on invading Haiti not only because it 
should but also because it could.  That is to say, the U.S. invasion of Haiti was not merely driven 
by financial and geopolitical interests but also a dogma of exercising colonial might for power 
sake.  Before 1915, U.S. officials spent years plotting to invade Haiti, but predictions of racial 
tensions delayed this imperial endeavor. For years, the U.S. worried about confronting what they 
imagined was a nation built on revolutionary principles of freedom and a black consciousness.   
 For example, Elihu Root, the Secretary of State under Theodore Roosevelt’s 
administration, observed, “The Haitians are suspicious of us…they have pretty good reasons for 
doubting the advantages of too close an association between the United States and a black man’s 
government.”  Understanding that U.S. invasion would likely prompt racial tensions, Root 
cautioned, “I have been watching every move in Haiti for several years very closely in the hope 
that a situation would arise in which we could give that help in such a way as to establish the 
right sort of relations. We have done something in that direction, but any positive step I think we 
must wait for the ‘psychological moment.’”58  U.S. leaders envisioned invading Haiti in ways 
that would sidestep the racial and post-emancipation legacies of both countries.  In the midst of 
international power play and growing suspicions of President Guillaume Sam surrendering 
customs houses to the U.S., another popular insurrection occurred that was led by the rebel 
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leader Dr. Bobo. This last insurrection culminated in the president’s death and produced a 
confusing political situation that divided Haiti and presented the right “psychological moment” 
in which U.S. forces invaded and justified their action based on promises to restore order.  
Regardless, and even after years of plotting, the U.S. imperial project in Haiti had a chaotic 
start.59    
 Upon executing plans to seize political control, came dizzying confusion and racist views 
on the part of U.S. officials that complimented political instability in Haiti. “Not at all sure what 
we ought to do,” the State Department Counselor Robert Lansing wrote to President Wilson just 
six days after the invasion, “‘or what we legally can do.”  President Wilson’s response revealed 
that he was also unsure, “we have not the legal authority to do what we apparently ought to 
do.”60  The invading marines were equally dumbfounded. “Something is going on in Haiti,” 
Private Faustin Wirkus was told before departure, “which required the Marines to land, and take 
the situation in hand.”61 Nor did they know, Wirkus admitted, where the nation was located. 
“Somebody said Haiti was a land of black people—‘just like in Africa.” And, thus, many drew 
on notions of anti-black racism.62  Lansing wrote, “The experience of Liberia and Haiti shows 
that the African race are devoid of any capacity for political organization and lack genius for 
government.”63 Despite this confusion, the U.S. proceeded with its imperial project in Haiti and 
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forms of control were imagined through a racist lens that spurred conflict rather than political 
stability. And above all, the U.S. took away peasant arms that they utilized to protect their 
freedom of mobility and labor since the Haitian Revolution. 
Initial Responses to U.S. Invasion             
 On 28 July 1915, the U.S. Marines invaded Haiti and professed to restore order after the 
murder of the president by a popular mob. Upon invading, U.S. forces immediately came under 
gunfire and clashed with various armed elements in the capital and provinces.64  After the U.S. 
undemocratically handpicked Sudre Dartiguenave as president, armed supporters of Bobo vowed 
to oppose the occupation.  In response, U.S. officials attempted to negotiate with insurgents as a 
tactic to demilitarize the population. The most influential insurgents were known as the cacos 
and operated throughout the northern provinces. On September 14, the U.S. signed an accord 
with caco leaders in the rustic northern town of Quartier Morin, with many insurgents agreeing 
to the conditions of popular disarmament. According to the Haitian newspaper Le Matin, “the 
result of the meeting had been more than satisfactory.”  Soon after, some caco insurgents began 
surrendering their arms. One such surrender included a transaction in which U.S. officials drew 
funds from the seized Haitian customs houses, purchased 595 rifles for $5 each and paid three 
generals the total sum of $6,600.65  However, other caco insurgents refused foreign occupation 
altogether.  
The caco and military general Antoine Morency declared that he would not disarm unless 
Bobo became president.66  Some caco rebels resisted the invasion on grounds that the U.S. meant 
to re-enslave Haitians.  "America annexation means slavery," read one circular written by the 
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caco rebel Benoit Rameau, who started his professional life as a servant but rose to the heights of 
a military general through participating in popular insurrections.67  Many caco rebels were 
military officers. It is quite likely that most military soldiers in the north were also part of the 
secret insurgent organization of caco. And they were unwilling to give up traditions of armed 
rebellion that helped foster peasant freedoms since the Haitian Revolution.   
“I will die than live under the protection of strangers,” declared the caco rebel and 
military general Jacque Marcelin in a letter dated on 20 October 1915.  Camped in a hideout near 
the Dominican border with his caco division, Marcelin disregarded the U.S. order to disband and 
disarm, professing his commitment to northern traditions of popular revolt, “I will not give up a 
single rifle even after all the divisions have done so…I am fully caco.”68  Although many 
bravely resisted, insurgents possessed outdated rifles, swords, and machetes and were ill 
equipped to fight against U.S. advanced weaponry on the battlefield.  Thus, the early waves of 
popular uprisings in the north were violently put down by the U.S. forces. While many resisted 
occupation, another class of citizens supported it.  
 Haitians were actually divided on whether to support the occupation or not.  Indeed, 
popular uprisings and insurrections aided many Haitians exercise their democratic rights as 
citizens and climb the social ladder. However, many others resented the terrorizing aspects of 
popular uprisings.  Furthermore, popular violence related to insurrections began to overwhelm 
the state. Between 1911 and 1915, insurrections made it impossible for any government to stay 
in power for longer than a year. Political instability along with roving insurgent bands caused 
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social upheaval as they laid siege to towns, cut food circulation, spread banditry, and much more. 
Desiring to see an end to popular violence, many Haitians supported the U.S. invasion.  
 Urban elites, in particular, showed support for the invasion by transmitting anti-insurgent 
propaganda. "I hate insurrections with all my nerves, with all my brain, with all my blood," the 
minister of interior swore in the newspaper Le Matin.69 The popular urban singer Auguste de 
Pradines “Candio” blamed popular uprisings for the U.S. invasion in a musical composition: 
There’s something we need to be honest about, 
And it is what makes everyone have hard teeth (silent)  
Uprisings… in the South, Cacos in the North, 
For their straw-sacks to be fuller, heavier, 
Who’s doing this? Educated men 
And stupid men, all mixed up together. 
It was all this that brought you the foreign/white Americans 
No one can say they don’t know.70  
 
Other elites resented the frequent revolts because they disrupted the circulation of agricultural 
crops from the countryside to cities, which urban elites depended on for daily sustenance. On 27 
October 1915, the state chargé of Saint-Louis du Nord breathed a sigh of relief: “Agriculture, 
which in the past was neglected or shall we say abandoned by the lack of hands and by the fact 
of recurring revolutions that swept the country, has retaken its strength and vigor and has 
permitted the peasants to do their great farm work."  The chargé reported to authorities that 
efforts were made to spread the news to St. Louis peasants of stability under the occupation and 
its president: "I have not missed the opportunity to talk to them advantageously of the 
government of Mr. Sudre Dartiguenave [president appointed by U.S. forces] who has sworn to 
                                                
69 Gaillard, écrasement, 106. 
70This song is quoted in full by Roger Gaillard in Les cents jours de Rosalvo Bobo (Port-au-Prince: R. Gaillard, 
1973), 243; Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 148-151.  
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offer Peace for a long time in order to make up for all their losses that they have endured by civil 
war.”71 
 In addition, some of the landowning peasantry hoped that the presence of the occupying 
forces would end insurrections, political violence, vigilantism, and vengeful killings, which often 
terrorized the rural population. “Your intervention in this Country is to prevent theft, murder, and 
pillage,” asserted the mid-sized landowning peasant Fromelin Françis of Pilate in a letter to U.S. 
officers in Cap-Haitien.  While Françis lay in bed with a sore foot in June 1916, “someone came 
and put his gun just in the side where my bed was and fired a shot, which thank god, did not hurt 
me…and ran into the woods.”72 In another case on 21 October 1917, the wife of Trejean [her 
name not given] watched as her husband was tied to a tree by two of his brothers who accused 
him of thievery in St. Michel de l’Attalaye. When Mrs. Trejean tried to offer her husband water, 
her brothers-in-law attacked her, then turned to their brother and hacked him to death with their 
machetes.73 A history of taking the law into their own hands fostered a culture of peasants 
administrating forms of popular justice and vengeful killings. Terrorized by these forms of 
                                                
71 “L’Agriculture, qui ces temps derniers a été négligée ou pour dire abandonnée par manqué de bras par le fait des 
révolutions tropes souvent répété que vient de traverser le pays, a repris force et vigueur et se feu de jours de repars 
a permis aux habitants de faire de grands travaux.” Léon Augustin to Secrétaire d'Etat au Département de 
l’Agriculture et des Travaux Publics, 27 October 1915, 11862, Interior, ANH, PauP. 
72Francis suspected one man of being the assailant and called upon the rural police to process his arrest [mandat or 
warrant] which was done with the presumption that the accused was guilty and without rendering a formal or 
thorough investigation (though probably standard practice given it is still done today).  In court the suspect was 
released on account that he was unlawfully arrested and Francis was ordered to pay court fees and a fine of 150 
gourdes payable to the accused for slander and false accusation of being a murderer. Francis’ complaint to the U.S. 
officials was that the fine was exorbitant and thus unjust; U.S. officials, on the other hand, saw this case as an 
example of a corrupt legal system and requested the judges to be removed. See, Fromelin Francis to Grand Prévôt 
Cap-Haïtien, 11 January 1917, Box 6, folder Department of Cape, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, 
NARA, Washington DC. 
73 When the alleged Trejean brothers were arrested by the gendarmes and brought to court in the city of Gonaives 
where they openly admitted to their actions (their testimony is not available), they were arraigned and immediately 
released by the courts after paying a fee of 30 gourdes. For U.S. officials, legal actions of this sort produced 
“lawlessness.” But the courts, aside from possibly being corrupt, could have been tacitly acknowledging its 
limitations. The U.S. officials rearrested the Trejean brothers and detained them “for the welfare of the community.” 
See, Commanding Officer  N.A. Eastman to Headquarters Gendarmerie Port-au-Prince, 9 November 1917, Box 9, 
folder 10th Company Reports, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
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popular terror, these cases reveal that some peasants hoped that the presence of occupation forces 
would stabilize local conflict that could lead to gruesome acts of violence. Still, many Haitians 
soon realized that U.S. involvement in Haiti threatened their rights and freedoms.  
 With the intrusion of U.S. forces, the military traditions that provided social mobility and 
status were repressed. In terms of military rank, U.S. soldiers did not recognize the standing of 
generals and soldiers who previously enjoyed high status in rural communities. Instead of 
receiving the traditional treatment as prisoners of war, U.S. soldiers treated military elements as 
mere convicts by jailing and sentencing them to hard labor for their resistance. U.S. soldiers 
handled many Haitian officers and soldiers dishonorably and in a degrading fashion. This 
treatment included forcing officers and soldiers into chain gangs that performed public works in 
convict suits while sweeping sidewalks.74  For many generals, public humiliation and 
degradation began with arrests. 
 In the past, generals were leading figures in their communities. However, during the U.S. 
invasion, a number of generals were arrested and thrown in jail.  In the fall of 1915, U.S. soldiers 
arrested General Baez Bernard who was a wealthy peasant living in the high mountains of 
Perches (a three hour climb, according to U.S. officials). Commander Pierrelus Pierre, also of 
Perches and known as an influential healer and practitioner of the African-derived religion of 
Vodou, was arrested in December but escaped prison days later and fled to the Dominican 
Republic. Living in the mountains between Terrier Rouge and Grand Bassin, General Choute 
Gustave was arrested by U.S. soldiers. Choute's arrest was ordered by U.S. Colonel Littleton 
W.T. Waller who, as we shall see, was influential in carrying out plans to force the population 
                                                
74 The former commander and caco rebel Charlemagne Péralte was arrested in 1917 and forced to sweep the 
sidewalk in Cap in a convict suit. See, Gaillard, Hinche mise en croix, (Port-au-Prince: R. Gaillard, 1982), 153 and 
133-138.  
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into unfree labor and jailing others as forms of social control that disarmed the population.75 
With roots in the post-emancipated U.S. South, Waller was charged with suppressing traditions 
of insurrections in Haiti that brought him to confront the legacies of the Haitian Revolution.  And 
he did so with domestic views in mind that disdained the idea of armed black people. Regarding 
Haitians, Waller once remarked, “you can never trust a nigger with a gun.”76  He imagined that 
Haiti had many of them and helped devised a plan to throw them in jail.  
Imposing U.S. Imperial Control: Gendarmes, Jails, and Forced Labor as Methods of Social 
Control 
  Groomed in a post-emancipated and racially charged U.S. southern society, Colonel 
Waller was well known for his anti-black racism and yet was still appointed to lead the U.S. 
invasion in Haiti. Waller was born on a Tidewater Virginian plantation where his family owned 
enslaved blacks.  Waller was about ten years old when the Civil War ended, which brought 
emancipation and left many slave plantations in ruins. Yet like many southern white men of his 
generation searching to redeem their masculinity torn by the defeat of the Civil War, Waller 
joined and became corporal of the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues militia that possibly oversaw 
racial violence during the end of Reconstruction and at the beginning of Jim Crow.77  Waller’s 
                                                
75 Memorandum for Brigade, 22 April 1920, Box 4, folder Bandits Activities and Distributions, Gendarmerie 
D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
76 Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1995), 103. 
77 On 26 September 1856, Waller was born on a York County slave plantation in Tidewater Virginia that was owned 
by his family. A year after the Civil War, Waller was ten-years old when Virginia passed the 1866 Vagrancy Law 
Act that attempted to restrict the freed population to plantation labor after slavery.  Some time between the period of 
Reconstruction and Jim Crow, Waller became the corporal of the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues militia, which 
possibly oversaw political terror targeting African Americans in Virginia. On Waller's birthdate and militia 
membership, see Glenn M. Harned, Marine Corps Generals, 1899-1936: A Biographical Encyclopedia (North 
Carolina: Mcfarland and Company, 2015), 43. On the history of the Norfolk Light Artillery Blues as part of the 
Confederate Army during the Civil War, see John Walters, Norfolk Blues: Norfolk Light Artillery Blues 
(Pennsylvania: Burd Street Press, 1997).  On the history of southern militias and popular white terror during 
Reconstruction and Jim Crow, see Steven Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural 
South from Slavery to the Great Migration, Cambridge: Belknap Press (2003), 265-316. 
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life trajectory and racist views made him the unlikely candidate to carryout an imperial project 
that promised stability in Haiti that consciously declared its citizens as black.  
 Yet with the departure of the admiral in charge of invasion forces in early 1916, Waller 
was assigned to command the U.S. forces in Haiti and his racist views were well documented.  “I 
know the nigger and how to handle him,” Waller once observed in regards to controlling 
Haitians. Waller described one Haitian beggar as "the blackest bluegum nigger you ever saw." 
Regarding Haitian elites, he once told another colonel, "These people are niggers in spite of the 
thin varnish of education and refinement. Down in their hearts they are just the same happy, idle 
irresponsible people we know of." And Waller, upon hearing news that the marines might be 
working under the command of a Haitian clientele president, sneered, “Did you ever hear of 
anything so fantastic in your life?” 78  Waller's comparison of Haitians to the racial epithet 
"nigger" was to say that Haitians should be imagined and treated similarly to African-Americans 
in the U.S.  Waller once remarked, "They are real nigger and no mistake–There are some very 
fine looking, well educated polished men here but they are real nigs beneath the surface. What 
people of Norfolk and Portsmouth would say if they saw me bowing and scraping to these 
coons–I do not know–All the same I do not wish to be outdone in formal politeness."79  These 
racial attitudes fused with U.S. imperial tactics and played out in forced labor policies and 
imprisonment that eventually prompted a large exodus and a major insurrection – all of which 
were counterproductive to an imperial project predicated on political stability.  
 Along with Waller, the officer Major Smedley D. Butler shared strong racist views that 
shaped the nature of the invasion.  Surprisingly, Waller was viewed as the cooler head in 
comparison to Butler who hailed from a Northeastern Quaker family.  Butler’s racism was 
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reserved for Haitian elites in particular. Confronted with a nation where thousands of peasants 
saw themselves as generals, Butler found many targets. One striking illustration occurred after an 
incident where one of his soldiers was seemingly challenged to a duel.   
 Butler wrote: "Last night the nephew of one of the prominent politicians attacked one of 
our… sentries, firing three shots at him. That [U.S. sentry] pursued him, and finally blew a hole 
in him as big as your fist, thus ending the life of a miserable cockroach. This morning there is a 
big uproar among the prominent citizens over the ‘unjustifiable’ shooting of this leader of 
society.  However, if all the leaders will only get busy and attack sentries we will soon clean up 
this country." As the historian Hans Schmidt points out, this "Disdain for the educated elite and 
complementary expressions of affection for the uneducated, impoverished peasants masses 
paralleled contemporary racist values in the United States…those who exhibited wealth, 
education, or ambition were subject to attack as 'uppity niggers.'"80  Put simply, racism toward 
perceived black elites in Haiti was still racism.  
Among U.S. officers in the occupation, Butler and Waller were known as the duo that 
"adopted a policy of force."81 Together, Butler and Waller became the architects of a harsh penal 
system and a militarized police state that reflected their racial attitudes and experiences as 
occupiers.  Butler and Waller both worked in colonial projects throughout the Pacific and 
Caribbean.  Before the U.S. invasion of Haiti, Waller served as a military officer in the 1898-
1906 Philippine-American War where he and U.S. soldiers utilized racial violence, policing, and 
incarceration as methods to discipline and control the Filipino population.82  Butler studied the 
                                                
80 Schmidt, 77-81.  Gaillard cites a newspaper report and an oral interview with Price-Mars' son, among other 
sources, to establish the latter's arrest for corvée.  Gaillard, Hinche, 153. 
81 Schmidt, 80. 
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U.S.-created Rural Guard in Cuba a year before putting together in Haiti the constabulary police 
called the Gendarmerie.83  
Domestic forms of racial repression and imperial practices of control converged in 
occupied Haiti.  In February 1916, Butler dissolved the independent national military and 
ordered the construction of 117 Gendarmerie posts, which housed prisons, throughout the 
provinces. On the same day, Waller sent out a circular to all Haitian commanders of the 
indigenous military to disband, with US gendarme officers assuming their posts.84  Gendarme 
officer positions, however, were only given to white U.S. marines while Haitians made up the 
rank-and-file. Indeed, Butler and Waller instituted a system of policing in Haiti that was the 
byproduct of knowledge obtained from colonialism mixed with domestic practices of racial 
segregation – a sort of Jim Crow colonialism. Racial segregation was also practice in public 
spaces that occurred most notably in the capital of Port-au-Prince. But urban forms of racism 
have dominated the attention of scholars, even though penal forms of Jim Crow prevailed in the 
Haitian countryside where the majority of the population lived. 
  Under the Butler-Waller period, Haitians experienced harsh police tactics that resembled 
Jim Crow in the U.S. South where black mobility and independent labor were criminalized. 
Beginning in early 1916, the Butler-Waller influence set in motion a new phase in the 
occupation's governance that employed gendarmes to enforce the previously defunct Haitian 
laws of corvée and vagabondage (vagrancy).  These laws originated in post-emancipation 
practices of compelling Haitians to labor in conditions akin to slavery. Butler "re-discovered" the 
corvée and vagabondage laws and utilized them to round up unfree labor.  This model of 
                                                
83 Gaillard, La république autoritaire: les blancs débarquent, 1916-1917 (Port-au-Prince: R. Gaillard, 1981),  20. 
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policing was vigorously pursued until the withdrawal of U.S. troops, leaving a bloody racist 
legacy in Haiti.   
The U.S.-created Gendarmerie eventually became the arm of this new administration and 
coercively enforced preexisting legal codes and laws. However, scattered resistance on the part 
of former Haitian soldiers and officers continued to obstruct the U.S.’s initial imperial mission. 
In March 1916, a post in the northern region of Saint Michel de l’Attalaye came under rebel 
gunfire and sent gendarmes fleeing.85  By April, U.S. marines and gendarmes returned to St. 
Michel but reported, "Very few men were visible.”86  St. Michel peasants disappeared in the 
nearby mountains and cliffs to regroup and carryout guerrilla warfare.  On 3 May, the peasant 
insurgents reappeared and frightened the local magistrate with gunfire and cries for freedom. 
“Announcing to you at one o’clock in the morning, beaucoup shots of rifles were exploded in St. 
Michel, [insurgents] shouting ‘vivre la liberté,’” the magistrate telegrammed superiors. “The 
gendarmes were unable to resist to this disorder fleeing, and I was transported to Ennery to await 
your final decision.”87   
 On July 14, a post in the mountaintop town of Carice was attacked and one 
gendarme "received a bullet to his face. All the gendarmes of Carice ran away.”88 Other 
insurgents urged the Haitian members of the Gendarmerie to join the rebel cause. "Run under the 
flag to save the country," read one poster placed on a gendarme barrack in Ferrier after 
                                                
85 Ibid. 
86 Detachment Commander to Expeditionary Commander, 20 April 1916,  Box 9, folder 10th Company of Gonaïves, 
Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC.   
87 To find full details on the clashes between gendarmes and St. Michel insurgents, see Gaillard, Écrasement, 41-52.   
Communal Magistrate Desruisseaus Etienne Gilles to Minister of Interior, 6 March 1916, Box 9, folder 10th Co, 
Gonaïves, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC.   
88 Sergeant Pierre Jean to Commanding 15ème Company de la Gendarmerie d'Haiti Ouanaminthe, 15 July 1916, 
Box 5, folder Caco Correspondence, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
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insurgents attacked it in 1916.89  Yet the occupying forces persisted and always returned to begin 
establishing a constant presence in peasant communities. Their presence was solidified through 
the revitalization of restrictive Haitian legal codes. 
For instance, General Butler ordered the U.S. gendarmes to enforce corvée that required 
six days of public labor from rural denizens unable to pay road taxes.90  Defending his use of the 
law, Butler presented the corvée as the simple solution to build better roads that opened up the 
impenetrable countryside to police the countryside more easily and disclose rebel hideouts. One 
major road, about 170-miles long, started from the capital in the southern tip of the island and cut 
through the northern region that was a rebel stronghold. However, U.S. forces went beyond the 
limits of the corvée law to build other structures unrelated to roadwork. 
Although corvée was legally intended for building roads, U.S. forces also ordered corvée 
gangs to perform tasks incompatible with the law. Haitians recalled corvée prisoners scraping up 
excrement from the streets in Hinche.91  Another U.S. practice straying outside the parameters of 
the corvée law was utilizing corvée gangs to build prisons that served as holding facilities for 
Haitians convicted of vagabondage.  Vagabondage (vagrancy) was another old dormant code 
rooted in the legacies of slavery and post-emancipation that the U.S. enforced in order to 
criminalize mobility.  After clashing with armed insurgents in St. Michel, for example, U.S. 
forces seized a thirty-acre farm owned by a general killed in the fighting. The general’s farm 
became the grounds on which U.S. utilized corvée labor to build a vagabond prison.  
Nothing more symbolized the threat to military customs of rights, freedom, and status 
than putting a prison on the farm of a general killed by U.S. forces.  But with "'Covees' 
                                                
89 "Copy of Proclamation," Box 5, folder Caco Correspondences, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, 
NARA, Washington DC.  
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amounting to four hundred men,” one officer reported to Butler in 1917, the building “[would] 
be used as quarters for convicted vagabonds.”92  Using corvée labor to build prisons constituted 
an unlawful act on the part of U.S. officers. Yet, U.S. soldiers were unconcerned with the 
accuracy of these laws; they were merely enforced to generate involuntary labor that built 
infrastructures for more effective control.  Roads made policing of the countryside easier and 
more prisons helped detain a rebellious population.  All together, these constructions served to 
control Haitian society. 
Increase in prisons and police also produced convict laborers that were compelled build 
or repair prisons to detain even more Haitians on misdemeanor charges. U.S. officials reported 
159 revamped or new prisons that confined thousands.93 This was drastically different from the 
penal practices prior to the invasion where jails were decrepit and barely populated.  In 1890, the 
prison in Aux Cayes jailed six people in the span of six months, but in a single month during the 
U.S. invasion the Cayes prison reported 177 prisoners who "all but one are for misdemeanors, 
such as petty thievery."94 Many peasants were arbitrarily arrested for petty crimes and detained 
against their will. Years later, one marine inadvertently admitted that peasants were picked up 
                                                
92 District Commander of Gonaives to General Butler, 10 July 1917, Box 9, folder 10th Company of Gonaïves, 
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93 The Commanding Officer, Constabulary Detachment to Brigade Commander, 4 August 1920, Box 4, Bandit 
Reports, in Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC.   
94 La Commission Communale to Secretary of Interior, 7 October 1890, 10840, Interior, ANH, PauP.  Director of 
Civil Prison to Department Commander, 16 July 1919, Box 7, Department of the South, RG 127, NARA, 
Washington DC.  Nineteenth-century prisons in Haiti detained few prisoners. In the Petite Rivière d l'Artibonite, for 
instance, only two persons were arrested, tried, and sentenced to hard labor between 15 May and 25 August 1891. 
François Guilbaud to Secretary of Interior, 25 August 1891,13238, Interior, ANH, PauP.  U.S. forces found many 
Haitian prisons in poor conditions. One U.S. marine offered his superiors a description of the dilapidated jailhouse 
in Anse d’Hainault, “is a tumbled down old Haitian prison situated about five minutes walk from the center of the 
town. The situation is out of the way and is also very unsanitary, being opposite a swamp, and the condition of the 
building is such that it would not be worth while to have it repaired.” Department Commander Carl Svenson to 
Chief of Gendarmerie, 29 July 1919, Box 7, Department of South in Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, 
NARA, Washington DC.  Stationed in the southern region, one U.S. officer reported that unfree labor was utilized to 
repair prisons in Cavallion and Saint Louis. District Commander, Cayes to Department Commander, 7 November 
1917, Box 9, folder 7th Co., District Commander in Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington 
DC.   
            
             
 55 
because "they had no other place to sleep, probably... They were detained in the town. They were 
not allowed to leave the town."95  
However, many of these peasants very well had their own living space.  This marine’s 
explanation was meant to excuse illegal detainment of the population. Even if peasants attempted 
to leave these prisons and free themselves, they were summarily executed.  On the holiday of 
U.S. Independence, one officer reported that the prisoner Chialy Eland of St. Michel, arrested for 
stealing chickens, attempted to escape jail but "was challenged to halt. Failing to stop, the sentry 
fired three shots, – all of which were effective."96 Although these methods of control were 
present in other U.S. colonial projects in the Pacific and the Caribbean, many U.S. contemporary 
observers compared U.S. penal practices in Haiti to the domestic racist practices of control in the 
U.S. South.   
  The comparison was so glaring that these observers assumed that Washington 
purposefully recruited southern soldiers to impose Jim Crow in Haiti.97 One U.S. trade 
commissioner reported, "It would appear that the bulk of the men in charge of policing, 
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sanitation and other duties were drawn from those States where the race question has always 
been a matter of delicacy–Louisiana, Texas, etc.–and that the Southern attitude towards the black 
man was imported at the beginning and has operated to alienate many natives who might have 
been useful."98  Studies have disproven allegations of a southern majority in the number of U.S. 
forces sent to Haiti, but the commissioner correctly suggested that the Butler-Waller period set in 
motion practices of social control that powerfully conjured up of racial repression in the minds of 
U.S. citizens.  Haitians saw the harsh penal system as slavery itself.  
 One Haitian peasant laid out his argument to the historian Roger Gaillard during an oral 
interview: "One: the work isn't paid. Two: you worked with your back to the sun wearing 
nothing but pants. Three: they only sent you home when you were sick. Four: you didn't eat 
enough, just corn and beans. Five: You slept in a prison or at the construction site. Six: When 
you tried to run away, they killed you. Isn't that slavery?"99  If this did not resemble slavery, then 
the occupation eerily resembled the incarceration practices of African Americans in the Jim 
Crow South. These measures were incorporated into a colonial project that sought to stabilize the 
political situation in Haiti. In reality, however, forced labor and incarceration destabilized 
peasant communities.  
If peasants were caught in activities other than farming, U.S. forces arrested them as 
vagabonds and put them to work on plantations owned used by U.S. forces.100  For instance, 
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those convicted were forced to labor on potato plantations that likely provisioned U.S. soldiers.  
In June 1917, Butler instructed one commander to seek out fifty acres of vacant land for a potato 
farm where “LABOR TO BE PERFORMED BY VAGABONDS.”101 On 25 July 1917 another 
marine named Baker sent a telegram to Butler affirming, “potato farm for this district assured 
period have arrested and tribunal condemned thirty vagabonds for the purpose …”102 Previous 
Haitian leaders hardly achieved such systematic enforcement of corvée and vagabondage codes 
in order to revive the plantation economy that was destroyed by the Haitian Revolution and 
subsequent insurrections.  However, U.S. forces successfully reinvigorated these old codes to 
carryout its imperial project for “stabilizing” Haiti.  In many ways, the U.S. invasion represented 
the convergence of post-emancipation legacies and imperialism that utilized labor codes to 
forcibly repress mobility and control labor.  
Fight and Flight: Responses To Jailing and Forced Labor 
 U.S. repression caused thousands to flee Haiti and others mustered an organized 
resistance against the U.S. repression. In the southern part of Haiti, many fled to Cuba, while 
inhabitants in the northern part of Haiti fled to the Dominican Republican. As the ultimate sign 
of resistance, many Haitians chose to regroup in the Dominican Republic and come back fighting 
as caco rebels.  In total, more than one hundred thousand peasants either fought or fled from U.S. 
measures of control.  Thus, the U.S. intervention amounted to a major migration and revolt that 
resembled everything but stability.  
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101 Chef de La Gendarme Butler to Department Commander Gendarmerie, 21 June 1917,  Box 6, folder Department 
of Cape, in Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
102 Baker to Chief of Gendarmerie, 25 July 1917, Box 9, folder 10th Company of Gonaives, Gendarmerie D’Haiti 
Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC.   
            
             
 58 
  In southern Haiti, U.S. officials often complained that Haitian men were suspiciously 
unavailable for forced labor because of migration to Cuba. In 1918, a U.S. official remarked, “In 
view of tremendous numbers of working men leaving for Cuba, corvée labor is difficult to 
obtain." The officer continued, “ in one section last month we were able to get only 13 men, and 
we find much difficulty allthrough [sic] this part of the country.” 103 Furthermore, U.S. 
authorities pursued a gender discriminatory policy that prevented many single women and 
“young girls” from migration because it was often believed that “the women of the emigrant 
class generally go for the purpose of prostitution alone.” These assumptions of prostitution, often 
rooted in gendered and racialized ideas of promiscuity attached to Haitian women, prevented 
their migration. In fact, these gendered regulations led to a decrease in the male population, 
compelling women to labor for low wages. Thus, women constituted one third of the corvée 
labor force in southern districts.104  The many reports of corvée laborers receiving no wages at all 
rendered it doubtful that women received anything at all.  
Instead of acknowledging the oppressive conditions of the occupied Haitian state, U.S. 
officials blamed the migration of approximately 25,000 Haitian men to Cuba on larger economic 
processes related to a global shortage of labor in wartime.105  Higher wages in U.S. owned sugar 
plantation companies, according to one report, drew thousands of Haitian men to work in Cuba. 
Even Haitians serving in the Gendarmerie deserted to plantations in Cuba. U.S. officials sent out 
orders to keep a careful watch “on passengers of all schooners to Cuba in order to apprehend any 
                                                
103 Department Commander to Chief of Gendarmerie, 4 March 1918, Box 4, folder Cayes Corresp., Gendarmerie 
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104An undated report that mention that information was drawn from data from November 1915 by Maj.G.d.H K.E. 
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of the deserters.”106 While written sources blamed the global economic crisis on the migration, 
Haitian oral sources suggest that corvée prompted other migration patterns.  
Elderly Haitians in the southeastern zone preserved memories of the harrowing 
experience of coerced labor under what they called travo piblik or public works. The elderly 
Gaston Tanis remembers that her mother and father fled Jacmel because of travo piblik leaving 
behind their home, land, and other material possessions to move east seeking refuge – not in 
Cuba – but in the impenetrable mountainous and forested area of Thiotte. In fact she pointed out, 
"most people around here are not from Thiotte but are descendants of Jacmel."107  The large 
settlement of Thiotte likely began as a maroon refuge from U.S. forced labor and harsh penal 
system.  
 As many Haitians fled into nearby mountains and neighboring nations, others chose to 
stay in Haiti and fight U.S. forces. Beginning in 1917, an organized rebellion exploded onto the 
scene in northern Haiti. The rebels were part of an insurgent tradition culture particular to the 
north called caco. During insurrections, cacos wore blue denim shirts with a red kerchief tied 
around their neck (this insurgent dress was later appropriated by the Duvalier regime and became 
the official uniform of the dreaded tonton makouts). Caco insurgents constituted an underground 
network that organized peasant soldiers, bandits, mercenaries, and other armed elements in the 
countryside into a collective force led by local military leaders. Caco participation cut across 
class lines and united armed peasants. Popular traditions of revolt existed everywhere in Haiti, 
but its activities in the north proved much more enduring because of its underground network 
that stretched into the Dominican Republic.  
                                                
106 Ibid.  Also see, Department Commander to Chief of Gendarmerie, 16 October 1917, Box 7, folder Department of 
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In fact, caco insurgents were most active along the Haitian-Dominican border and drew 
upon relations with their Dominican insurgent counterparts called the gavilleros for arms and 
support. Some Dominicans actually joined the second wave of caco insurrections, including the 
general Yingue Lebrong who was killed by U.S. forces in the Haitian province of Mont 
Organise.108 Other Dominicans supplied the caco insurgents with armed weapons. For instance, 
Norberto Ramirez arranged a secret meeting place in Cercadillos de las Cruzadas on the 
Dominican side of the border where supplies of guns and ammunitions were distributed to 
Haitian insurgents.109 Previously unregulated, border crossings helped Haitian exiles flee U.S. 
arbitrary arrests and gave insurgents the opportunity to remobilize with support from Dominican 
allies.  
During the early stages of U.S. invasion, the general and caco leader, Pierrelus Pierre, 
escaped prison and fled to the Dominican Republic. Becoming homesick, Pierre yearned to 
return but first wished to know which Haitians escaped detention during the caco insurgency.  
Hiding in a southeastern Dominican town of San Pedro de Macoris, Pierre and two other 
generals secretly sent a letter to a compatriot in Haiti, "since nearly six years we are exiled here 
and we want some information from you [on] who are free and we beg you to find some means 
to send us a few words so that we may communicate to one another and it is time, it is the hour 
that we be able to go back home."110 Other former generals remained caco insurgents and 
utilized secret trails between the borders to obtain fresh provisions and supplies. The caco 
general Charlemagne Masséna Péralte, a Haitian of Dominican ancestry, received food and fresh 
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meat from an ally Dominican who owned a farm on the Haitian side of the border in Ravine 
Fond.111 Once a former officer in the disbanded military, Péralte emerged as the leader of the 
caco revolt.  
Péralte was the quintessential caco leader who represented the disenchanted rural military 
elite that felt acutely disempowered by the U.S. invasion. Péralte hailed from a prosperous 
peasant family in the border town of Hinche.112  With a personal experience raising goats, sheep, 
and cattle, Péralte identified himself as a “cultivateur” or peasant.113  Because of family’s wealth, 
he was also educated in the prestigious school of St. Louis de Gonzague that was located in he 
capital.  Péralte eventually abandoned his education but decided to pursue a revolutionary life 
such as many of his rural contemporaries.  He joined the military and involved himself in caco 
revolts that propelled him to the position of military commander. However, weeks after U.S. 
troops invaded Haiti, Péralte was discharged from his commanding post in Léogane and retired 
to his farm in Hinche.  A couple of months later, U.S. forces would, again, undermine Péralte’s 
status as a powerful general.  In 1917, U.S soldiers arrested Péralte for organizing an insurgent 
attack on a prison in Hinche. Upon arrest, U.S. soldiers seized Péralte's revolver, incinerated his 
home, and marched him on foot to court in the northern province of Ouanaminthe where he was 
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sentenced to hard labor in Cap-Haitien.114  In 1918, however, Péralte broke out of prison to 
become the leader of the second major caco revolt.   
Péralte and caco insurgents fought against forced labor, imprisonment, and coercive 
policing tactics by U.S. forces that destabilized peasant communities.  In a circular, Péralte 
declared that the insurgency was "a peasant revolt... a demand by many men who need the 
protection to farm [travailler] and live in peace." Péralte blamed the presence of U.S. gendarmes 
as a contributing factor which have "for nothing, condemned [peasants] to forced work, 
administration of slaps, kicks, punches, violating peasant women, taking by force their 
merchandise."115  Years later, caco insurgents issued a declaration criticizing the U.S. penal 
system imposed in Haiti, "our laws tramped upon, our best citizens are despised thrown into 
prison without cause and no action taken, they are left to die in prisons everywhere, ladies and 
young girls are condemned without legal trails and left to die..."116 Heeding caco calls to fight 
against U.S. repression, tens of thousands of peasants abandoned farming to join the rebellion 
that lasted for four years (1917-1921).  The insurgency was not merely a war against U.S. 
incarceration, but a last defense for protecting a martial way of life that fostered freedom in the 
countryside.  
This included the preservation of a porous border that supported peasant insurgencies and 
was an important factor at stake for cacos. The dissemination of information, supplies, and 
frequent border crossing compelled U.S. officers to regulate the Haitian exodus to the Dominican 
Republic. The insurgent culture in the northern borderland between cacos and Gavilleros created 
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solidarity that transcended national boundaries. So much so that one ethnic Haitian that lived in 
the borderlands region recalled, “Although there were two sides, the people were one, united.”117 
However, the discovery of secret networks between Haitian cacos and Dominican gavilleros, 
prompted U.S. forces to regulate the border even more rigorously.118 This restriction set in 
motion the first systematic attempt to control Haitian migration to the Dominican Republic under 
the U.S. invasion. Just only a year after U.S. invasion, one U.S. officer reported, “Forty or fifty 
Haitian men from the interior town daily cross frontier into San Domingo urgently recommend 
that old permit system reestablished to control exodus I recommend same for Ouanaminthe and 
Hinche."119 The U.S. suppression of caco insurgent networks represented the real first disruption 
to this transnational borderland culture that supported a martial life on both sides of the border.120  
Now under U.S. repression, restrictions were placed on the mobility of Haitians traveling to the 
Dominican Republic to rearm themselves.  
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At home, the war placed even harsher limitations on the freedoms of Haitian insurgents 
and civilians alike. The U.S.-led a violent campaign in the Haitian countryside that generated 
more arrests, forced labor, and illegal executions of prisoners. Prisons reached maximum 
capacity. Stationed in the north, one U.S. officer telegrammed, “Gonaives prison overcrouded 
[sic] stop Cape prison filled up.”  More prisoners provided more labor, “they can be put to work 
forming there this considered an ideal arrangement.”121  The overcrowding of prisons, however, 
led to a surplus of convict labor that U.S. solider began to casually eliminate.  One U.S. officer 
suggested that soldiers eliminate insurgents without trial: "The orders down there were: prisons 
are filled; we don't want anymore prisoners." And admitted, "You may rest assured that I was 
relieved when I found out that I had been ordered to Port-au-Prince to be decorated for killing 
cacos and not be court-martialed for the same."122  Another U.S. gendarme officer who oversaw 
a corvée detail of 3,000 later admitted during senate hearings that 400 illegal executions might 
have occurred.123  In general, the insurgency was shockingly violent. U.S. forces took the lives of 
some 3,000 Haitians though estimates were likely higher.124 One of the victims was Péralte 
himself who was ambushed and assassinated in 1919 by U.S. forces. Coupled with U.S. 
atrocities, insurgents also carried out their own terroristic tactics on the population.  
 Leaving their farms behind and carrying little provisions, roving insurgents often utilized 
banditry against the population to sustain themselves. Prolonged rebellion eventually cost the 
civilian population their farm crops and possessions that were the targets of starving insurgents. 
The longer the insurgents waged war, the more instances of highway robberies occurred. In 
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January 1920, for example, U.S. officer Walter Hill wrote, "50 bandits reported robbing market 
women."125  Taking note of these complaints, U.S. soldiers again exploited peasant fears of 
insurgent tactics of banditry, just as they did with initial invasion in 1915.    
 In 1920, U.S. officer E.A. Raymond, for example, preached to peasants that his soldiers 
desired to suppress "banditism" and urged the population to encourage friends and relatives to 
surrender.  Raymond promised that those insurgents who turned themselves in could farm on 
their land unmolested.  Raymond even released prisoners from jail as proof of U.S. sincerity.  
Eventually, U.S. officers throughout the northern zones began to follow Raymond's tactics of 
persuasion that resulted in "more than a thousand farm houses hav[ing] their men back."126  The 
population also began to support U.S. forces in stamping out bandits.   In August, insurgents 
struck the town of Grand Bassin, but locals helped the U.S. gendarmes fight off the insurgent 
attack.  In April 1920, locals near Trou d'Eau mobbed a reputed caco named Viquena who was 
later shot down by U.S. soldiers.127  U.S. led violent terror alongside anti-banditry propaganda 
compelled many starving insurgents to surrender.  
Initially, U.S. officers attempted to downplay the scale of the insurgency. During senate 
hearings in October 1919, Major General Barnett publicly declared: “It is estimated that about 
2,000 bandits infest the hills. They are under Charlemagne Péralte, who styles himself the 
supreme chief.”128  Before his death, Péralte’s claimed, on the other hand, that he commanded 
about forty thousand followers.  Indeed, secret documents corroborated Péralte’s estimates.  In 
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D'Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington, DC.  
127 Sub-District Commander to Headquarters Gd'H., 15 April 1920, Box 4, folder Bandit Activities, Gendarmerie 
D'Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington, DC. 
128 Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo: Hearings before a select committee on 
Haiti and Santo Domingo, Volume 1, (United States Senate: Washington DC, 1921), 428. 
            
             
 66 
September 1920, a U.S. intelligence report disclosed that a total of 43,772 Haitians 
surrendered.129  Some months later the numbers grew; by October, 81,277 peasants 
surrendered.130  These numbers of peasant participants reveal that the scale of the war, which 
was until now minimized, was actually an immense occurrence. Thus, this final defeat of the 
caco insurgents constituted a tremendous blow to traditions of revolt that protected peasant 
freedoms in the countryside since the Haitian Revolution.  However, sources suggest that 
peasants were initially reluctant to surrender their arms.  
U.S. officials reported a small number of arms surrendered in proportioned to the number 
of surrendered rebels. Barnett told U.S. senators: “I estimate that they are mostly armed with 
machetes, knives, pikes, a few pistols, and some  200 or 300 rifles. I don’t believe that in all 
Haiti there are more than 400 to 500 rifles, if that many.”131  In reality, by 1920, about two 
thousand guns were captured and/or surrendered to U.S. forces.  This number still remains small 
for a nation to be well armed and militarized.  The disproportionate ratio of guns to peasants was 
explained by captured rebels in Lascahobas, "only chiefs and sub chiefs have them."132  
 Although U.S. reports do not provide a total number of guns surrendered throughout the 
entire time of the insurgency or occupation, scattered evidence reveals that Haitians gave up 
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hundreds of more guns by the next year. In January 1921, peasants in Gonaives surrendered 132 
rifles in the span of two weeks; in Terre Neuve and Gros Morne, 339 guns were surrendered 
within four weeks.133  Oral sources reveal that other rebels buried their weapons that they never 
retrieved again. The exact number of guns surrendered remains unknown. Nonetheless, U.S. 
invasion successfully disarmed the countryside and the nation no longer had the potential to 
revolt in a serious manner. Additionally and more importantly, the vigorous enforcement of 
vagrancy laws stamped out opportunities for insurgent mobilization, despite false promises by 
U.S. forces to stop repression.  
 
 
Figure 2. Caco Rifle. During research, I photographed a caco rifle that was hidden from the 
sight of U.S. forces during the occupation. Instead, the rifle was passed down to the 
descendants of its original owner who live in the parish of St. Suzanne near the 
mountainous regions of Vallières.  
 
 The U.S. abolished the corvée as a response to the caco insurgency, but continued to 
apprehend any rural male caught wondering around and charged them with vagabondage. The 
enforcement of vagabondage prevented mobility that was crucial to insurgent mobilization. As 
late as 1929 in the region of Acul, a butcher, a disabled peasant, and another crippled by yaws 
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were all picked up for vagabondage.134 Also from Acul, the minor Ganthier de Antoine was 
arrested for vagabondage and released in court only after explaining to the judge that he was a 
schoolboy and, thus, could not farm.135  One Haitian newspaper revealed, "in order to repress 
vagabondage the Police are picking up all journeymen they meet along the road."136 U.S. 
enforcement of vagrancy laws was certainly a cruel method of control but strangely seduced 
some peasants to report loved ones as vagabonds. On March 20, Encé Étienne was arrested for 
vagabondage and mentioned in court, “It is my mother that denounced me as such.”137  On 7 
June, the accused vagabond Lorvilus Fleury also revealed in court, “It is my father who has 
denounced me capable of such an infraction.”138 Likely utilizing vagabondage to discipline their 
children, these peasants bought into the system that ultimately functioned to control their labor 
and limit mobility. In Aux Cayes, U.S. authorities reported that prisons were "rather crowded for 
the most part with many vagabonds and petty thieves are picked up now." So many Haitians 
were prosecuted as vagabonds that U.S. officials began to speak of a "vagabond class.”139  
Disarmed and immobile, peasants lost their freedoms that were tied to traditions of popular 
revolt which were rooted in the Haitian Revolution. The U.S. took back those freedoms and 
solidified a harsh police state and penal system to detain the rebellious population. This process 
effectively led to stronger forms of authoritarianism in Haiti after the U.S. withdrew from Haiti.   
 To be sure, the U.S.-created Gendarmerie, which evolved into the Haitian army (Garde 
Haiti), strengthened state power in the post occupation period. But the fall of popular sovereignty 
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was equally important to the making of post-occupation authoritarianism. The military’s 
foremost responsibility was to suppress the countryside by, among other things, enforcing post-
emancipation laws such as vagabondage that criminalized mobility. Thus, repressing the rural 
population was key to allowing an authoritarian state to flourish in the post-occupation period.   
 In the same breath, Haitian intellectuals including Jean Price-Mars – who were the scions 
of the demoralized rural military elite – produced a brand of nationalism that romanticized the 
Haitian peasantry. These pro-peasant nationalist ideas swept the nation and influenced a 
generation of intellectuals. A young man named François Duvalier was inspired by pro-peasant 
ideologies that later became the basis of his regime's populism and gave him the idea to rearm 
and remilitarize the rural population. Duvalier presented the creation of the militia as a 
restoration of the nineteenth-century martial culture and proclaimed that the makouts were the 
solution to post-emancipated crisis established by U.S. intervention.  
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Disempowered Peasants, the Police State, National Ideology, and the Rise of François 
Duvalier (1921-1962) 
 
In 1934, the invasion ended and U.S troops withdrew from Haiti.  Peasants formed the 
overwhelming majority but were wholly repressed by the U.S. created military and rural police 
that to led their exclusion from political participation.  National leaders did very little to 
eliminate persistent forms of repression in the countryside, yet peasants became the mere focus 
of elite conversations regarding the state of the nation. While disempowered peasants became the 
central topic of national discourse, their own thoughts on repression were rarely publicized. 
Instead, national elites portrayed peasants as passive subjects that fully lacked a political voice to 
attain recourse.  In reality, peasants also participated in national discourses regarding themselves. 
Often victims of the military police in the countryside, peasants seeking justice sent 
letters of complaints to army headquarters and national leaders. Peasant wrote letters that utilized 
elite constructed tropes of peasant victimization to elicit sympathy and recourse from political 
elites. These peasant discursive actions sometimes produced justice, but often were dismissed by 
state officials. Nevertheless, these letters show that peasants were being politicized and actually 
involved in national discourses that eventually shaped the political trajectory of the nation. 
Duvalier, himself an active participant in pro-peasant discourses, seized upon the national 
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consciousness around peasant livelihoods and made their plight the focus of his 1957 presidential 
campaign.  
Duvalier won the election and embarked on building a dictatorship that relied on violent 
repression but also utilized peasant-based populism to generate popular support. Duvalier’s 
populism was rooted in concerns and discourses that transfixed elites and peasants alike since the 
U.S. invasion. Duvalier was particularly a self-professed noirist that was a strand of thought 
within pro-peasant discourses that partly saw peasant marginalization as a result of light-skinned 
elite prejudice. However, as president, Duvalier emphasized materialist inequalities.  
Duvalier preached to peasants that disempowerment was the result of class exploitation 
and political abandonment. To remedy these inequalities, Duvalier announced his program of 
justice sociale that promised to reallocate national resources toward improving the 
underdeveloped conditions of the countryside and create policies aimed at eradicating class 
exploitation. To be sure, the loftiness of the term justice sociale shrouded the more nefarious 
aspects of the regime’s violent forms of political control by almost implying that national 
political participation and class equality for peasants would be accomplished through just, and 
even democratic, means.  In reality, justice sociale was a paternalistic authoritarian project from 
start to finish that linked the political liberalization of the peasantry to the gratitude of the 
supposed, conscionable Duvalier.  
Nevertheless, justice sociale populism indicated to peasants the state’s break from its 
previous urban-centered tendencies, now shifting its attention and political energies to the 
countryside. Whereas the central government in the post-occupation functioned as a distant 
authority, the Duvalier state unprecedentedly reached out to the peasantry and infused, 
developed, and nurtured in them, although paternalistically, the notion that the state was 
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responsible for their wellbeing. Indeed, the regime’s discourses and policies of justice sociale 
were influential in ways that made peasants see the central state as an institution that represented 
their interests. For the first time since the U.S. occupation, the national state under Duvalier was 
pro-peasant.  
However, Duvalier’s peasant-based populism failed in delivering on its promises and 
overlooked the repressive police and penal system. Under Duvalier, peasants continued to face 
the same repressive laws and police abuse that were reinvigorated by the U.S. invasion.  As 
political opposition mounted against his regime, Duvalier would turn to the age-old tradition of 
arming the peasantry to protect his power and present such as strategy as the solution to peasant 
grievances generated by the U.S. invasion that unleashed post-emancipated laws that haunted 
peasants ever since.  
Turning Disempowered Peasants into Malheureux Paysans  
U.S. repression in the countryside prompted Haitian intellectuals to construct nationalist 
ideas based on disempowered peasants. Haitian intellectuals witnessed mass arrests, jailing, 
forced labor as U.S. tactics of population control.  It was in northern Haiti where a peasant-based 
nationalism first appeared.  No small wonder since the north was most devastated by the peasant 
wars and U.S. repression.  In her insightful article, the scholar Chelsea Stieber tells us that 
northern intellectuals were the actual progenitors of the “modern peasant novel,” which arguably 
was the first intellectual experiment with peasant-based nationalism in the occupation period.  
These intellectuals such as Christian Werleigh, Jean-Baptiste Cinéas, Cadet Dessource, and 
Louis Mercier were the children of the demoralized rural military elite and peasant soldiers 
whose major insurgency throughout the north was violently suppressed by a U.S.-led military 
campaign.  Branding themselves as l’homme du nord, these intellectuals had set out to vindicate 
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the defeated northern countryside through writings of fiction.  They published, for example, 
peasant novels in the northern-based magazine Stella through which they were the first among 
Haitian intellectuals to express nostalgia for a disappearing insurgent militarized rural society 
that was disempowered and forced into mass migration.1  
Some northern intellectuals were even victims of U.S. penal practices of repression. 
While traveling on horseback in the Haitian countryside near the capital in the south, Jean Price-
Mars – who was a scholar, diplomat, native of the north, and had familial ties to the old rural 
military/insurgent elite – was arrested arbitrarily and almost impressed into a corvée gang.2  
Experiencing firsthand the U.S. project of social control, Price-Mars utilized his status as a 
respected statesman and intellectual to broadcast to the nation about the political and cultural 
marginalization of peasants. In the same year of his arrest, Price-Mars published La vocation that 
included a critique of national elites and their complicity in U.S. enforcement of force labor.3 
Later in 1928, he published the nationally acclaimed Ainsi Parla l'Oncle that denounced the 
elite's French-based identity and urged them to see peasants and their African-based traditions as 
the ideal brand for Haitian nationalism. So began a nationalist movement that saw peasants as 
perpetual victims of state abuse, and so began their culture as the basis of Haitian nationalism. 
These two dialectics shaped popular imagination during the invasion and post-invasion periods. 
                                                
1The peasant novel produced in the north during the occupation was the first intellectual experiment with creating a 
brand of nationalism based on a romanticization of peasant culture. Stieber’s insightful article shows that northern 
intellectuals were the first to write the “modern peasant novel,” which was formed during the occupation. The 
“modern peasant novel” usually contains descriptions of migrations and discussions of a nostalgia for a militarized 
culture. See, Chelsea Stieber, “The Northern Récit Paysan: Regional Variations of the Modern Peasant Novel in 
Haiti,” Journal in French Studies 70 (2016), 48, 52-54, 58.  
2 Gaillard cites a newspaper report and an oral interview with Price-Mars' son, among other sources, to establish this 
claim. Gaillard, Hinche mise en croix, 153. 
3 In a passage critical of elite complicity, Price-Mars mentions in the footnote, "Certain jour du mois de Juillet 1918 
j'ai été personnellement arrêté pour le service de la corvée." See, Jean Price-Mars, La vocation d’élite (Port-au-
Prince, 1919, 40. 
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That is, seeing peasants as passive subjects and symbols of African-based nationalism produced 
a pro-peasant ideology that swept Haiti. 
 Urban southern intellectuals born in the capital helped popularized pro-peasant-based 
nationalism through their publications in the southern-based magazine La Revue Indigene.  
These writers were branded indigéniste that described a strand of thought which utilized 
ethnographic description to emphasize African-based traditions in Haiti. These indigéniste 
intellectuals usually hailed from the capital of Port-au-Prince, where U.S. rule concentrated 
commercial wealth and the new military power. Living in proximity to centers of commerce and 
power during the occupation, southern intellectual were in a position to package and elevate pro-
peasant ideas to the level of nationalist discourses.  
 In La Revue, Phillip Thoby-Marcelin, a son of the urban elites classes and native of the 
capital, valorized peasants in his 1926 “Sainement:” 
 
This morning my heart is bursting with youth, 
seething with violence. 
My cheek resting against the freshness of the dawn, 
Swearing an eternal scorn for European refinements, 
I wish henceforth to celebrate. 
revolutions shootings and massacres, 
the sound of coco-macaque on black shoulders, 
the roar of the lambi, the mystic sensuality of voodoo; 
to celebrate in a delirium three times 
lyrical and religious. 
 
Haitian elites began to concentrate on the peasantry that reflected the “African” (i.e., the lambi or 
the peasant conch shell flute and their African-derived religion of vodou) and former 
revolutionary potential in search to recreate a new national self.  In his 1927 poem titled “Vous,” 
Carl Brouard, also an elite and native of Port-au-Prince, wrote:  
You 
the destitute  
            




peasantry [paysanne] who descended the mountains 
with a child in your bellies… 
you 
all the people 
stand up.4 
 
Brouard exhortation for rural denizens to rebel against U.S.-led repression was in fact nostalgia 
for a repressed insurgent tradition. In addition, Brouard and Marcelin were what contemporaries 
described as la génération occupation that represented a group of Port-au-Prince-based 
intellectuals who were nostalgic of past revolutions.  Even though the former traditions of 
peasant revolt were notoriously reputed for terrorizing urban life, these urban-based intellectuals 
constructed ideas that focused on revitalizing the disempowered peasants. Of course no longer 
posing an actual threat, the idea of a rebellious peasantry was now part of the urban elite’s 
imaginary.   
The young François Duvalier, at the time living in the capital and a medical student, also 
published pro-peasant ideas in a newspaper column that, in one case, depicted insurgent leaders 
as mere patriots whose “blood spilt for the defense of the ancestral country.”5 However, Duvalier 
was not necessarily part of the indigénisme group of thought but another brand of nationalism 
called noirisme that stressed color tensions in Haiti. Noirisme was predicated on racial scientific 
notions that the dark-skinned elite was the most naturally suited for political leadership in Haiti 
because of their supposed biological link to the dark-skinned peasant masses.  Noirists eerily 
found inspiration, including Duvalier, from the scientific racist writings of Arthur de Gobineau, 
but they simultaneously rejected conspicuous notions of eurocentrism and white racial 
                                                
4 Michael Dash, Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915-1916.  London: The Macmillan Press, 1981), 94. 
5 François Duvalier, Souvenirs d’autrefois (bric-à-brac) 1926-1948 par Abderrahman (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie 
de L’État, 1968), 31. 
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superiority. Noirists and indigénistes, though differed on questions of colorisms, formed la 
génération occupation whose ideas tied peasant culture to nationalism and focused on the 
political marginalization of peasants.   
 Together, these intellectuals adopted important vernaculars to describe the plight of the 
peasantry.  La génération occupation popularized the term “paysan” that meant peasant but 
infused with nationalist connotations.  The French root of paysan refers to country and denotes 
both compatriot and peasant in Haiti. In Haiti, paysan came into vogue during the early twentieth 
century. Again, northern intellectuals may have been the first to popularize this term that turned 
peasants into symbols of nationalism.  Before his assassination during the caco insurgency, 
Charlemagne Péralte employed the term “paysan” in his declaration of war against U.S. forces.6 
Northern national intellectuals such as Cinéas also began to adopt the usage of paysan in one of 
the first modern peasant novels.7  Eventually, the term paysan grew widely popular in nationalist 
lexicon.  
 In addition, la génération occupation repackaged old popular the terms for the rural 
masses such as malheureux pauvre miserables. Malheureux and pauvre (unfortunate and poor), 
alone, were a part of many affective terms that early nineteenth-century Haitian leaders adopted 
to describe the freed population’s former brutalized conditions under slavery.8 The term 
obviously carries class connotations. But during the time of U.S. invasion, these terms came to 
mean disempowered peasants. “Malheureux,” “miserables,” “pauvre” were attached to “paysan” 
and together became tropes of victimization that were in vogue among political and intellectual 
                                                
6 Commander of Insurrectional Forces Charlemagne Masséna Péralte to Brigadier-General A. W. Caitlin, 1919, Box 
5, folder Caco Correspondence, Gendarmerie D’Haiti Collections, RG 127, NARA, Washington DC. 
7 Stieber, “The Northern Récit Paysan.”  
8 René tells us that that the 1805 Constitution described the newly freed as “malheureux.”  See, Réné, “Le Culte de 
l’égalité, 82 and 263. 
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elites.  Often, national elites invoked these tropes to elicit sympathy for peasants subjected to a 
harsh police system imposed by the U.S. forces.  
The Military-Led Police State and the Malheureux Paysan  
 Before withdrawing, U.S. forces revived a police system of control that was designed by 
early Haitian leaders to limit mobility in the Haitian countryside. Peasant communities formed 
villages called abitasyon or bitasyon (from the old French word habitation for plantation). The 
Haitian state mapped its control in the countryside by organizing clusters of abitasyon into 
geographical units labeled section rurale or rural section. Haiti roughly had about 500 rural 
sections and, beginning in the occupation period, the Haitian state appointed each section a 
single chef de section (Kr: chef seksyon). The chef in turn appointed auxiliary officers to police 
the several abitasyon constituting a single section rurale.  Yet throughout the nineteenth-century,  
armed peasants resisted the sort of police enforcement that impeded on their freedom of mobility 
and labor. However, by the 1920s, U.S.-led forces disarmed and demilitarized peasants and made 
them defenseless toward the police chefs that functioned under the military.   
  The military soldiers policed towns and cities; the police rurale, also under military 
authority, policed the countryside.  Even though the sole state agents in remote communities, 
police chefs relied on U.S. forces and military reinforcements located in nearby towns. 
Interestingly enough, isolation and sole access to state power made chefs immensely powerful. 
Furthermore, because U.S. forces neglected to provide the rural population with accountability 
measures for redress, peasants often encountered unchecked police brutality.   On 27 April 1929, 
for example, a magistrate in Jacmel reported that a local rural police agent habitually “clubbed 
the people, [and] he was always protected by certain american officers.” Noticing the effects of 
the political order under U.S. control, the magistrate urged national state officials to protect the 
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“malheureux… pauvres paysans.” 9  The researcher could not locate other primary materials to 
know the outcome of this particular case. Still, although the Jacmel magistrate wrote this 
conscientious letter, most persons in his position were complicit in police tactics.   
 Vigorous policing provided the bulk of convict labor to state officials, which included 
magistrates, that utilized the labor for their private purposes. Thus, Haitian magistrates 
energetically utilized the police force to compel labor. In some cases, they did so to drive the 
value of labor down to make it cheaper than what peasants were willing to accept. On 12 
December, the rural police arrested the peasant Petite Moucher Désir for insulting the local 
magistrate in the northern coastal town of Le Borgne.  Court records reveal, however, that the 
arrest had more to do with Désir objecting to negotiations regarding the value of his labor.  “I did 
not insult the communal Magistrate in the exercise of his function,” argued Désir to the judge, “it 
was for a simple observation [negotiation?] that I would do for him for the value of two gourdes 
which he makes we work for…him.” But the magistrate demanded that Désir work for one 
gourde. Désir refused the magistrate’s pittance and was arrested for “insulting” an authority 
figure.10 Previously, peasants utilized their guns and insurgent traditions to resist state tactics of 
forcefully extracting labor from the rural population. However, the occupation ended egalitarian 
traditions of popular revolt. U.S. troops withdrew in 1934 but left a militarized police state that 
continued with harsh police methods of control and labor compulsion in the countryside. Put 
simply, legacies of the occupation persisted in the post-occupation period. 
  One legacy was the police enforcement of vagrancy laws. Previously a post-emancipation 
law that was driven to dormancy by rural revolts in the nineteenth century, vagrancy was 
                                                
9 “Il a été toujours protégé par certains officiers américains qui ajoutaient foi à toutes les défense mensongères que 
produisaient devant eux ce Garnier.” Le Magistrat Communal to Monsieur le Préfet, 27 April 1929, folder 11857, 
ANH, PauP.  
10 1924 Simple Police, 12 December 1924, TP, Le Borgne. 
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reinvigorated in the occupation period to criminalize mobility and functioned to prevent 
insurgent mobilization in the Haitian countryside.  In the post-occupation period, the army 
directed rural police chefs to continue the enforcement of vagrancy laws such as vagabondage or 
sans aveu (without profession).  In the northern mountaintop town of Dondon, for example, the 
police chefs arrested “vagrant” peasants as sans aveu if they were not observed performing farm 
work.  On 28 February 1944, the peasant Mécius Bolivard of rural section Mathador was picked 
up and faced sans aveu charges in Dondon’s court of peace. Bolivard pleaded to the judge: “I am 
not a sans aveu…I am a hard worker for SHADA (a private U.S.-owned rubber plantation).”  
But in a moment of respite, he travelled to the rural section Bassin Caïman to enjoy a rural 
pastime and suffered the consequences. “I was in a gageure [cockfight] at Bassin Caïman where 
the agent of rural police arrested me,” Bolivard told the judge.  No mercy was shown; Bolivard 
was sentenced to three months in prison with hard labor.11  In addition to restrictions on their 
mobility and leisure time, peasants also faced police abuses. 
 Thus, ordinary rural denizens were often victims of excessive police violence. In January 
1948, the peasant Denise Laurent left her village in Bonbon and travelled twelve miles, either by 
foot or on beast, to the city of Jérémie seeking audience with the regional prefect. She 
complained to the prefect that two local chefs arrested her without just cause. The prefect agreed 
with her and stated in a letter of complaint to the regional commander of the army in charge of 
the rural police: “I cannot explain why the agents of police would behave in such a way, even if 
                                                
11 1944 Simple Police, 28 February 1944, TP, Dondon.  
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Ms. Denise Laurent had been guilty of theft.”12 These acts of police abuse infringed upon 
peasants’ sense of justice and sometimes led to their deaths.  
 In 1948, Joseph Mondesir, who was accused of stealing a goat in the rural section of 
Juanarie located on the northern central plateau, died in police custody while being escorted to 
prison. Mondesir’s case was posthumously investigated by the military, but the investigators 
ruled out foul play and blamed the death on the victim’s health issues instead. But Graveus 
Joseph, who was arrested along with Mondesir, mentioned to investigators that the already sickly 
Mondesir died after the police agent beat him with a club and whip.13 As police repression 
persisted in the post-invasion period, so did pro-peasants discourses and ideas. 
Many intellectuals portrayed the police rurale as autocratic and employed tropes of 
victimization that emphasized peasant disempowered conditions. In 1940, the ethnologist 
Emmanuel C. Paul published an essay in the Haitian newspaper Le Nouvelliste that criticized the 
legal immunity of chefs that led to abuse of power. Paul remarked, “Often these victimes nos 
paysan…they lack the understanding and their distance makes their cries not always available to 
us.”14 Assuming that peasants were entirely marginalized, Paul was suggesting that peasants lack 
ways for recourse. The noirists Larimer Denis and François Duvalier in their essay “Etude sur le 
problème des classes a travers l’histoire d’Haiti” also denounced, "the legendary attitude of our 
chefs de section… towards their brother paysans strangled by misery and ignorance.”15 In his 
novel Gouverneur de la rosée, the marxist and indigéniste Jacques Roumain portrayed a fictional 
chef as villainously antagonistic that unlawfully jails and taxes peasants.  
                                                
12“Je ne m’explique pas que des agents Police puissent agir la sorte, même si Madame Denise Laurent était 
coupable de vol.” Prefect George Jerome to Captain Emile Zamor, 2 February 1948 in the dossier of titled l’agent de 
la police Vincent Mécène, Dossier des renvoi de militaire et de policier rural 1947-1963, folder 11963, ANH, PauP. 
13Commandant Max Chicouye to Commandant du District de Hinche, 29 April 1948, in the police dossier of Joseph 
Josias, folder 11973, FAd’H, ANH, PauP.  
14 “Le chef de section et la classe de paysanne,” 10 February 1941, Le Nouvelliste,. 
15 François Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentielles, vol.1-2, (Port-au-Prince: Presse Nationales, 1968), 304. 
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One of the most famous phrases in Roumain’s novel employs the trope of disempowered 
peasants: “Malheureux farm in the sun and the riches are enjoyed in the shade.” In another 
instance, the protagonist peasant Manuel decries against the rural police and penal system in 
Haiti and bemoans: “we are pauvres, it’s true we are malheureux, it’s true, we are miserables.”16 
These intellectuals were alluding to the problems posed by governing a population utilizing the 
police to enforce repressive laws from the post-emancipation period. The intellectual 
conversation regarding police repression reached the heights of the national state that sometimes 
prompted official response.  
In 1942, the newspaper Haiti-Journal ran a story about President Élie Lescot’s plans to 
“open a school for training of Chefs de Section.”17 Even though the “police school” never 
officially opened, Lescot’s gesture to reform the police showed that the national state reacted to 
pro-peasant discourses regarding police abuse. In addition, the central military headquarters was 
seemingly sensitive towards criticism about the police rurale and usually responded to 
complaints – though not always favorably. On 5 November 1947, after an article in the 
newspaper Le Rempart described an unlawful imprisonment of a peasant by a chef in Aux Cayes. 
A military investigation was immediately opened. However, the investigation report dismissed 
the details of the newspaper article as mendacious.18
  
Nevertheless, the article had the rapid effect 
of triggering official response due to the national influence of pro-peasant discourses. And 
although marginalized, peasants also took notice to these discourses and participated in elite 
conversations regarding police abuse and employed its vernacular to prompt state action.  
                                                
16 See, Jacques Roumain, Gouverneurs de la rosée (edition Le Temps des Cerises,1944), 45 and 71-72. 
17 Kate Ramsey, The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power in Haiti (Chicago: The University Chicago Press, 
2011), 341(n61). 
18 Commandant du Sous-District to District des Cayes, 18 November 1947, in dossier L’agent de la police Pierre 
Booz, Dossiers de carrier militaire des agents de polices rurales (1947-1955), folder 11989, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
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       ***** 
In 1948, the peasant named Pyrra Dimanche of Kenscoff sent a letter to the central 
military headquarters in the capital that supervised the rural police. “Grand Général, the only 
reassurance that a pauvre malheureux of the countryside can have is to know that justice, even its 
enjoyment in the countryside, reigns in your bureau,” declared Dimanche.  His letter described 
how a search for his missing calf led to his own arrest by the local chef de section named Saint-
Rilus Solius. Dimanche complained that he spent two days in jail under “the worst treatment” 
and was finally released after paying chef Solius a bribe. “Voila général,” Dimanche bemoaned, 
“how a pauvre paysan is taxed to live under the caprice of the chef de section.” Dimanche could 
have been a “poor peasant” but this last phrase and others that appear in the letter seemed 
borrowed from political elite tropes of pilfering rural policemen living off helpless peasants 
through jailing and unjust taxation.  Dimanche identified himself as “un pauvre malheureux” and  
“paysan” which were twentieth-century labels that political elites had popularized to emphasize 
peasants disempowered conditions.  In reality,  “cultivateur,”  “habitant,” “habitant cultivateur,” 
or “habitant propriétaire (for mid-sized landowning peasants),” were official categories for 
peasants. Thus, when paysan appeared in official records, it usually was done so to elicit political 
sympathy for the peasantry. This explains why Dimanche avoided the more euphemistic 
“cultivateur” and, instead, emphasized his special citizenship as a “paysan” to make claims on 
the state. 19  
 Dimanche’s letter seemed to have produced some justice but inadvertently. It underwent 
the tortuous process of being officially discredited before action was taken against chef Solius. 
                                                
19 Monsieur Pyrra Dimanche to Grand Générale du Quartier General de Port-au-Prince, 8 June 1948; found in the 
folder titled L’agent de la police Saint-Rilus Solius, Dossiers de carrier militaire des agents de polices rurales 
(1947-1955), folder 11989, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
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The letter, as Dimanche intended, was forwarded to the highest level of the military hierarchy 
(Chef d’Etat-Major Général) and an investigation was ordered. But the investigatory report 
conclude that Dimanche was a “professional thief” who lacked “morality.” The report also 
dismissed his letter as a “tissue of lies.” Nevertheless, the Dimanche’s letter drew the attention of 
the military hierarchy to his case that compelled the army to recommend that chef Solius be 
jailed for neglecting to follow appropriate procedures concerning Dimanche’s arrest. Six months 
later Solius’ military contract expired without being approved for reenlistment; his character was 
labeled, “MAUVAIS.”20  
  
 
Figure 3. Chef de section. Image of chef Rilus Solius 21 
  
 Before the U.S. occupation, peasants would turn to insurgency and revolt to address 
abuses. In the post-occupation period, however, peasants learned from intellectual and national 
discourses to look to Port-au-Prince for political sympathy and official redress. On 10 June 1952, 
the peasant Emmanuel “Emmanus” Jolicoeur sent a letter to President General Paul Magloire 
regarding a complaint against a local chef.  “Permit me to disturb you for a moment in your 
multiple occupations to demand you cast a completely paternal regard on my sad situation which 
was done to a pauvre paysan,” declared Emmanus.  In the letter, Emmanus described how he 
                                                
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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was the victim of an egregious plot organized by local land surveyors and court officials, by 
whom he referred to as homme de sac et de corde (French for brigands), to dispossess him of 
land he recently purchased in the neighboring region of Léogane. They had him arrested in 
Léogane where he spent three tortured nights in prison. Emmanus was later transferred to a 
prison in Petit Goâve further away from home. He was transferred by chef Lorméguy Espérance 
who beat and mistreated him on the road leaving him with a laceration above one eye. Emmanus 
pleaded in his letter, “It cannot be that under the all humane Government of your Excellence 
Paul E. Magloire, reigning in all its beauty, [this] malice and injustice.” He concluded the letter 
by employing tropes of victimization, “it is persuaded by the spirit of social justice, of the 
solicitude of all paternal of Your Government, that this pauvre citizen lost in the remote 
corners… you come to listen to my feeble voice.”  Emmanus’s letter of complaint reached 
President Magloire whose secretary forwarded the complaint to the general of the military 
whereby an investigation was initiated. But the road to justice was tortuous and often endless. 
Unfortunately, the military investigation discredited Emmanus’s claims and no action was taken 
against chef Lorméguy. This instance and others demonstrate the deployment of pro-peasant 
political ideology by intellectuals, state officials, and peasants as a way of defending their 
respective interests and in the process building a national consciousness regarding the welfare of 
the peasantry.  However, these concerns were not converted into political reforms that improved 
the conditions of peasants.  
 Throughout the post-invasion period, state expenditures on agriculture never exceeded 
five percent while coffee, the peasant’s chief cash crop, faced stiff competition on the global 
market.22  The state’s investment in agriculture was negligible in comparison to its expenditures 
                                                
22 See charts on expenditures in Lundalh, Peasants and Poverty, 304-306. 
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that went to the small U.S. created military and state bureaucrats which together consumed more 
than half of the state’s budget.23  Often, the very political elites who espoused pro-peasant 
discourses were beneficiaries of structural inequalities. One judge of peace in the northern town 
of Acul-du-Nord sworn not to assist local state agents in tax collection because his duties 
involved the “protection for the masse paysanne.” But the tax agent revealed in a latter that the 
Acul judge was merely appropriating the nationalist discourses to avoid paying two year’s worth 
of back taxes on his own property.24  Despite much talk about peasant rights among political and 
intellectual elites, abuses continued as the rural population began to form a fully disempowered 
class. These discourses rarely became into the chief concerns of the central government and were 
subordinate to urban planning and modernization.  However, Duvalier ran for president in 1957 
and made pro-peasant discourses the basis of his presidential campaign.  
Duvalier’s Justice Sociale 
 In 1907, François Duvalier was born into an urban family of modest means. His father 
Duval Duvalier was a judge of peace and his mother was a baker. The young Duvalier came of 
age during the U.S. invasion and was shaped by the pro-peasant discourses of the moment. By 
the time U.S. troops withdrew in 1934, Duvalier regularly published opinions in newspapers that 
covered topics heavily focused on peasant marginalization and urban-based prejudice toward the 
rural population. In addition, Duvalier’s professional occupations as a country doctor 
familiarized him with the countryside.   
Many elderly peasants living in inaccessible villages recall that the young Duvalier, 
whom they referred to as “Papa Doc,” worked in local medical centers to give piki (Fr: piqûre) or 
                                                
23 Lundalh, 379-385. 
24 Préposé des Contributions to Collecteur des Contributions Cap-Haitien, 9 April 1947, Folder Letter rel. Chef 
Section ’46, DGI/Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.  
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vaccinations. From the dry isolated northern region of Lacoma to the southern reclusive 
mountaintop village of Mackary near the coastal town of Jacmel, peasants recalled Duvalier 
curing them of pyan (Fr: pian) or yaws that made rural life exasperating. Duvalier’s engagement 
with pro-peasant discourses and his personal interactions with rural denizens shaped his early 
understanding of rural life. But Duvalier’s noirist writings brought him national attention.     
Duvalier and other noirists represented the views of a disaffected urban black bourgeoisie 
that criticized mulatto elites for political inequalities in Haiti.  “How to explain since 1804, the 
black class though the majority has been dominated by the minority?” inquired Duvalier in a 
1948 weekly column.25  However, noirists rarely articulated a clear vision that would facilitate 
peasant integration into national politics. Instead, noirists looked upon the rural masses as mere 
benefactors of the political success of the black elite. Yet when he ran for president in 1957, 
Duvalier’s noirist views were overshadowed by a class-based populism that he branded justice 
sociale which emphasized the plight of the peasantry.26   
During his presidential campaign, Duvalier travelled throughout the provinces and 
espoused pro-peasant ideas that class inequalities and political abandonment of the Haitian 
countryside, rather than color divisions, were the chief causes of peasant poverty.  Duvalier laid 
out plans to achieve what he branded justice sociale. With a particular focus on improving 
material conditions in the countryside, Duvalier traveled around the country to spell out his 
program of justice sociale. He preached the expansion of irrigation and rural education in 
                                                
25 Duvalier, Souvenirs d’autrefois, 119. 
26 Noirists eerily found inspiration, including Duvalier, from the scientific racist writings of Arthur de Gobineau, but 
simultaneously rejected conspicuous notions of eurocentrism and white racial supremacy. In addition, noirists often 
disagreed with Haitian Marxists’ emphasis on the prevailing role of class exploitation as a function of political 
inequality. Still, they did possess some criticisms of class inequality but was shape by the notion that the political 
marginalization of the dark-skinned masses was the product of color prejudice by the traditional light-skinned elite 
who remained politically supreme in a zero-sum color conflict. Furthermore, noirisme looked upon the peasants as 
mere benefactors of the political success of the dark-skinned elite, but rarely articulated peasant integration into 
national politics. Thus, conceptually, noirisme continued to distance the peasantry from central politics.   
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Arcahaie; reforestation and reduction of land and irrigation taxes to which Artibonite peasants 
were subjected; the revival of banana agriculture in Grand Goâve; the end of “feudalism” in 
Léogane; the realization of a twenty-thousand hectare irrigation system in the plains of Port-de-
Paix and Moustiques; and so on.27  Duvalier’s notion of justice sociale resembled more like the 
ideas of the marxist Roumain whose own novel Gouverneur concluded with the installation of an 
irrigation system to improve farming for beleaguered peasants. In fact, as we shall see, Duvalier 
would complete the construction of the largest peasant-based irrigation system in Haiti. Thus, for 
reasons yet unknown, Duvalier’s noirist views dissipated during his presidential campaign and 
gave way to the class-based populism of justice sociale.  
Leaving noirisme behind on the campaign trail, Duvalier speeches emphasized class 
divisions produced by elite exploitation. In the province city of Gonaives on 23 December 1956, 
Duvalier decried, “I always fought against the exploitation of workers and peasants.”28  On 19 
March 1957, Duvalier proclaimed to an audience in Port-de-Paix, “I dream that the provinces of 
my country, still abandoned, oscillating between material and moral desolation, a destiny of 
development which will permit each person, man of the Rural Section like the city-dweller put in 
words his tragedy and rediscover, with determined work, the indomitable energy which creates 
and maintains the confidence in oneself.”29  Rival presidential candidates also included the 
peasantry into their discourses, but not with the same focus on social and class-based issues.   
The other presidential candidates were technocratic in their approaches. Hailing from a 
family of landed elites, Clement Jumelle studied economics at the University of Chicago and was 
exposed to U.S.-based theories of development. Jumelle centered his political platform on the 
                                                
27 Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentielles, 32, 96, 98, and 115.  
28 Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentielles, 37. 
29 Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentielles, 139. 
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need for increase technical expertise in Haiti. Louis Dejoie, a large landowner and former 
senator, focused on the development of the commercial agribusiness. Dejoie would become a 
serious contender for the presidency.  
 Dejoie was an influential politician, but opponents exploited his ties to the commercial 
elite. For example, Dejoie’s campaign slogan aimed to revitalized agriculture, but was 
purposefully misinterpreted by rivals as urban condescension toward peasants: “the return to the 
farms.”30  Whether true or not, Duvalier sought to take advantage of speculations regarding the 
urban elitism of some of his rivals by portraying himself as the candidate who, supposedly unlike 
the other candidates, embraced the significance of peasant participation in the election. On 17 
September 1957, Duvalier declared to an audience of peasants in the Artibonite, “My adversaries 
have reason…I am rural in a nation where 90% of the population is rural."31 In September, the 
elections drew results that reflected the efforts of Duvalier’s rural-based campaigns: Duvalier 
lost the vote in the capital of Port-au-Prince (Duvalier, 6,443 votes; Dejoie 10,596 votes), but 
won the majority in the provinces.32  In addition, Duvalier’s presidential victory was also the 
product of internal military conflict.  
The elections fractured the U.S.-created military into groups that supported various 
presidential candidates. This led to scattered street battles between military factions.  The most 
significant example was the May 25 crisis where Colonel Pierre Armand and his forces, which 
were supporters of Dejoie, besieged the military headquarters in the capital held by General Léon 
Cantave who was posturing to take power for himself. Rumors only explain how the crisis came 
                                                
 30 Leslie F. Manigat, Haiti of the Sixties Object of International concern (a tentative global analysis of the 
potentially explosive situation of a crisis country in the Caribbean), Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research 
(1964), 43. 
31 “Grand Succès du Docteur Duvalier dans l’Artibonite,” 17 September 1957, Le Nouvelliste. 
32 “Les premiers résultants des élections du 22,” 22 September 1957, Le Nouvelliste.  
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to a close, but Armand was unsuccessful and Déjoie’s chances of winning the election waned. 
Cantave was also traumatized by the event and, soon after, fled to Miami. The elections 
completely divided the military that created an opportunity for Duvalier. One historian observes, 
“the biggest loser of May 25th was the Haitian army…Soldiers had taken up arms against 
soldiers, officers against officers. The military had become completely politicized and was now, 
more than ever before, susceptible to pressure and influence from presidential candidates. It 
would pay for this weakness.” 33 Military factions eliminated each other and cleared the way for 
officers who supported Duvalier to secure his path to power. Thus, the role of the fractious 
military in the rise of the Duvalier dictatorship was disjointed and inadvertent. 
 Déjoie, Jumelle, and other rivals, who also had connections in the army, alleged that the 
pro-Duvalier military faction rigged the elections, but a lack of evidence makes it difficult to 
verify these charges. If the elections revealed anything, it was that Duvalier’s rural-based 
campaign foreshadowed how the regime would rely on the rural population, as much as trusted 
elements within the military, to consolidate power.  This political approach brought Duvalier into 
power and eventually sustained his repressive regime.  
François Duvalier took office in October 1957 and soon utilized force to eliminate 
political opposition. In December 1957, for example, Duvalier modified the constitution to 
outlaw strikes by government employees and to suppress the previous intractable tendencies of 
the Haitian senate.34 Newspapers critical of the regime were forced out of print, hundreds of 
supposed dissidents were locked up, and the boldest of dissenters were greeted with utter state 
brutality. One of the most gruesome examples of the last point was illustrated in 1958 when 
                                                
33 Christian Alcindor, “U.S.-Haiti Relations From 1957 to 1963: Anticommunism, Nation-Building, and Radical 
Diplomacy in the Age of National Liberation” (dissertation PhD, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey. 
2002), 61. 
34 Alcindor, “U.S.-Haiti Relations From 1957 to 1963,” 158-159.  
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secret state agents kidnapped and sexually assaulted the feminist writer Yvonne Hakim-Rimpel 
after she criticized the regime. Already in its infancy, the Duvalier state showed signs of brutal 
political intolerance.  
Yet as Duvalier government violently repressed the political opposition, pro-peasant 
populism formed the public discourse of the regime. In May 1958, during one of his many 
organized peasant rallies in the capital of Port-au-Prince, Duvalier declared to a “Congrès” of 
rural denizens: “The evolution of the peasant… by being totally conscious, accelerates the rise to 
citizenship.” Duvalier added that this rally was not held simply for the present rural audience to 
talk about their agricultural production, but for the “producers themselves” to “recount their 
frustrations, decry their miseries, and denounce [stigmatiser] the cruelty of city people and the 
behavior of intermediary merchants.” He declared that his new government, “is the triumph of 
the peasant and worker; it marks the end of artificial demarcations and it announces the 
anticipated moment, that is to say the liberation of the Haitian Man by the liquidation of forms of 
moral and material oppression.”35  
His speeches were the culmination of pro-peasant conversations developed since the U.S. 
invasion and came to define the regime. Duvalier harped on the point regarding improving 
peasant material conditions.  On 1 May 1958, he promised “A new rise of consciousness… to 
achieve the fight of production, the fight of conserving the growth of resources and assuring to 
                                                
35“ L’évolution du paysan…par une prise de conscience totale, accélère cette accession à la citoyenneté…La 
réalisation de ce Congrès ne consacre pas le verbalisme creux des tirades sur la production. C’est le producteur lui-
même qui vient dire son expérience, raconter ses déboires, décrire ses misères et stigmatiser la férocité de l’homme 
des villes ou le comportement des intermédiaires. ”  "...il est le triomphe du paysan et l’ouvrier; il marque la fin des 
démarcations artificielles et il annonce les temps attendus, c’est-a-dire la libération de l’Homme haïtien par la 
liquidation des formes d’oppression morale et matérielle." Docteur François Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentiales Vol. III, 
La révolution au pouvoir. Port-au-Prince, 1967, 63. 
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the peasants and workers a distribution of revenues, quite equitable, quite humane.”36  “This 
election was the victory of the miserables masse paysan who henceforth would be assured a fair 
and equitable share of national revenue," Duvalier announced in another speech.37  
Posturing as the national leader of peasants, Duvalier also interwove his populism with 
political repression. For example, the Duvalier regime expropriated the estates of his political 
rivals and redistributed them to peasants. On 15 October 1957, the Duvalier regime nationalized 
the properties of the former president Paul E. Magloire and his family.38 The six hundred acre 
estate of Arsène Magloire in the irrigated valley of Artibonite was subdivided and transferred to 
a state-sponsored peasant association comprising 125 members.39  To be sure, the regime did not 
redistribute all of the Magloire estate, but peasants squatted on what was left regardless. For 
instance, Duvalier ordered Magloire’s two hundred-twenty nine-acre plantation in abitasyon 
Balan of Quartier Morin to be resold for state revenue. However, according to local oral 
tradition, Balan peasants “pwan’y pou piyay” or “took it for free.”40 Peasants squatting on 
nationalized land prevented the regime from economically exploiting land seizures reveals the 
                                                
36 "Une  nouvelle prise de conscience des difficultés à vaincre pour gagner la bataille de la production, la bataille 
de conservation de l’accroissement des ressources et assurer au paysan et à l’ouvrier une distribution de revenus 
plus équitable, plus humaine.” Duvalier, 157. As we have seen, Duvalier occasionally mentioned the Haitian 
proletariat in speeches, but the number of workers was negligible in Haiti. Furthermore, wage labor included 
agriculture workers who also farmed on their own lots. Duvalier’s populism was centered on improving peasant 
material conditions. 
37 "Cette élection c’était la victoire de nos miserables masses paysannes pour qui se trouverait désormais assuré 
une part juste et équitable du revenu national.” Duvalier, Oeuvres Essentiales Vol. III, 91. 
38 AMEmbassy, Port-Au-Prince to The Department of State, 31 December 1956, 8.38.16/12-3156, RG 59, Central 
Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, Maryland; “Enquête à Desdunes Grand Place,” 17 June 1961, Le Nouvelliste.    
39 In the 1970s, Arsène’s former land remained in legal dispute between elites and peasants. It may have been that 
after François Duvalier died former claimants to the nationalized land were seeking to recover it under Jean-Claude 
Duvalier. See, Max Belot to Juge de Paix du Quartier Desdunes, 4 January 1972, (letter can be found folded in the 
1971 Interrogatoire at the) Tribunal de Paix in the commune of Desdunes, Artibonite Department. Even after the 
fall of the Duvalier regime, this land was still the object of violent dispute. See, the report “LES CONFLITS 
TERRIENS SUR L’HABITATION ACCUEIL, DESDUNES,” ODVA in Pont Sonde.  
40 On official directives to local officials to seize Magloire land in Quartier Morin, see,  Procès-verbal le prise de 
possession des 72 carreaux de terre de sieur Arsène Magloire, 7 November 1957, Tribunal de Paix in the commune 
of Quartier Morin, Northern Department. On official directives to resell land in Balan see, Collecteur des 
Contributions to Préposé des Contributions de Quartier Morin, 5 November 1957, DGI-Impôts Locatif, Quartier 
Morin. On local information regarding local squatting on Balan, Interview with Louis Nicolas in habitation Galmant 
du Plat, Quartier Morin, 23 May 2015.  
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state limitations on how to control the whirlwind of its own populism. Nevertheless, the state 
continued the practice of taking land from political enemies and giving them to peasants.  
On 23 November 1958, the regime nationalized Dejoie's 1,235 acre estate in the offshore 
island Ile a Vache (about 20 square miles or 12,800 hectares large) and subdivided it among 
three-hundred peasants, each given a minimum of five hectares when the average peasant plot in 
Haiti was no larger than one hectare. The Duvalier state publicly expressed that its decree was an 
act to bring about social equity that would “ameliorate the deplorable life conditions of the rural 
population.”41 Not much information could be found to elucidate how the redistribution process 
was administered and to determine whether it was conducted in an equitable manner.  
But recent news from Ile à Vache confirms that peasants actually were given land by 
Duvalier. In 2013, Haitian President Michel Martelly, who fashioned himself as a neo-
Duvalierist and a strong-man political leader, attempted to dispossess peasants in Ile à Vache to 
build ecotourist resorts on peasant farms. In so doing, however, President Martelly confronted 
the populist legacies of the Duvalier regime revealed to him by peasant claims that their land was 
gifted to them by Duvalier himself.  One news source has opined on this curious irony:  
 
All this, for the sake of ‘ecotourism’  and without any consultation with 20,000 islanders, many of whom 
hold rural grants of their properties and farming rights from the State, as well as various leases. Interestingly, 
it was François Duvalier who distributed some 2,500 acres [this number is higher than what was reported in 
my primary sources] of Ile a Vache lands to the population in 1957 after wresting them from a Senator 
called Louis Desjoies [sic], who had treated the island as his private fiefdom. Thus this recent move by the 
Martelly… regime to reverse this bit of Duvalierist agrarian reform could be regarded as a sort of 
Duvalierism with all the dictatorial tactics but none the resources of nationalism.42 
 
                                                
41 “Commission Formed to Distribute 500 Hectares of Ile A VACHE,” Haiti Sun, January 17, 1959. “Distribution de 
Terres aux Paysans de l’Ille à Vache,” 1958, Le Nouvelliste,. 
42 “Widespread Abuse and Police Brutality in Haiti’s Ill a Vache” 24 July 2014, Counter Punch, 
www.counterpunch.org. 
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What the journalist describes as nationalism was more likely part of justice sociale populism that 
integrated repression and peasant interests to buttress the power of the regime. In this way, 
populism was as significant as a to tool of establishing the regime’s hegemony by having the 
double effect of weakening the opposition while deepening peasant’s loyalty to the regime.  
Often in the literature, however, the regime’s ideology has been presented as a noirist 
brand of fascism. Noirisme and its particular emphasis on the call for black elites to achieve 
political supremacy can be rarely, if at all, found in most of Duvalier’s recorded presidential 
speeches. The same cannot be said for local regime loyalists. For example, Wilfred Siméon, the 
minister of interior and later magistrate of Jérémie, gave speeches that alluded to color conflict as 
the preeminent political problem of the nation and saw Duvalier as the leader who would 
unshackle the dominance of the mulatto elite.43  Duvalier as president, on the other hand, had 
rarely been recorded espousing noirist ideology.  On the contrary Duvalier endorsed color unity. 
One U.S. journalist recounted how president Duvalier alluded to his commitment to reflect the 
colors in the Haitian flag that symbolize the union between the dark-skinned and light skinned 
Haitians. “I am neither the red nor the blue but the indivisible bicolor of the Haitian people,” 
                                                
43 In a speech in Jérémie on 22 September 1957 praising Duvalier’s election victory, Siméon called for unity 
between dark-skinned and light-skinned Haitians,“c’était enfin le triomphe de la rénovation nationale dans l’union 
des Fils de la Patrie, noir et jaune qui nous créa le bicolore Noir et rouge  qui nous a valut l’Epopée fulgurant de 
Vertières, la geste Immortelle de 1804.” But his speech alluded to disrupting the hegemony of the light-skinned 
traditional elite, “Ils ignorant cependant que la réaction d’une petite clique de monarques déchus, inconsolés, 
fatigues de contempler à leurs pieds les débris d e leur couronne et qui manigancent dans l’ombre pour conquérir le 
trône.” Wilfred asserted that the Duvalier rule was not going to be similar to dark-skinned puppet presidents under 
the control of the light-skinned elite, “…le Président Duvalier noble pauvre de la classe refuse de servir de 
doublure…” See, 22 September in untitled folder, Wilfred Siméon  Private Collection.  Still, color tensions may 
have been comparably more acute in Jérémie which manifested in one the most bloody massacres in Haitian history. 
A group of exiled Haitian men  in the U.S. who hailed from Jérémie’s light-skinned elite families organized a rebel 
group called Jeune Haiti who in 1964 launched an attack in the interior near the city of Jérémie. The rebellion was 
suppressed and the local agents of the regime executed a number of the light-skinned elite families in Jérémie.    
            
             
 94 
asserted Duvalier.44 As we shall see, the regime’s central ideology would eventually change into 
something more racially conscious, but this would come after his populist project failed. 
Pro-Peasant Populism in Haiti and the Artibonite Irrigation Project 
 Between 1957 and 1962, the regime focused on certain agricultural projects that were 
partly administered and financially supported by U.S. development agencies. The Duvalier 
regime relied on U.S. assistance to realize justice sociale. The projects were portrayed as 
beneficial to the peasantry but also seemed motivated by the regime’s desires to augment the 
national economy that relied heavily on peasant production. Duvalier’s request for U.S. 
assistance for the construction of roads, wharfs, state-owned sugar mills, and an international 
airport suggests his goals to improve the internal circulation and export of peasant-grown 
commodities. That is to say, these projects were not merely intended to generate support among 
peasants but also sought to develop an already market-oriented peasant economy that was fully 
integrated into the national economy and heavily taxed by the state. Contrary to generalized 
representations of subsistence farmers simply growing their meals for immediate consumption, 
the peasant mode of existence in Haiti was primarily based on producing commodities that 
peasant women shuttled to public markets where they sold off their agricultural production in 
exchange for cash utilized to buy food not locally grown, pay medical bills, reluctantly 
contribute to tax, purchase properties, make offerings to the ancestral spirits and saints, and so 
on. Since the tax bureau was created during the U.S. occupation, the state strove to regulate this 
economy by taxing the circulation of commodities and money in every way it could and, thus, an 
                                                
44 Ibid. 
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improvement of rural infrastructure and the underdeveloped peasant market-based economy 
would logically augment state revenue and strengthen its control over the peasant economy.45  
The most significant development project was the expansion of irrigation in the 
Artibonite valley that had already been underway for eighteen years prior to Duvalier taking 
office, but the project remained wholly incomplete.46 In 1949, President Dumarsais Estimé and 
Haitian agricultural experts drew up plans to integrate small U.S. built gravity irrigations into a 
larger system extending throughout the Artibonite valley and requested U.S. technical expertise 
and monetary funding. The U.S. and the Haitian governments agreed to form an autonomous 
administrative body called Organisme de Développement de la Vallée de l’Artibonite (ODVA) 
that governed the irrigation project. ODVA comprised U.S. and Haitian officials that represented 
the joint efforts and interests of the respective governments. The Haitian government appointed 
the ODVA director while most important financial positions were reserved for U.S. officials.  In 
1950, the ODVA project was stalled after Estimé was overthrown by a military coup led by 
General Paul Magloire who succeeded to the presidency. The construction of the dam and 
                                                
45 Peasants (mainly women) vended and, thus, contributed crops and non-crop-based commodities into an extensive 
market network that responded to pressures of supply and demand. Peasant market women machann or madam sara 
bought, sold, and transported commodities to and from local markets that formed an extensive market network that 
carried commodities to wherever they were demanded—all of which the state (inefficiently) monitored for taxation. 
Peasants also grew exported commodities such as coffee and cocoa which were indirectly taxed passing through 
customhouses.   
46  George F. Freeman, “Report on the soil survey of the Artibonite Plain: an investigation of the psychical and 
chemical properties of the soils, the occurrence and composition of alkali, of the climate, and of the native 
vegetation, crops, and agricultural practices of the region,” Service Technique of the Department of Agriculture and 
Vocational Education, 1926, Port-au-Prince. In fact, many of the irrigations projects, sites of older colonial 
waterway systems near ruins of former plantations, that Duvalier undertook were legacies of the occupation. Since 
independence, agriculture in terms of a technical development had been associated with the plantation economy. 
When the peasant economy prevailed, the Haitian state abandoned technical assistance to small farming leaving the 
majority of the rural masses to toil the soil with simply the primitive tools such as machetes. The Agriculture 
Department seemed to be more concerned with the surveillance of labor than technical development which explains 
why the Agriculture and Public Works (Travaux Public) were combined into the one institution throughout the 
nineteenth-century. During U.S. intervention, a new building was built for agricultural, detaching it from the 
Travaux Public but this seemed to have attached agricultural development to U.S. financial support ever since. One 
economic study on Haiti demonstrates that the Agriculture department never received annually more than  8% of 
state expenditures in a country predominately agrarian, leaving the financial support of agricultural development to 
U.S. aid. See, Lundalh, 303-317. Most of state revenue, more than half, went to state employees and the Haitian 
army that only contributed to urbanization of central politics; see, Lundalh, 379-386. 
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irrigation system resumed in 1952 and plans were devised to expand the system to include 
33,000 hectares of land. However by 1955, even though the U.S. government expended three 
million dollars towards irrigation construction, only 4,000 hectares of land were irrigated.47 In 
1956, the Magloire government fell from power in the face of urban-based popular unrest.  
Substantial irrigation expansion occurred after the fall of the Magloire government. From 1955 
into the first two years of the Duvalier government, construction continued, brining the irrigation 
to cover some 20,000 acres in the Artibonite. Ever since the U.S. occupation, the Haitian state 
outsourced agricultural development to U.S agencies and Duvalier continued with this practice to 
support the materialist side of his pro-peasant populism.  
Duvalier turned to the U.S. for loans and grants to support what would become the largest 
irrigation system in Haiti that was being constructed in the Artibonite valley. His hopes of 
receiving assistance followed the recent creation of Eisenhower’s Development Loan Fund, 
passed in 1957 that provided Third World countries with low interest loans for development 
projects. Duvalier spoke optimistically about the prospects of U.S. aid. During an interview with 
a New York Times’ reporter, Duvalier admitted that similarly to Puerto Rico whose economic 
progress was attributed to U.S. assistance, he also wanted Haiti to become “the spoiled child with 
the of American capital.”48 
Early U.S. assistance, however, was delayed by, among other issues, U.S. concerns 
regarding Haiti’s defaults on foreign obligations amounting to a 2.7 million deficit and by a 
pending case involving the murder of the U.S. citizen Shibley Talamas in the custody of Haitian 
                                                
47 “SCIPA Complete Review Years of Work in Haiti 1955,” RG 286, Central Decimal Files: 1962-963, NARA, 
College Park, Maryland.  
48 Alcindor, 74. 
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authorities.49  For U.S. officials, the case was satisfactorily resolved with Talamas’s wife 
restituted $100,000 from the Duvalier state and demoted and discharged authorities complicit in 
Talamas’s murder.50  Aid began to trickle in as well, but the regime had to convince Washington 
of economic efficiency. The Duvalier state immediately pursued rigorous austerity measures to 
cut down on public spending and to reduce state operating costs by 10%.  A sudden (yet short 
lived) peasant-produced coffee boom in exports between 1957-59 contributed to efforts to raise 
state revenue.  By fall 1958, according to a U.S. economic report, the Duvalier regime generated 
a 2.6 million surplus.51 In his second inaugural address on 22 October 1958, Duvalier thanked 
Haitians for bearing the brunt of taxation in order to pay off foreign debt.52  Duvalier in the same 
speech announced to the public that his next step was “to appeal to foreign capital.53  After 
meeting austerity conditions to receive aid, U.S. began releasing large amounts of money in the 
form of grants and loans to the Haitian government in support of agricultural development 
projects. 
Previously, Haiti received the least amount of U.S. financial investments in the Caribbean 
and Latin America. In 1955, for example, the U.S. gave Haiti $18 million; whereas the 
Dominican Republic received $134 million; Panama, $479 million; and Cuba, $723 million.54  
Finally, for the completion of the Artibonite irrigation project, the U.S. released unprecedented 
amounts money to the Haitian government under Duvalier. The construction of the Artibonite 
                                                
49AMEmbassy Port-au-Prince, Haiti to The Department of State, 9 January 1958, 838.00/1-958, RG 59, Central 
Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
50 Alcindor, 82 
51AMEmbassy Port-au-Prince, Haiti to The Department of State, 9 January 1958, 838.00/1-958, RG 59, Central 
Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
52 Duvalier, 110. 
53 "...dans la mesure où les intérêts nationaux le permettraient Mon Gouvernement a fait appel aux capitaux 
étrangers.” Duvalier, 110-111.  
54 Alcindor, 70. 
            
             
 98 
irrigation system was promoted as a justice sociale project that aimed to distribute water to small 
farms owned by peasants throughout the previously arid valley.  
            ***** 
Aside from propping the agricultural economy, the regime intended the Artibonite 
irrigation project to generate local peasant support for Duvalier. In June 1958, Duvalier visited 
the Artibonite valley where he declared to local peasants, “I do not give the right to anyone...my 
accession to this position of Chief of State. I remain, above all, the President of the 
Backcountry.”55  The construction of the irrigation system was certainly tied to the regime’s 
propagandistic programs that aimed convey to peasants that the regime was the guarantor of 
political, social, and economic opportunities for Artibonite peasants. Duvalier himself strove to 
reinforce this brand of populist paternalism.  A glance at the monthly prefecture briefings 
illustrate how the regime held rallies in the countryside to inculcate the peasantry with state 
populism and official ideology that were in nature quite paternalistic but promoted justice 
sociale: 
13 October 1958: Meeting organized in Pont Benoit by the Prefect Aubin and the 
Communal Magistrate of the Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, Emile Jean François. Fight 
against abuse. Creation of Literacy Center… 
 
13 October 1958: Steps by the Prosecutors Office next to the Civil Court of Saint 
Marc against the abuse whose victims are certain paysans of my Jurisdiction…  
 
21 October 1958: Visit to Desdunes and meeting…AIM OF MEETING: Definition of 
Duvalierism. Duvalierists think Nation. Ignore the value of Money, sacrifice for the 
collective and unite in this action.56  
 
                                                
55 "je ne dois à personne...mon accession à cette position de Chef d’État. Je demeure, et avant tout, le Président de 
l’Arrière pays.” “Le Voyage du Président Duvalier dans l’Artibonite,” 28 June 1958, Le Nouvelliste. 
56 Michel Aubin to Secrétaire d’Etat de l’intérieur et de la Défense Nationale, 6 November 1958, folder 2112, 
Interior, ANH, PauP. 
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The regime’s rallies, meetings, and speeches informed peasants about their rights and what 
rendered them good citizens within the parameters of the regime’s patronage. 
 In addition, the joint effort of the ODVA helped stretched the regime’s tentacles into the 
lives of Artibonite peasants scattered across the expanse of the valley. According to a U.S. 
official report, the ODVA reached out to a population of 300,000 peasants to improve local 
communities by employing techniques such as sending out “a mobile projection truck [that] 
visits remote farm areas” to distribute “simple posters, leaflets, exhibits and radio programs 
[that] make a persistent attempt to spread the notion of a better way of life.”57 Furthermore, the 
performance reports of U.S. officials reveal advances in agriculture in the once arid valley of 
Artibonite.  
 On 8 May 1959, Harry Yoe, the director of U.S. Operation Missions (USOM), wrote to 
Washington that the expansion of ODVA irrigation under the Duvalier period surpassed 
expectations established when irrigation construction was originally undertaken: “The yield of 
$16,000,000 on 50,000 acres shows a farm unit gross return of $320 per acre or $640 per unit, 
which is a return not anticipated six years ago.”58 On 25 January 1962, the newspaper Haiti Sun, 
which was privately owned by a U.S. citizen, reported that U.S. Ambassador Raymond L. 
Thurston went on a four-hour inspection tour of the Artibonite valley. Thurston returned with 
news that “he was impressed with the scale and magnitude of the joint Haitian-American efforts 
for the economic development of the Artibonite Valley [and] saw miles upon miles of 
irrigation...”59 The agricultural progress in the Artibonite largely resulted from the expansion of 
the irrigation system which reached projected goals of watering approximately 70,000 acres of 
                                                
57 Report: The ICA Program in Haiti, 1961, Haiti, 28. 
58 Harry W. Yoe to Ray J. Lyman,  8 May 1959 Box 2, RG 469, Records of the U.S. Foreign Assistance, USOM to 
Haiti Office of the Director, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
59 “Thurston Views Work In Artibonite,” 25 January 1960, Haiti Sun.  
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land.  And records suggest that plans might have been underway to irrigate the entire valley 
covering about a million acres.60 
 Strides, too, were made in irrigation expansion across the country. The construction and 
rehabilitation of the following systems contributed to the spread of irrigated peasant farms: 
Cabaret, Les Anglais, Port-de-Paix, St. Marc, Manneville, Cul-de-Sac, Léogane Plain, Cayes, 
Camp Perrin Torbeck, Quartier-Morin, St. Raphael, and Grison Garde.61 In total, which included 
the Artibonite project, irrigation between 1960 and 1962 throughout Haiti reached an 
unprecedented capacity of 150,000 acres that surpassed previous levels of operation.62   
 Also around the period between 1959 and 1962, newspapers were reporting Duvalier’s 
land distribution everywhere that seemingly sought to complement agricultural progress.  Haiti 
Sun reported that during a “May Day” celebration of agriculture, Duvalier signed land grants to 
two hundred and sixty-two peasants, rewarding each of them four hectares of land.63  In the titled 
article “LAND GRANTS TO THOSE WHO WORK,” Haiti Sun reported, on 18 September 
1960, that the Duvalier state signed more than forty-seven land titles to peasants in Baradère and 
                                                
60“An area of 1 million acres is the source for the Artibonite irrigation project, and the huge Peligre Dam serves as 
the reservoir here, a pilot area of 30,000 acres has been selected as demonstration and raining area for technicians 
and farmer.” See, The ICA Program in Haiti, 1961, United States of America Operations Mission to Haiti, 5.  
61 See, The ICA Program in Haiti, 1961, United States of America Operations Mission to Haiti,  21-23. For St. 
Raphael and Grison Garde, see Albertano C’de Baca, Acting F&A Officer to Richard M. Highsmith, Professor of 
Agriculture Geography, 1 March 1963, AGR 9-, USAID Mission to Haiti/Executive Office, Central Decimal Files: 
1962-1962, RG 0286, NARA, College Park, Maryland. Mentioned in a chart prepared by Jack L. Sparks, Irrigation 
Operation and Maintenance Engineer. The chart curiously provides most completion dates of irrigation systems 
prior to the Duvalier government, including Quartier Morin, Cul-de-Sac, and even St. Raphael (when it later 
contradicts this fact). 
62”History shows that irrigated agriculture was introduced into Haiti by the French during the days of French 
Colonization. By 1789 45,000 hectares (112,500 acres) were under irrigation. The Cul-de-Sac Plain and the Cayes 
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respectively. In reviewing present day irrigation, it must be noted that the area placed under irrigation has increased 
less than 40 per cent. Estimates give the total irrigated area for the 1961-1962 season to be about 60,000 hectares 
(150,000 acres). Most of this increase is due to the expansion of irrigation in the Artibonite Valley Irrigation Project, 
the construction of the St. Raphael Irrigation System, and the expansion in the Cul de Sac Plain.” See, Albertano 
C’de Baca, Acting F&A Officer to Richard M. Highsmith, Professor of Agriculture Geography, 1 March 1963, AGR 
9-, USAID Mission to Haiti/Executive Office, Central Decimal Files: 1962-1962, RG 0286, Central Decimal Files, 
NARA, College Park, Maryland.  
63 “50,000 To Parade,” 2 May 1960, Haiti Sun. 
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bragged that land distribution had “multiplied throughout the country.”64 Haiti-Journal, on 18 
November, published public minutes on the distribution of state land to peasants living in Grand 
Boucan du Sud; on 6 December, the same newspaper reported the distribution of land to peasants 
on Ile de la Torture.65  To be sure, land grants and redistribution was part of statecraft since 
independence. And not enough evidence was found to determine the extent of the regime’s land 
distribution policies. Still, the publicity around land redistribution provides enough evidence to 
suggest that land grants served to bolster the regime’s justice sociale program. 
      ***** 
 However, exiled political elites lobbied Washington to suspend aid to the Duvalier 
government.  In the context of the Cold War and in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution, the 
exiled political opposition tried to convince Washington officials that the regime’s repression 
fostered an unstable political climate that would lead to communist takeover in Haiti.  After Fidel 
Castro and his revolutionaries overthrew the U.S.-backed Batista government in 1959, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower’s administration grew evasive in its support for the Duvalier regime, thinking that 
bolstering the oppressive regime would have unintended consequences that could lead to a 
socialist revolutions. Receiving news from political exiles that the regime was creating political 
disorder in Haiti strengthened U.S. concerns regarding Duvalier’s rule.  Moreover, exiled 
political groups called for the end of  U.S. aid to Haiti that underwrote development programs 
associated with the regime's ideology of justice sociale.  On 12 January 1959, the exile group 
called the Haitian Democratic League held a public meeting in New York where former 
presidential candidate Dejoie was the chief speaker.  The organization, according to the New 
                                                
64 “LAND GRANTS TO THOSE WHO WORK,” 18 September 18, 1960, Haiti Sun. 
65 “Nouvelle distribution de terre aux Paysans,” 18 November 1960, Haiti-Journal; “Distribution Terre Ile de la 
Torture,” 6 December 1960, Haiti-Journal. 
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York Times, drew up a resolution that urged "the United States [to] halt all aid to Haiti."66 In 
addition to exiled groups pleading with the U.S. government to cut aid, tensions between the 
Duvalier regime and U.S. aid officials also threatened to stall assistance for development in 
Haiti.  
  Despite the fact that ODVA was contractually a joint U.S.-Haitian project that irrigated 
the valley of Artibonite, a confidential letter written by the chief of U.S. aid in Haiti, Harry Yoe, 
revealed U.S. designs to maintain complete control over the ODVA administration. Yoe wrote, 
“I believe I am correct in thinking that the placing of the U.S. Government employees under the 
administrative jurisdiction of a foreign government is taboo.” He admitted that the Haitian 
leading ODVA administrator only had nominal control over operations.  Rather than work under 
a Haitian administrator, Yoe disclosed that a U.S. official “would run the Administrator from 
offstage.”67  In 1960, Duvalier dismissed the ODVA’s Haitian administrator, Garvey Laurent, 
who was essentially a puppet for U.S. personnel.68 Duvalier’s action against ODVA’s 
administrator set in motion events that would eventually lead to the end of U.S. aid to Haiti.  
 In response to what U.S. personnel viewed as unilateral decisions by the Duvalier regime, 
Yoe suspended a 3 million dollar loan disbursement to the Artibonite irrigation project.69  Next, 
U.S. officials ran a smear campaign against the Duvalier regime in the U.S. press. Duvalier’s 
dismissal of the ODVA administrator was portrayed in U.S. newspapers as the result of an 
autocratic political witch-hunt orchestrated by the Duvalier regime. For example, the New York 
                                                
66 “Ouster of Regime in Haiti Predicted,” 12 January 1959, The New York Times. 
67 Harry W. Yoe to M.L. Spector , 12 December 1959, Box 2, RG 469, Central Decimal Files, Records of the U.S. 
Foreign Assistance, USOM to Haiti Office of the Director, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
68 “Rapport de la Commission sur les Activités de l’ODVA,” 5 March 1960, Le Nouvelliste. 
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Times described the discharge of Laurent and other ODVA personnel as “summarily 
dismissals.”70 U.S. aid to Haiti was temporarily suspended.  
 In the meantime, U.S aid officials on the ground prepared reports supporting the basis for 
suspension of the DLF loan to the Duvalier government. The reasoning was often based on 
depictions of a despotic Duvalier bent on ruling for ruling sake without making any mention of 
the agricultural advances that U.S. aid officials previously documented. Instead, exoticized 
portrayals of an unaccountable primitive state were played up. “The [Duvalier] Administration 
stays in power,” the USOM program officer Caspar D. Green assured his superior Yoe on 13 
May 1960,  “because there is no opposition; because government in Haiti directly affects only a 
very small percentage of the population; and because the President is regarded, even by highly 
educated professional men, more as a tribal elder than as the chief administrator of a modern 
state.”  The officer continued that U.S. assistance was only used to sustain the regime, “So long 
as President Duvalier retains personal control of the [Duvalier] Administration, it will have 
systematically built into it elements which shut it off from accompanying any internal 
recuperation or from following any constructive policy. Since the only purpose of the 
Administration is to maintain Dr. Duvalier in power, ‘aid’ for any other purpose is, in his view, 
beside the point. But aid directed to the purpose of keeping him in power would be at an ever-
increasing cost and would promote rather than retarding the built-in processes of deterioration.”71  
 As U.S. officials marshaled its defense for suspended assistance, Green received news 
that these events regarding aid triggered an anxiety within Duvalier that manifested in his 
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brooding over the impending political crisis. “Minister of Public Health, Boulos, deeply 
concerned at the deterioration of the situation, has commented that President Duvalier spends all 
his waking hours with politics,” wrote Green. In the midst of U.S. aid officials and political 
exiles lobbying against his regime, Duvalier feared losing power and scrambled for an alternative 
to his populism of justice sociale that was financed by waning U.S. support.   
 Emerging out of Duvalier’s anxious ruminations regarding suspended aid did not take 
long to show itself.  On August 3, the regime for the very first time publicly held a militia parade 
that took place on the lawn of the National Palace. The regime announced that the event 
commemorated the second anniversary of the civil militia which was supposedly formed after a 
rebel attack in 1958. Haitians, however, until that point never heard of a civil militia. "Men and 
women of the Volunteer Civilian Militia staged a review and drill, unveiling themselves to the 
public for the first time," reported Haiti Sun.72 Haitians, of course, heard about urban-based 
armed loyalists of the regime. Still, the public parade signaled something new about the militia. 
But limited evidence leaves us with two possible interpretations of the militia parade: either the 
regime was misleading the public about the militia's two-years existence and was in fact newly 
created, or the parade marked a new phase in the militia's buildup as it moved from an urban to a 
rural-based militia. Whatever the reasons may have been, the militia parade was certainly an 
audacious response to the temporary suspension of U.S. aid and mounting opposition by exiled 
political groups. 
 During the same parade, one militia commander announced that the regime formed the 
militia to defend against “the eternal enemies of the people, Haitians while in foreign lands, 
                                                
72 "Le Défilé de la Milice Civile Volontaire," 3 August 1960, Le Nouvelliste; and “CIVILIAN MILITIA PALACE 
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blinded by materialism, don't understand my nice warnings, they started a cold war to paralyze 
the initial working plans of the Government.”73 Bordes was alluding to the supposed role of exile 
rebels colluding with the U.S. to suspend aid and overthrow the regime. The popular support that 
the Duvalier regime had obtained through his populist programs of justice sociale was funded by 
U.S. assistance.  Thus, the threat of justice sociale crumbling apart compelled Duvalier to create 
a militia as a way to institutionalize popular support in the countryside before withering away 
along with U.S. aid.  Although by September 1960 U.S. aid resumed temporarily, the militia 
continued to exist and expand.  In the next year, for example, about three thousand members of 
the militia from the Artibonite marched in the capital to show their support for the regime.74 The 
ambivalence of Washington along with the mounting threat of the Haitian political exiles drove 
the regime seeks support mainly from the rural population.  Thus, the regime, built a nationwide 
militia that incorporated its popular support base into its political machinery. The buildup of the 
militia, which converged with calls by the exiled opposition groups and U.S. aid officials to 
suspend aid to the Duvalier regime, convinced Washington to permanently suspend aid in 1962.  
Under the presidency of President John F. Kennedy, the U.S. government ordered the full 
suspension of aid and cited, among other reasons, how the creation of the militia undermined the 
influence of the U.S. backed Haitian military.   
 At the time, the Haitian military remained under U.S. influence, but the creation of a 
militia loyal to Duvalier checked any military intrigues operating against his regime and at the 
behest of the U.S. government. In other words, Duvalier’s militia prevented the U.S.-backed 
military from overthrowing his government. In the White House’s oval office, a cabinet official 
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urged Kennedy to cancel because of  “a constant policy of encouraging a buildup of a militia 
devoted to Duvalier at the expense of the regular armed forces.”75 This 1962 political crisis not 
only marked the end of U.S. assistance, but also of justice sociale as the basis of Duvalier’s 
populism.   
 Duvalier’s break from justice sociale, a derivative of the peasant-based nationalist ideas 
born out of the U.S. occupation, was articulated in a speech he gave earlier that year on 1 
January (i.e., Haitian Independence Day).  In his speech, just as he did in his younger years as a 
noirist, Duvalier returned to racialist themes. But his speech did not resemble noirist discourses 
in terms of stressing color tensions. In fact, Duvalier’s speech condemned “the lower middle 
class born of these masses” that exploited peasants – he meant the black bourgeoisie. No, his 
speech did not possess the contents of noirisme that favored the black middle class.    
 Rather, the racial content of Duvalier’s speech seemed more aligned with ideas of 
international black liberation while employing the vernacular of the Haitian Revolution.  
Duvalier argued that his efforts to develop Haiti were thwarted because he was a “misunderstood 
Negro [the regime’s translations].” He decried: 
 
 If my country and my people in the Latin American and Caribbean context, are a black entity having 
no tie ethnically with those surrounding it –– a black entity different by its genesis as a Nation, –– a 
genesis responsible somewhat for a laborious growth and development, because on the burnt soil of 
former Santo Domingo, it fell to share of the heirs of the Man of Comiers to create a civilization for 
the benefit of the chattel slaves raised to the dignity of human beings; ––if My country and My 
country kept in backwardness for two decades in their aspirations to normal and free growth, today 
cry out their feelings of frustration to legitimate the opening of new horizons, who shall dare throw 
them the stone of curse? Who? 
 
                                                
75 Timothy J. Naftali, Presidential Recording, John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises Volume 1, July 30-August 1962 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 295.  
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In addition, Duvalier announced to Haitians, “we will not surrender this country to slavery in 
order to supply our arid soils with water, – with roads to foster civilization and progress, – with 
energy for the promotion of development!” 76 Duvalier’s speech reflected a turning point in the 
regime’s populism. It was leaving behind the materialist justice sociale and embracing diasporic 
ideas of black liberation. More importantly, by alluding to the Haitian Revolution, Duvalier was 
indicating that the regime was reviving traditions of arming the civilian population.  The tonton 
makout militia was already in the process of being made.
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Making Peasants Chèf: The Tonton Makout Militia, Counter-Military Politics, and the 
Moral Grammar of Terror (1960-1971) 
 
 The regime's populism of justice sociale fell apart in the face of political opposition and 
U.S. pressure. Duvalier abandoned this materialist-based populism for another violent brand of 
populism that offered a glimmer of citizenship and political prestige to peasants if they armed 
themselves against the political opposition. However, the Duvalier regime portrayed the creation 
of the militia as an act to restore the militarized political order which previously provided 
peasants with the means to defend their interests.  In all actuality, this was the regime's attempt to 
save itself from being weakened by mounting political opposition from groups that included 
political elites, exiles, disaffected military figures, and the U.S. government.  In particular, 
Duvalier interpreted U.S. disapproval for his regime as an indication that U.S. officials would 
rather support his opponents. Indeed, the U.S. gradually abandoned the regime and aligned itself 
with key members of the political opposition.  Feeling cornered and in a weakened position, the 
Duvalier regime announced that it was turning to the age-old political tradition of arming the 
rural masses to protect the regime from downfall.  
In reality, Duvalier’s militia approach belonged to a contemporary global trend utilized 
by Third World authoritarian states and European fascist governments that armed the masses in 
order to consolidate political control. Throughout the twentieth century Communist China, 
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Socialist Cuba, and Fascist Italy, just to name a few, created civil militias to buttress their 
respective governments. In fact, Duvalier did not have to look afar to see examples of militia 
buildups.  In relatively the same period of time in which Duvalier began organizing his militia, 
Haitian newspapers ran several publications announcing Fidel Castro's peasant-based militia and 
its activities in Cuba.1  Well informed in global politics, Duvalier seemingly followed this 
political vogue of arming the civilian population.   
Despite these global connections, the Duvalier regime chose to depict the creation of its 
militia as a revival of old military customs that benefited the peasantry in order to legitimize his 
power.  In the nineteenth-century, peasants utilized their membership in the military and 
insurgent groups to defend their status and rights.  However with the U.S. invasion, peasants 
were disarmed and disempowered.  Attaching himself to this history, Duvalier portrayed himself 
as returning arms to the rural masses in exchange for their loyalty. "Excellency, the gun that 
Sothonax gave us to defend our liberty and that the American occupation had taken away from 
us, without fear you have given back to us," a militia commander boasted during a militia parade 
in 1960.  "Rest assured that this gun will not be turned against you. We will exclusively use it to 
defend the ideals of the Duvalierist Revolution."2  Sothonax was a radical French commissioner 
that armed rebel slaves during the Haitian Revolution while reportedly saying, “Here is your 
liberty: he who takes this away from you will try to make you slaves again.”3  Though peasants 
previously associated freedom with guns that derived from the events of the Haitian Revolution, 
                                                
1 The Haitian newspaper Le Nouvelliste ran reports on Cuban militias between 1960 and 1961. See, "Des Miliciens 
Cubains peu habiles provoquent des Accidents," 12 November 1960, Le Nouvelliste; "L'INVASION DE CUBA: Les 
Milices Paysannes luttent avec Ardeur," 18 April 1961, Le Nouvelliste. 
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avait ravi, sans crainte Vous nous l’avez remis. Soyez sur que cette arme ne sera pas retournée contre Vous. Nous 
nous en servirons uniquement pour defender idéaux de la Révolution Duvaliériste.” "Le Défilé de la Milice Civile 
Volontaire," 3 August  1960, Le Nouvelliste. 
3 Burt and Diederich, Papa Doc, 156. 
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the suppression of peasant rights and freedom during the U.S. occupation amounted to a post-
emancipation crisis that Duvalier purportedly attempted to resolve by creating the tonton makout 
militia.    
Although his actions were strategic, he attached himself to the liberating traditions of the 
Haitian Revolution by giving weapons and status back to the rural population.  This 
disingenuous solution to the problem of freedom in Haiti gave false hopes to the masses. In fact, 
instead of carrying out reforms that eliminated abusive practices toward peasants, the regime 
devised a perverse solution to arm peasants as a way to fend for themselves, while serving the 
regime's interests. Thus, the conditions for peasant complicity in the tonton makouts were shaped 
by the regime, which left very few avenues open for self-determination. With only the option to 
defend their interests through arms and loyalty to the regime, thousands of previously ostracized 
peasants joined the makouts, becoming the regime's arm of repression. Occupying this complex 
role, makouts straddled between roles as oppressors and defenders of peasant interests.  Oral 
interviews reveal that peasants turned into makouts because they were attracted to the 
opportunity of obtaining power that they utilized to fend against abusive state agents, which 
particularly included the rural police and chefs de section.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, since the U.S. occupation, power in rural villages 
was largely concentrated in the hands of chefs de section (military rural police chiefs) who were 
notorious for subjecting peasants to arbitrary arrests and abuse. But after Duvalier created the 
militia, power was democratized.  Or, as the elderly Adonat Touchard put it to me during an 
interview: “ tout te chèf." "Everyone was a chèf, then."4  By enlisting into the militia, many 
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peasants became "chèf" in the Duvalier years. For these reasons, thousands of peasants joined the 
makouts and ordinary peasants became loyal to the militia and, by extension, the regime.   
While loyalty to the regime was one motivating factor, archival sources also reveal a 
much more complicated facet that attracted peasants to the militia. Peasants also became makouts 
for their own ambitions to join the ranks of the traditional power-holders that oppressed and 
exploited the rural population.  For instance, many collaborated with the rural police and chef 
section to reenact the role of a "chèf." Thus, "becoming chèf," oddly enough meant absorption 
into the police state and perpetrating traditional forms of repression.  As both protectors and 
oppressors, makouts were neither simply proponents, nor opponents of pro-peasant interests. 
Instead, the makouts were a violent body that moved in contradictory directions, depending on 
social, political, and individual circumstances. This complexity generated contradictory popular 
responses to either support or to resist the makouts. Nevertheless, the makout militia was a 
nationwide organization of loyalists that provided the regime with widespread "consent" as well 
as a hidden, yet vast, defensive bulwark that protected the regime from the political opposition. 
Defending the Regime in Exchange for Power 
In exchange for power, the regime expected makouts to loyally defend the position of the 
regime. Duvalier enlisted the masses into the militia to help the regime fight the political 
opposition.  In particular, the regime expected the militia to counter the influence of national 
military that was frequently involved in intrigues against the Duvalier regime. Not only did 
Duvalier distrust the national army, peasants often resented the army because of its repressive 
practices in the countryside. During the occupation, the U.S. specifically created the Haitian 
army to suppress the countryside and prevent peasant insurgencies.  One CIA officer later 
recalled: "During the occupation of Haiti (1915–1934), the US Marines created a multiservice 
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army that was designed originally to combat the Cacos, a group of peasant insurgents. The 
system is useful in counterinsurgency operations."5 By eliminating popular insurrections, which 
previously checked state power, the army subsequently developed into a powerful institution 
beyond challenge. In the post-occupation period, the supreme power of the military certainly 
manifested not only in the suppression of peasants, but also in how the army meddled in state 
politics, forcing almost every head of state out of power up until the election of Duvalier.6  With 
a soldiery comprising five thousand soldiers and five hundred chef de sections, the army had an 
unrivaled national monopoly over national force that transcended the influence of other political 
state institutions including the executive.  With similar interests to check the power of the U.S.-
backed military, Duvalier and armed peasants in the makouts would weaken the military's 
previously dominant position.  
The decline of the military's influence began during the 1957 election that divided the 
military hierarchy along political party lines. High-ranking military officers were split between 
supporting Duvalier and the rival presidential candidate Louis Dejoie.  This fractionalization 
diminished the military's ability to strongly influence the outcome of the election. Duvalier won 
the presidency, quite likely through the popular vote, and exploited these divisions among 
officers by promoting loyalists and discharging anti-Duvalier elements.  Additionally, Duvalier 
carried out constant reorganizations and purges within the military; in 1962, for instance, 
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Duvalier named his fifth army chief in five years.7  By the late sixties, Duvalier purged or 
replaced over seventy-five officers trained in U.S. service schools. He would also closed down 
the Haitian Military Academy and the U.S. Naval Missions to prevent officers from receiving 
U.S. instruction. "Little or no training has been conducted by the Haitian armed forces since 
then," bemoaned a CIA officer in a report.8 When in power, Duvalier moved against the military 
because of its tendencies to intervene in national politics, but most importantly due to its ties to 
the U.S. government.   
Violent conflict with elements in the Haitian army also compelled Duvalier to create a 
militia that was designed to neutralize the army and assume the position of national defense. 
There were many disgruntled elements of the army that joined the exiled opposition, and 
conspired to overthrow the regime. However, their plots and attacks contributed to the creation 
of a civilian force that was armed by Duvalier himself.  One particular attack caused Duvalier to 
take action. In 28 July 1958, four former military officers and four American mercenaries led a 
coup d'état and occupied the military headquarters that stood directly across from the National 
Palace. In response, the regime distributed arms to about two hundred urban denizens in the 
capital to defend against the rebel attack on the military headquarters.9  Eventually, the rebel 
attack was suppressed and set in motion the process of the state arming and organizing ordinary 
civilians into a militia.10 
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In the aftermath, Duvalier was frank about his plans to build a civilian force that checked 
the military's dominance.  Quoting a French political scientist, Duvalier wrote, “In nations where 
the tradition of pronunciamientos [military coups] are strong, such as Latin America, only the 
constitution of popular militias can prevent militaries from dominating the state.’”11 Thus, 
Duvalier created the makout militia that served to splinter the army's monopoly over force, curb 
its interventionist tendencies, and eliminate the intrigue of its disenchanted army officers.  
However, as described in the previous chapter, the fall of the populism justice sociale due to the 
lost of U.S. support and mounting exiled political opposition, also persuaded Duvalier to turn to 
peasants for armed support.  
 Indeed, the regime recruited thousands of peasants into this militia, which outnumbered 
the army of a few thousand. By 1960, Duvalier transformed the civil militia into an immense 
peasant-based corps. "The militia composed of 90% of men of the backcountry who in 
appearance represent nothing,” declared a militia commander during the 1960 militia parade.12  
Militia membership was large – certainly in the tens of thousands and conceivably in the 
hundreds – and Haitian peasants formed its bulk.13 The early regime did not maintain official 
estimates partly due to neglecting to register membership.14 Therefore, it is quite plausible that 
the Duvalier regime itself knew little about how many people were in the civil militia.  
Nonetheless, this did not prevent one Haitian ambassador to boast in Washington that the militia 
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Minister,  19 June 1969, POL 15-1 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
14 Only in 1984 did the regime begin to register members of the militia. See Laguerre The Military and Society in 
Haiti, 116. 
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had about two hundred thousand active tonton makouts. 15  At best this estimate was a good 
guess. 
           During oral interviews, elderly peasants gave their take on the vastness of militia 
membership.  "All the zones were filled, all!" bellowed Marc, a peasant living in the northern 
rural village of Grison-Garde.16  The former makout Louis Nicolas of Galmant du Plat 
remembers, "the entire population was milisyen."17 "We can't count this thing. It was vast. Many 
people," former makouts Élie and Ton Tatou of Camp Louise exclaimed almost 
simultaneously.18 The market woman Émilsien "Nana" Jean-Gilles of Gotier recalls, "many 
milisyen lived in this zone."19 When asked if some members of his family were enlisted in the 
militia, the peasant activist Desilien of Lacoma coughed out, "woy ah (of course), there were."20  
Capturing the inclusivity and vastness of the makouts, one Abricots peasant remarked, 
"Everyone was chef, if you weren't chef it was because you didn't want to."21  
 By 1962, Duvalier branded this peasant-based militia, Volontaire de la Sécurité 
Nationale (VSN) whose members were officially known as milicien (or milisyen in Haitian 
Kreyòl). However, traumatized by state terror, the Haitian populace secretly gave the militia its 
notorious name: tonton makout.  The term refers to a straw-sack carrying old peasant man in 
rural legend that abducted wayward children from unsuspecting parents – a fitting name given 
that some Haitians heard of the peasant militia whisking away friends, relatives, and neighbors 
that were never seen again. Nevertheless, thousands of previously ostracized peasants enlisted 
                                                
15 One Haitian ambassador was recorded to have boasted in Washington that the militia comprised 200,000 active 
members (possibly excluding thousands of others rural denizens who were less active). See, Call of Haitian Foreign 
Minister,  19 June 1969, POL 15-1 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
16 Interview with Marc in rural section Grison Garde, Acul du Nord, June 2015. 
17 Interview with Louis Nicolas habitation Galmant du Plat, Quartier Morin, 23 May 2015. 
18 Interview with Élie and Ton Tatou in rural section Camp Louise, Acul-du-Nord, 2015. 
19 Interview with Émilsien Jean-Gilles in rural section Gotier, Jean Rabel, 29 November 2013.  
20 Interview with Desilien “Tonde” in rural section of Lacoma, Jean-Rabel, 13 June 2014. 
21 Interview with unnamed peasant in Anse-à-Foleur, July 2015.  
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into the makout militia with the opportunity to counter the influence of the military that had long 
suppressed rural communities since U.S. intervention. 
 Rural denizens recall the vast body of makouts, though often ill equipped and 
undisciplined, overtaking the traditional power of the U.S. backed army. The former makout 
André Georges of Bas Limbé (Kr: Enba Linbe) explained: "The real state was the Haitian army. 
Then, Duvalier created milisyen – milisyen was what we call tonton makout. They were the real 
[George stops and continues] I mean the military was the military, but tonton makouts 
commanded [power]...That is why they got more respect from Duvalier because when I was in it, 
when you heard we had to go Port-au-Prince, one would see so much traffic." The vast number 
of makouts served to counter the military's influence. Some even saw the makouts as more 
influential than the army. "The army had no value for people," one tax agent of Bobon recalled, 
"the milisyen were above their heads and everyone else."22  The former makout Ton Tatou 
exclaimed, “I remember an army lieutenant was disrespecting folks around here and a makout 
commander grabbed the lieutenant by the collar and threatened him to stop, by his collar!"23  For 
rural denizens, the Haitian army lost its previous prestige and influence to the growing number of 
makouts. They saw themselves as a group tasked with the special role of defending the regime. 
Previously ostracized, makouts and peasant loyalists were recognized by Duvalier as agents of 
national security.24 Duvalier’s politics of recognition proved powerful enough to persuade 
peasants to risk their lives in defense of the regime. 
 Both makouts and ordinary peasants, who were sometimes indistinguishable, fervently 
engaged in guarding the state against invasions by the exiled opposition. Exiled political elites 
                                                
22 Interview with Maias in Bonbon, August, 2015. 
23 Interview with Ton Tatou in rural section Camp Louise, 2015. 
24 In 1962, the Duvalier regime decreed outlining militia responsibilities. See, "Arrêté définissant et réglementant 
provisoirement les rôles et attributions des Volontaires de la Sécurité NLE," 16 November 1962, Le Nouvelliste. 
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opposing the regime often underestimated the regime's influence in the countryside and the 
growing participation of peasants in national defense.  During a meeting with the U.S. State 
Department officials, one exiled opponent dismissed peasants as "politically inert and 
detached."25  This explains why Haitian exiled rebels repeatedly made the mistake of seeking 
refuge in the countryside where they attempted to recruit peasants into their ranks. To their 
surprise, however, rebels often stumbled upon rural communities that were the strongholds of 
makouts and peasant loyalists. These indistinguishable supporters of the regime often gave away 
rebel hideouts or joined state forces to eliminate rebel activities.  
 A very telling case reveals how most rebel activities were squelched in the countryside. 
In 1962, the exiled writer Jacques Stephen Alexis was a marxist and pro-peasant novelist and 
landed in the northwest zone of Haiti with plans to mobilize local peasants for what he probably 
imagined would be the beginning of a rural-based communist revolution in Haiti. In an 
unforeseen twist of fate, peasants reported Alexis to local authorities that led to his 
disappearance.26  Another example involved Clement Barbot who was the erstwhile confidant of 
Duvalier.  In 1963, Barbot, now in cahoots with the CIA, coordinated rebel plots against the 
regime in a secret hiding place in a rural community, just north of the capital. However, peasants 
gave away his hideout to the authorities in July 1963 that led to his immediate execution.27     
 In other instances, peasant loyalists and makouts took up arms and actually fought against 
rebel attacks. On 26 April the wealthy Hector Riobé led a group of armed rebels who attacked a 
                                                
25 "Political Situation in Haiti," 18 April 1963, XR POL 26 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, 
College Park, Maryland. 
26 Haiti Situation, 6 May 1963, POL HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland; also 
see, Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 231. 
27 Barbot was supported by the CIA. See, Opposition Plans of Clement Barbot, 28 March, Central Intelligence, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov. Barbot execution is found in an official report. See, American Embassy to State 
Department, 20 July 1963, POL 2-1 HAI, RG 59, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
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military post in the rural commune of Kenscoff.28  Riobé led this attack because he was incensed 
after his father, a factory owner, was murdered by a makout over a labor dispute. The makout 
was later spotted driving around town in a Mercedes Benz belonging to the Riobé family.  
Angered by his father’s death and makout appropriation of his family’s property, Riobé 
organized and armed revolt in the mountaintop zone of Kenscoff in 1963 that oversaw the 
capital. According to both Haitian and U.S. reports, Kenscoff peasants joined authorities in 
beating back Riobé's rebel forces.  
 At seven o’clock in the morning, a Kenscoff peasant woman surprised one rebel, Jean-
Pierre Hudicourt, and smashed his head with a club while her husband wrestled away a 22 
caliber telescoped rifle from his grasp. By ten o’clock, the ensuing battle left four soldiers, four 
makouts, and a peasant loyalist named René Ocène injured; another makout and three other 
peasant loyalists died during combat. After rebels were violently suppressed, the local army 
general sent an internal missive to Duvalier that described how peasant involvement contributed 
to the regime's victory over Riobé and rebels in Kenscoff: "The rural population in the zone of 
Kenscoff demonstrate a limitless devotion regarding the Government of their well-liked Chef, 
Doctor François Duvalier... Armed with clubs, machetes and instruments of plowing, the 
peasants of Kenscoff... hunted the enemy with tenacity".29  Unbeknownst to opposing rebels, the 
countryside was the lion's den of the regime, hiding rural denizens and makouts who comprised 
the core of Duvalier's support base. 
                                                
28 Testimony by Nancy Tunier-Férère. See “Hector et Nous,” 18 July 2015, http://www.haitiluttecontre-
impunite.org/texts/123, Haiti Fights Against Impunity.  
29 "Les populations rurales de la zone de Kenscoff se montrant d’un dévouement sans borne envers le Gouvernement 
de leur Chef bien-aimé, le Docteur François Duvalier. Elles les sont guère inquiétées par les sectes de brigandages 
et les lâches assassinâtes perpétrés par les terroristes. Armée de bâtons, de manchettes et d’instruments aratoires, 
les paysans de Kenscoff, comme aux temps héroïques qui donnèrent naissance à la Patrie Commune, poursuivent 
l’ennemi avec acharnement." Jacques Larouche to President Duvalier, 18 July 1963, Haiti Fights against Impunity, 
http://www.haitiluttecontre-impunite.org/texts/39, 
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 Popular support in the countryside protected the regime from being overthrown. And 
though this was almost a secret to exiled rebels and U.S. officials, the Dominican President Juan 
Bosch understood the source of Duvalier’s political strength. Reflecting on U.S. attempts to use 
his country’s border to mobilize exiled rebel groups against Duvalier, in the 1960s, Bosch 
remarked, “it was very stupid to use our country in order to overthrow Duvalier because he had 
popular support. That is why it was not easy to overthrow him.”30 And yet, the U.S. continued to 
support exiled rebels and political intrigues against the Duvalier regime because they found 
unfathomable the idea that peasants would assist rural makouts to defend the regime.    
! To be sure, the complexity of the political terrain did sometimes allow rebel plots to find 
support among peasants.  However, these plots only served to further divide peasants into either 
proponents or opponents of Duvalier that led to internecine violence.  In 1964, for example, a 
group of exiled rebels organized themselves in the southeast region of Thiotte and found support 
among some local peasants. One army report to Duvalier on 30 June admitted, “ they [rebels] 
captured many Haitian peasants employed to transport their equipment."31 On 3 July, the chief of 
the army demanded that the local captain provide, “the nature of aid received by the rural 
population.”32 After rebels broke into the store of a local merchant family called “Bernadotte” 
and seized merchandise to redistribute among the peasants in the nearby rural villages of Mapou 
and Citadelle, Haitian officials began to suspect that the rebels were successfully gathering 
stronger local support.  
                                                
30 “An interview with Juan Bosch,” NACLA Report Americas, 46:2, 73-77. DOI: 10.1080/10714839.2013.11725574. 
This citation format was required by NACLA. 
31 "ils [rebels] ont capturé plusieurs paysans haïtiens employés au transport de leur équipement.” Com. Dep. Ouest 
to CHEMG, 30 June 1964, Box 1, folder Rebels’ Landing, Haitian Military Documents Collections (HMDC), 
Schomburg Center in Research Black Culture (SCRB), New York Public Library (NYPL). 
32Constant to CHEMG, 3 July 1964, Box 1, folder Rebels’ Landing, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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 As events increasingly appeared favorable to the rebels, the regime turned to "les VSN et 
CIVILS DUVALIERISTE" of the southeast region and summoned them to join the army and fight 
the rebels and peasant sympathizers.33  In other words, Duvalier mobilized local makouts and 
peasant loyalists to fight rebels and their peasant sympathizers. Civil war broke out in Thiotte 
that resulted in a massacre. On July 6, the local military captain sent Duvalier a coded message 
that was translated as: “Habitant peasants [of] the Mapou and Citadelle zone sympathize and aid. 
Requesting authorization to raze these two localities."34 The authorities, which comprised 
soldiers, makouts, and peasant loyalists, participated in the suppression of the rebel movement. 
The number of those killed remains unknown but the incident came to be known as the Thiotte 
Massacre and served as an example of the kind of state terror that consumed peasants who 
sympathized with the political opposition.35 
 Cases of peasants either supporting rebel forces, or supporting the Duvalier regime 
challenges the conventional wisdom that peasants were politically ostracized in the Duvalier 
years. Quite to the contrary, peasants were bound up in the political conflicts between exiled 
political elites trying to topple the state and this new regime.  In the summer of 1964, peasants 
influenced the longevity of another rebel attack in the southwest peninsula. Hailing from the 
peninsula's urban elite families in Jérémie and backed by the CIA, a group of thirteen exiled 
                                                
33 Fritzner Henry, Prefect of Jacmel to Dr. François Duvalier, 4 July 1964, military documents on Haiti Fights 
against Impunity, http://www.haitiluttecontre-impunite.org. 
34 "Habitants zone Mapou et Citadelle sympatisent [sic] et les aident. Sollicité autorisation raser ces deux localités à 
titre exemple.” And it is also an example of how the regime was able to turn peasants against their neighbors to 
preserve the hegemony of the regime. Take notice of the fact that the captain did not refer to them as “paysan” but 
relegating peasants to the more derogative “habitants” when requesting official permission to “raze” the peasant 
communities of Thiotte.  Capitaine Jose Borges to CHEMG, 6 July 1964, Box 1, folder Rebels’ Landing, HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL. 
35 To excuse the murder of those the regime vowed to protect, the regime debased the characters of sympathizing 
peasants.  After reporting the execution of sympathizing peasants on 9 July, the local prefect demeaned their 
characters, “La section rurale de Mapou ayant été repéré des rebelles qui ont eu l’adhésion de plusieurs paysans, 
notamment les voleurs de renom condamnés en maintes fois par le Tribunal de Paix de Bellanse [sic].” Edgard 
Jameu, Prefect to Docteur François Duvalier, 9 July 1964, military documents on Haiti Fights against Impunity, 
http://www.haitiluttecontre-impunite.org/texts/107. 
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rebels calling themselves Jeune Haïti returned to the peninsula and launched a rebellion in the 
region's mountainous countryside.  Jeune Haiti's rebellion lasted two months and twenty days, 
surpassing the length of most rebel attempts during the Duvalier period. One U.S. official found 
the longevity of the rebellion suspicious and reported, “the fact that such a very small band of 
rebels succeeded in withstanding government efforts to destroy them for almost three months 
seems to be prima facie evidence that they were not operating in a hostile milieu.”  For this U.S. 
official, the truth was in the silence of the regime's propaganda machine.  
 The Haitian government released a public communiqué regarding details of the rebel 
attack and, contrary to state custom, “there were no reports of rebels’ having been killed or 
wounded by the peasants themselves.”36  Eventually, local authorities, makouts, and peasant 
loyalists repressed the Jeune Haiti movement, which was followed by a massacre that killed 
urban elite families of Jérémie in the most murderous fashion. Events surrounding the Jeune 
Haiti attack showed the world the virulence of makout terror.  The attack also revealed to some 
that the militia was an unpaid ill-equipped force. 
                 ***** 
 Perhaps the most overlooked fact regarding the VSN/makout militia was their status as 
unpaid volunteers because the Duvalier regime lacked the revenue to fund its vast militia. The 
1964 rebel attack even gave U.S. officials the opportunity to rate the performance of the makouts 
and they were highly unimpressed.  One U.S. officials wrote to Washington, "The VSN in the 
south showed again that they were ineffective as a fighting force against an armed aggressive 
enemy. From all reports they were poorly-armed, poorly-led, poorly disciplined and without 
adequate logistic support."  The report went on to say that many makouts feared the "danger of 
                                                
36 American Embassy to State Department, 13 February 1965, XR POL 23 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, 
HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland.   
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getting shot plus hardship of being in the field without adequate supplies."37  Indeed, makouts 
participated in national security but were meagerly supplied; they were not even paid. 
 The costs of militia uniforms, arms, and, in rare cases, unofficial membership fees were 
borne by peasants. Communities sometimes came together to gather cash for a fellow peasant to 
be inducted into the militia. But makouts rarely received material rewards from the state. 
Peasants and former makouts admitted in interviews that the militia's role was a taxing, unpaid 
labor.  "The way they suffered, do you know they were never paid," Floreine Desir interjected 
mockingly during an interview with her husband and former makout, Georges. She continued, 
"when summoned to Port-au-Prince, they had to spend their own money...every night they would 
guard the homes of powerful people (gwo moun) staring blankly without any coins in their 
pockets."  Georges, then, smirked and somberly admitted: "We were not even paid one gouden 
[the lowest amount in coin money], our service wasn't paid for, we marched...on patrol. Ask me 
what we were looking out for? I hear we're looking out for rebels. Where are the rebels? Who 
really knows? You're walking around breaking your body all night."38  If not paid, what did 
makouts get in return for loyally defending the regime against attacks? Without much revenue, 
the regime offered political power in the form of political recognition and privileges in exchange 
for makout loyalty.   
 Previously separated from political life and shunned by urban society, peasants expressed 
that membership in the makouts increased their political and social status that even high-ranking 
state officials and urban elites recognized as important. The former makout Pè Camille of Ravine 
du Roche recalls, "Milisyen were not paid, none were. But when a milisyen, one was greatly 
                                                
37 From American Embassy Port-au-Prince to Department of State, November 5, 1965, POL 2-1 HAI, Central 
Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
38 Interview with Floreine Desir  in Limbé, June 2015. 
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valued (gran valè) even if you were the minister of justice, you must value milisyen."39  Georges 
also explains: 
There were places one [a makout] would go, some people came and greeted you including big 
state officials [gwo leta] who [called makouts] my brother, my brother. What was that, we weren't 
supposed to rub with those folks, because [before] they would call you a peasant [abitan payzan] 
who lives in the wild. How else were we going to find people in Port-au-Prince, to find people in 
Okap [Haiti's two largest cities] who wanted to rub with us [if not a member in the militia]. Now 
you're spending so many days in militia headquarters [in the cities], they need you so much you 
can't return home––you think if we stayed as abitan in the wild woods could we have survived? 
Now we're rubbing with [powerful] people, becoming enlightened [eklere] if someone does you 
wrong you know where to go to defend yourself, you're not a maroon [mawon] anymore. You're 
not scared."40   
 
The prize behind joining the makout militia involved the politics of recognition and prestige that 
manifested in obtaining respect from influential figures. In other cases, makouts utilized their 
status to break down the urban-rural divisions that functioned to discriminate against peasants. 
Some makouts, for example, saw the capital for the very first time while participating in militia 
parades near the National Palace.41  In other words, membership in the militia increased peasant's 
sense of self in a political system that previously ostracized them and privileged urban culture.   
 It turns out that one source generating peasant enthusiasm for the militia and the regime 
was rooted in the politics of recognition.  Thousands of peasants became makouts to be 
recognized as people of importance in national politics.  Observing this reality in 1964, one U.S. 
official telegrammed:  
MILITIA ORGANIZED BY DUVALIER REGIME SHOULD ALSO BE MENTIONED FOR 
POSSIBLE EFFECT ON RURAL POPULATION. MILITA UNITS FORMED AT LOCAL 
LEVEL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY TO PROTECT ‘DUVALIERIST REVOLUTION’ 
HAVE TENDED TO GIVE SOME INDIVIDUALS SOME SENSE OF PARTICIPATION IN 
NATIONAL LIFE WHICH COULD HAVE LONGER-TERM POLITICAL EFFECTS...42 
 
                                                
39 Interview with Pè Camille in rural district of Ravine du Roche, Limbé, 9 June 2016. 
40 Interview with André Georges in Limbé, June 2015. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Incoming Telegram, 31 July 1964, LAB 10 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, 
Maryland.   
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The opportunity to increase in political stature attracted peasants to the militia who, in return, 
promised to defend the regime.  Exchanging power for loyalty, the regime relied on its peasant-
based militia to provide a massive shield of undersupplied peasant bodies that formed a bulwark 
around the dictatorship. Makout "consent" and defense helped the regime stay in power for 
almost three decades.  Recognizing that his regime stood on the backs of makouts, Duvalier once 
remarked that the militia was the “permanence of his revolution... even though I disappear.”43  
Makouts and peasant loyalists were the foundations of the regime as long as it kept up with its 
end of the bargain: giving power in exchange for loyalty.   
From Malheureux to Chèf and the Politics of Terror 
 Indeed, the recognition of peasants' personhood and their access to political privileges 
came with an awful price.  For peasants, the decision to become a makout put them in a morally 
ambiguous position that sometimes called for murderous political actions in exchange for a freer 
life. However, some peasant correspondents urged that, if not a makout, alternatives to political 
freedom and political recognition of personhood were little. "You couldn't remain a 'hello' 
(civilian) because when a 'hello,' you were nothing," former makout Élie Marslen justified.44  
Local archival sources demonstrate how the civilian rural population was burdened by a locally 
repressive state. Ever since the U.S. occupation, peasants were dominated by a police state and 
penal system that outlawed their religious practices, harassed their independent labor, and 
criminalized their mobility.  
 For example, military soldiers and police arrested civilian peasants as vagabonds if they 
were caught not farming on the weekdays.  "Long ago everyone worked...during the week young 
                                                
43 American Embassy to State Department, 8 April 1964, POL 15-1 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, 
NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
44 Interview with Élie Marslen of Camp Louise, 2015. 
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men did not promenade except on Saturday and Sunday or else the state would arrest you," 
explained one peasant in Grison-Garde.45  Rare court records in Le Borgne reveal the continued 
prosecution of vagabondage (vagrancy). Previously a dormant post-emancipation law revived 
during the US occupation, vagabondage essentially criminalized mobility and sentenced those 
charged of the crime to months of imprisonment with hard labor (I found a partly damaged legal 
book in Borgne dated in 1907, which contains records of court proceedings prior to the U.S. 
occupation, and it does not mention a single case of vagabondage).  The fact that vagabondage 
was enforced in the early years of the Duvalier regime shows the limitations of the regime's early 
populism of justice sociale, which promised political equality. As the regime transitioned from 
justice sociale to makout populism in the early 1960s, ordinary peasants in Borgne accused of 
vagabondage pleaded with judges in vernacular that eerily resembled the regime’s discourse that 
included terms such malheureux (disempowered) and themes of peasant injustice.   
 On 30 October 1961, the peasant Exilus Saintilma replied to charges of vagabondage, 
“I’m not a vagabond, I’m a malheureux searching for work to earn my daily bread."  Others 
included class exploitation in their defense.  Sully Pierre, arrested for vagabondage, proclaimed 
in court, "There is something that is hard to understand about this country. The very big crush the 
very little.”46  Exantus Georges, in November, was arrested in his garden while harvesting coffee 
beans and brought to court to face charges of vagabondage. When the judge interrogated as to 
why he was arrested as a vagabond, Georges defiantly replied, "If arrested as such, it is because 
                                                
45 Interview with an unnamed peasant in Grison-Garde, 2015. 
46 "Je ne suis pas vagabond, je suis un malheureux cherchant du travail pour gagner mon pain quotidien” “Je ne 
suis pas vagabond…je travaillais comme un grand cultivateur si aujourd’hui je ne trouve pas de quoi à faire c’est 
pas de ma faute; c’est la volonté de Dieu...Dans ce pays, tout est mystère, il faut savoir vivre pour vivre pou être en 
bonne relation avec les gens de ce pays, et je pris vous dire que c’est ma malchance qui m’a amené ici.” “Il y’a une 
chose que l’on ne comprend dans ce pays. Les plus grands foulent les plus petits." 1961 Simple Police 1961, 30 
October 1961, TP, Le Borgne. 
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of pure injustice."47 Interestingly, the remarks of these persecuted peasants mirrored the 
discourses of the regime's pro-peasant populism of justice sociale for their rights. Nevertheless, 
Saintilma, Pierre, Garçontil, and Georges were tried as vagrants and sent to prison for convict 
labor, but their true crime was their audacity to move freely as they pleased. After being 
reinvigorated under the occupation, Duvalier finally wrote vagabondage out rural law in 1963 
that finally that ended the repressive practice of extracting involuntary labor from peasants.48 
Still, peasants faced other forms of repression that were also legacies of U.S. intervention.  For 
instance, peasants strove to avoid state predation from armed tax agents. 
  During the occupation, the Haitian government promulgated in 1924 the creation of the 
national tax bureau, Administration Générale des Contributions and maintained local offices 
throughout the provinces that were responsible for collecting taxes. Each local office (Fr: impôts 
locatif) was staffed with a single armed tax officer (Fr: préposé) and a tiny army of underling 
collectors (Fr: percepteur). These tax agents were nearly always outnumbered by the peasant 
population, in which they hunted down to tax. So, tax agents often utilized their own ties to rural 
communities and the circulating rumor mill in order to discover what taxes were not paid. 
Although this system was nowhere near efficient, and taxes were often evaded, tax officers kept 
up a menacing presence by harassing peasants. Under the Duvalier regime, tax agents pestered 
on that tightened peasant economic possibilities.  
 Following national law, tax agents targeted the peasant economy, religion, and leisure 
activities for the purpose of generating state revenue that rarely circulated back to the welfare of 
peasants. Thus, taxation had the effect of impeding on peasants' sense of economic opportunities 
and freedom.  This may explain why peasants in the northwest region of Grand’ Anse referred to 
                                                
47 “Si on m’arrêté ainsi, c’est par pure injustice.” Simple Police 1961, 24 November 1961, TP, Le Borgne,  
48 Code Rural Dr. François Duvalier, (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l’Etat, 1963). 
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tax collectors as "gwo woch" or a huge rock that symbolized the toughness and rigidity of 
taxation that tumbled over the moral economy of the Haitian countryside.49  For example, agents 
attempted to tax rural market women for vending the crops of their families' harvest in public 
market places. Under the cover of mountains and underdevelopment, however, peasant women 
attempted to market their agricultural production free from the taxation of state agents. As a form 
of resistance, rural market women set up clandestine markets where they surreptitiously vended 
merchandise. Although this served as a type of discreet protection, somehow the word still 
reached tax collectors regarding this evasion of taxes.  
 Rare tax records in Acul-du-Nord show how peasants were menaced by a taxing system 
that utilized police tactics and coercion to extract revenue from vulnerable peasants. In 1961, the 
stealthy market women in Acul-du-Nord were unable to escape the hawkish local tax collector:  
 
Il m’a été donné de constater qu’une pluralité de vendeurs de [sic] d’acheteurs se sont plu à 
organiser des marchés illicites dans les section rurales de votre commandement, ce qui, en effet, 
diminue les recettes de cette source. Je vous demande en l’occurrence, d’expédier les jours de 
Marché des Agents de Police sur dits lieux, lesquels, le case échéant, prendront des dispositions 
contre eux, ce vue de les porter à se divorcer avec leurs procédés nuisant aux intérêts d l’État.50 
 
Market women were the most subjugated class in Haiti, who often experienced state coercion, 
especially when concerning the market tax.  
 Living in the mountainous rural section of Mackary, Louisiane and her sister (though 
agreed to talk, refused to provide her name to the interviewer) recalled the arduous journey on 
foot to vend rural crops in the urban district Jacmel – a journey and task that took an entire day. 
They described how marketing took a cruel toll on the body, “when you leave on this route here 
to bring you all the way to Jacmel, when you return you're not a person anymore.” After the 
                                                
49 Interview with Maias in Bonbon, August 2015. 
50 Martin Jean, Préposé to Corporal Chargé du l’Avant Poste de Acul du Nord, 10  February 1961, in folder C. 
Année, DGI/Impôts Locale de Acul.  
            
             
 128 
rugged terrain taxed their bodies, market women would be taxed some more at the marketplace 
in Jacmel. “They [tax agents] used to make us experience misery, everywhere we turned we had 
to pay kat [ticketed tax], if you're with your mule they'll pass their hand on it [take it by the reins] 
and demand that you pay for it. You move ahead [in the market] they ask you to pay, you move 
even further they'll ask you to pay again.” Louisiane's sister interjected, however, “we fought 
them, they made us pay too much. We would fight them en route and say we’re not paying at 
all.”51  As men were arrested for their mobility, women were taxed for their mobile economic 
activity. Together, their freedom of leisure and religious practice were further menaced by armed 
tax agents.   
 Gageure (cockfighting games) was a leisure activity in the countryside, but became 
taxable occasion during the occupation (prior to U.S. invasion, gageure was outlawed). 
Participants and hosts of untaxed gageure games were subjected to arrest and imprisonment. On 
10 March 1961, the Acul tax officer ordered the arrest of Émile Abraham from the rural section 
of Bas Acul because he organized a gageure without registering the game for taxation.52  
Circumstances were no different for other untaxed leisure activities in Acul. “It has come to my 
attention that certain delinquent taxpayers,” the irritated Acul tax agent wrote to the local army 
corporal in 4 October 1961, “have taken to reunions of games, of spectacle public [rural parties 
and Vodou ceremonies], all parties in the rural Sections under your commandment…” The tax 
                                                
51 Interview with Louisiane and her unnamed sister in the rural section of Mackary (or might be spelled Macquarie), 
February 2015. 
52Martin Jean, Préposé Contributions to Caporal des Forces Armées d'Haiti, 10 March 1961, DGI/Impôts Locatif, 
Acul-du-Nord. 
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officer ordered the corporal to suppress the tax evaders that caused a "problem to the interest of 
the state."53 
 It is noteworthy to mention that the state even taxed ceremonies associated with the 
popular African-derived religion of Vodou, whereas institutionalized religious practices rooted in 
European traditions such as Catholicism and Protestantism were not. In theory, Vodou 
ceremonies were outlawed even under the Duvalier dictatorship. But in practice Vodou 
ceremonies were officially sanctioned if the devotees paid a tax called spectacle public that was 
an official general tax on festive events. Put simply, untaxed communal ceremonies were 
prohibited. Some peasants held secret Vodou ceremonies but risked state retribution. On 27 May 
1962, an Acul tax agent discovered that an unauthorized Vodou ceremony was soon in the 
making at “habitation ‘Guilmaçou’” and wrote to the local corporal, “Presently, I request you to 
please put at my disposal the ministry of public law enforcement under your command: a soldier, 
a chef de section and auxiliary police force to put a stop to spectacle public consisting of prayers, 
dancing etc. whose host was not authorized by the tax office.”54 Armed tax agents and the army 
collaborated to extract taxation from peasants that was a nuisance to their economy and freedom. 
Thus, the undemocratic practices of the police state in the countryside compelled many peasants 
to join the VSN/makout militia.  
           ***** 
                                                
53 “Il m’a été donné de constater que certains contribues indélicats ont eu à tenir des réunions de jeux, de spectacles 
publics, de bals dans toutes les Sections rurales relevant de votre commandement…En vu remédier à cet état de 
chose, nuisent aux intérêts de l’Etat, vous voudrez bien passer ordres à vos subordonnes pour qu’aucune des 
réunions ci-dessus établies ne s’organise dans leur Section respective sans que les contribuables intéressés 
s'acquittent de leurs droits règlements prévus par la loi. See, Martin Jean, Préposé to Corporal Chargé du l’Avant 
Poste de Acul du Nord, 4 October 1961, in folder C. Année, DGI/Impôts Locale de Acul.  
54“Par la présent, je vous demande de bien vouloir mettre à ma disposition le ministère des Agents de la Force 
Publique relevant de votre autorité: un soldat, le Chef de section rurale et ses Adjoints pour l’arrestation d’un 
spectacle public consistant en prières, danser etc et dont le tenancier ne s’est pas mis en règle avec le fisc.” Préposé 
Acul to Caporal de Forces Armées d’Haiti cantonné en cette commune, 27 May 1962, in folder Correspondance 
avec Collecteur, DGI/Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.  
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 Seeking a way to defend themselves, peasants joined the makouts for protection. One 
peasant referred to such makouts as "malere pè presyon" or malheureux fearful of pressure. 
Indeed, peasants had long seen themselves as malheureux [disempowered] but many became 
"chèf" in the Duvalier years to shield themselves from state predation and repression. One 
makout in the section of Bokozel of Artibonite, for example, carved the letter VSN into a 
wooden plank and nailed the sign to his front gate of his family compound or lakou. This VSN 
sign served to warn lurking state officials that relatives and friends living inside the lakou were 
under makout protection.55  Other makouts extended their protection to incorporate their entire 
communities.  
 Brining peasants under makout protection created tensions between the militia and state 
agents.  In a rural section of Soufrière located in Acul, a tax officer complained about local 
makouts obstructing tax collection on leisure activities and rural parties which was a category 
that included Vodou ceremonies. “Miliciens... of this region enjoy inculcating the habitants 
[peasants] with the spirit of embezzlement,” the tax agent in 1964 bitterly complained to 
superiors.  Soufrière makouts were advocating tax evasion, “They let them [peasants] understand 
that the Government of the Republic henceforth cancels the collection of taxes notably Spectacle 
Public [Vodou ceremonies and rural parties], card game of chance, slaughterhouse fees etc. ... 
this has paralyzed the submission of Funds.” The tax officer acknowledged that the makouts 
were only encouraging what peasants had already a propensity to act against, “This disturbance 
has left the wrong feelings in the minds [l’esprit] of the peasants [paysans], since it is manner in 
                                                
55 Interview with an unnamed peasant in Bokozel, 2014.  
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which they move voluntarily.”56  Many makouts were peasants and protected their communities 
against repressive state officials. 
 This means that, while the militia defended the position of the regime, makouts 
simultaneously militated against the local tentacles of the regime. This contradiction was the 
product of the Duvalier regime neglecting to turn its pro-peasant populism of justice sociale into 
meaningful law and practice in all levels of government. Instead, the regime created a peasant-
based militia whose rural members utilized their status to defend peasant communities from a 
predatory state.  Makouts were in constant tensions with local state agents harassing peasants.  
One former makout shared the following story:  
My aunt was arrested because she put coffee on the ground [in violation of laws on coffee preparation]. I 
wasn't present during the incident that day. When the state agronomist went up to my rural section of 
Laurent and had her arrested, I nor the other stronger ones [more influential makouts] were there. A 
jakoma (fresh militia recruit), you know who wasn't yet strong but still was a chèf was told that the state 
arrested my aunt. He dropped his farming and ran to where she was. And he yelled out to her stop and 
return. She replied she could not because she was under arrest but he cried out again to her to return. And 
she did. He instructed her to take back the coffee and she took back the coffee. And he told her to go back 
home and eat. And she did. The agronomist and the rural police just stood there and couldn't do anything 
because the tonton makout had priority [priòyite; Fr: priorité].57 
 
This story is an example of how makouts negotiated between their ties with the state and the 
community. Indeed, makouts often showed solidarity with kin and friends caught in the grasp of 
a predatory police state.   
                                                
56 "Depuis quelques mois les Membres des différents groupements politiques: Miliciens, Rempart, Syndicat de cette 
région se plaisent à inculquer aux habitants l'esprit de malversation.” "Ils leur laissent entendre que le 
Gouvernement de la République annule désormais le perception des taxes notamment les Spectacles Publics et les 
jeux de hasard, les droits d'abattage etc...cela paralyse le rentrée des Fonds. “Cette perturbation a laissé de 
mauvais sentiments dans l'esprit des paysans, car ceux-ci à la manière d'une que l'on meut à volonté.” “Je me fais 
l'impérieux devoir de vous  faire cet important rapport soit pour en plaindre aux Chefs respectifs de ces 
groupements, soit pour faire organiser au dit marché par les autorités locales un Meeting ayant pour but diffuser de 
l'esprit des masses paysannes la mauvais conception qui leur a été inculqués par ces gens pervers.” See, Préposé J. 
Arnold Thimoléon to Collecteur des Contributions Cap-Haitien, 7 September 1964 in folder titled Correspondance 
Avec Collecteur, DGI Acul Du Nord.  
57 Interview with André Georges in Limbé, June 2015. Some examples of arrest for violating coffee preparation laws 
can be found in Dondon's court records. Merceus Pierre and Madame Revilus Préval were charged for leaving 
coffee cherries on the ground to dry. See 1965 Simple Police, 4 November 1966, TP, Dondon. 
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 Rural makouts, in particular, were part of peasant communities and maintained solidarity 
with those who worked the land and sold their harvest in order to make a living. The notion of 
travay tè or working the land did not merely describe farm labor but an ideology that forged 
community ties. For some peasants, travay tè bounded Haitians together so tightly that it became 
commensurate with nationalism. "I'm Haitian, I work the land," explained Immacula Honarat of 
Anse-à-Foleur.58  Haiti was a nation of predominantly peasants so travay tè was not simply a 
marker that distinguished their economic class [and would not be an accurate one at that] but also 
a way of seeing the world that created local solidarity. This solidarity led to the expectation from 
peasants that local makouts would behave differently from urban makouts. 
  One rural denizen in Abricots, located in the southwestern peninsula, expressed that 
local makouts "didn't do harm, it was milisyen in Port-au-Prince that did harm. You can't harm 
peasants, you'll always pay for it."59 Indeed, local solidarities sometimes ran so deep that it often 
created regional divides among makouts. One week in March 1963, for example, an argument 
broke out in the province of Gonaives between the local militia and visiting makouts from Port-
au-Prince. One U.S. official reported what followed, "The argument led to the shooting of one of 
the Gonaives militia by the group from Port-au-Prince and subsequently to their own deaths at 
the hands of a mob."60 The local population of Gonaives, in defense of the local militia, killed 
makouts from the capital. 
 Sometimes makout local solidarities trumped the interests of the central government. 
Around June 1964, Duvalier held a constitutional referendum that would make him “President 
for Life.”  However, rural denizens and makouts living in the northern offshore island of La 
                                                
58 Interview with a Immacula Honorat in Anse-à-Foleur, 2015 
59 Interview with a rural denizen in Abricots, August 2015. 
60 American Embassy in Port-au-Prince to Department of State, 10 March 1963, POL 2-1 HAI, Central Decimal 
Files, RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
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Torture risked sabotaging the local referendum because they were involved in a conflict with a 
local army officer named Charles Lefère. On the July 1, the army commander Henri Namphy 
telegrammed Duvalier the following: 
Recall your Excellence the unworthy behavior of officer Charles Lefère in 
Latorture constantly in shock with VSN and population following report already 
done. Stop. New incidents 5 days of elections and this week with VSN who 
refused any collaboration and with good reason. Solicit your Excellency's 
removal of this officer for collective security [of] La Torture.61 
 
 The short telegram to Duvalier did not provide enough details to understand what exactly 
sparked tensions between military officer Lefère and makouts/local population in La Torture. 
Nonetheless, we see that local solidarities brought makouts and rural denizens together to 
confront the traditionally abusive military that almost jeopardized Duvalier’s local efforts to 
reelect himself into the presidency until his death. Duvalier succeeded in his national agenda to 
become President for Life, but this position had to coexist with locally-based makout activities 
that militated against the regime’s interest. 
 Indeed, makout activities were not only rooted in the nation, but also rooted in their 
localities. Militia sensibilities to communal interest derived from collective notions of morality 
that had been stitched and constantly reworked over time.  Aside from making occasional trips to 
the capital and attending local weekly militia meetings, marches, patrols, and training, many 
rural makouts scraped the earth with machetes searching for existence (chèche lavi) as most 
ordinary rural women, men, and children performed. Working the land also yielded uncertainty 
                                                
61 “Rappelle à votre excellence comportement indigne officier Charles Lefère à latorture constamment en choc avec 
VSN et population suivant rapport déjà fait. Stop.  Nouveaux incidents 5 jour des élections et cette semaine avec 
VSN qui ont refusé toute collaboration et avec raison. Sollicité de votre Excellence déplacement  de cet officier pour 
sécurité collective La Torture.”    
Henri Namphy to Son Excellence Dr. François Duvalier, 1 July 1964, Box 4, folder Maj. General Henri 
Namphy/Correspondences Feb-May 1984, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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created by natural and human forces. To shore up against the unforeseen natural disasters, 
peasants learned and passed on how to strike up fellowship with kin, friends, neighbors, local 
elites, and the supernatural. The peasant culture of dependency created practices and techniques 
that could ameliorate the ferocity of the unpredictable (e.g., hurricanes, sickness, crop failure, 
and bad luck). For the more discernible problems such as local state repression, ordinary 
peasants in the Duvalier era became makouts to protect their communities against local state 
abuse. 
 For example, makouts sometimes assisted market women in resisting unfair or abusive 
tax collection because taxation harmed profits accrued by vending women and disrupted their 
capacity to share what they had earned with needy relatives and friends that were bound up 
together by the moral economy of the Haitian countryside. For rural makouts, market taxes 
harmed household economies. Tonton makouts argued that their relatives and others covered 
under their notion of protection should not be taxed at the market that predicated on the makout 
"social contract" with the Duvalier state. That is, makouts gave free voluntary service to the 
regime in exchange for state privileges that included tax exemption.  
 Rural makouts asserted that tax evasion was a form of recompense for being unpaid 
members of the VSN militia.   One former makout of Limbé explains: "People used to pay a kat 
(ticketed market tax). It could be any little item brought to the market, a kat had to be paid...Like 
me, I'm a chèf and I send my wife to the market but we don't have much and we have to pay a 
tax.... We said this could not go on. I'm not paid and the little that I have is going to be taxed. No 
we revolted this could not go on."62  Archival records show an unusual occurrence of cases in 
which makouts defended market women from local state predation.  In 1963, rural police officers 
                                                
62 Interview with peasant in Limbé, June 2015. 
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in the border town Thomassique spotted a group of “contrebandier” or market women moving 
untaxed merchandise of Dominican providence between the rural sections of Savanna Mulâtre 
and Nolaquite.  “Among them two miliciens,” one police agent reported, “who after seeing the 
police, began fighting the two police agents... and the others [contrebandier] had time to take 
flight.”63  On a Sunday morning in 1965, Sainte Thérèse Daniel left her parents home in a rural 
section of Dondon to transport freshly harvested cabbage to the city of Cap-Haitien. Daniel was 
stopped on her path by a tax agent claiming to have received orders to destroy bad [piques] 
cabbage.  When Daniel protested, the tax agent threatened that either she lose her life or her 
cabbage. She wisely chose the latter and her cabbage was destroyed. But she took her complaint 
to three “miliciens” who arrested the tax agent.64 The unofficial tax agent was jailed and forced 
to recompense the lost value of Daniel’s cabbage and fees that she had to pay to the police to 
hold him custody before the trial.  
 Makout efforts to evade taxes sometimes spurred revolts and violent conflict with state 
agents.  These forms of violence were part of makout terror, but terror employed against the 
state. In 1966, market women in Gonaives openly resisted paying market fees to a tax officer and 
local makouts rushed to their side. The anti-tax action evolved into a popular revolt 
encompassing both market women and makouts against the state. Duvalier sent his presidential 
guard to suppress the revolt and reorganized Gonaives’ militia in retaliation for their 
                                                
63 Interrogatoire de l’Agent de Police Rurale Isidor Abraham, Commandant du District to Commandant du 
Département Militaire du Centre  31 May 1963, find in the police dossier of Joseph Mettellus, folder 11963, FAd’H, 
ANH, PauP.  
64 And during court it was revealed that the tax agent may have been informally appointed and rumored to be a 
sexual predator who preyed on market women. The tax agent mentioned in court that he was appointed by the tax 
office and was ordered by the “Chef du Syndicat” to survey cabbage entering Acul. 1965 Simple Police, 11 June 
1965, TB, Dondon. 
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collaboration with market women in the tax revolt.65  In 1967, Telius Audalus accompanied by 
Estasse Joseph who was in militia uniform stabbed a tax officer trying to collect taxes in 
Sourfrière’s market. The makout Estasse was arrested and jailed but, according to Acul tax 
officials, was released from prison on the order of the local “chef de la milice” without 
undergoing legal judgment.66  On 7 April 1969, the prefect of Mirebalais reported to Duvalier the 
names of makouts "Brunevil Dulormé V.S.N." and "Tardieu Clermont V.SN." among the 
participants in habitation Tizeau of Cazale who rose up in rebellion against the regime that partly 
originated from local resistance to market and irrigation taxes. The regime dispatched makouts 
from another region to help squash the rebellion in Cazale that led to the 1969 Peasant 
massacre.67 Avoiding dependency relationships with male makouts, some market women enlisted 
into the militia to enjoy privileges that included the evasion of market taxes.68 In sum, makouts 
collaborated with and absorbed members of their rural communities to resist taxation that 
harmed the moral economy of the Haitian countryside.  
 Makouts also showed solidarity to agricultural workers in labor conflict with powerful 
foreign industrialists operating in Haiti. In fact, many agricultural labor unions were pro-
Duvalier organizations,69 and others converted into makout lodges while continuing to advocate 
                                                
65 American Embassy in Port-au-Prince to State Department, 16 October 1966, POL 2-1 HAI, RG 59, Central 
Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
66 Préposé des Contribution de l'Acul-du-Nord to Collecteur des Contributions, Cap Haïtien, 17 May 1967, 
DGI/Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.  
67 Franck Geffrard, Prefect to Chef Supérieur et Effectif des Forces Armées et des volontaires de la Sécurité 
Nationale (Duvalier), 7 April 1960; this letter was reprinted in the following source, "1969: toute la vérité sur 
L'horrible massacre de Cazale," L'Union, 4 September 1991, Haiti Fights against Impunity, 
http://www.haitiluttecontre-impunite.org/texts/53?locale=en.  
68 Desir's mother was a market women and also member of the VSN militia. Interview with Floreine Desir in Limbé, 
June 2015. 
69 In June 1961, for example, union leaders from Grand Rivière du Nord, Bahon, and Grand Pré helped organized a 
mass rally along with other political bosses in honor of "Son Excellence le Président de la République.” See, 
RAPPORT DU JOURS DU DEPARTEMENT MILITAIRES DU NORD, 14 June 1961, 12079, FAd'H, ANH, PauP. 
Other unions were created with the explicit intent of operating in the interest of the Duvalier regime. On 23 June 
1961, for example, the Parti Syndical de Pignon in central plateau region was formed to "d'épauler la politique de 
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for labor rights. Many labor unions, especially in the northern zones, subsequently coalesced 
with the makout militia.70  This was particularly true in northeast Haiti. "One of the interesting 
features of Duvalierism in northeastern Haiti," one U.S. foreign officer reported to Washington 
in the sixties, "is the complete control of the principal labor federation in that area by the Civil 
Militia, President Duvalier's para-military band of political activists." These VSN militia-
northeast labor unions led two labor strikes against U.S.-owned sisal plantations for better wages. 
 During one union-makout strike in May 1962, the makout and prefect Berthelus Pierre 
taunted U.S. managers of the Dauphin Plantation in Fort Liberté: “You are not so powerful, you 
couldn’t even get Castro out of Cuba.” Also participating in the labor strike, and upon hearing a 
U.S. manager concede to union demands for holiday pay but under certain conditions, another 
makout interrupted, “they would always get this holiday pay under any condition as Dr. Duvalier 
would be President forever.” The makout-union won their strike against Dauphin Plantation that 
strengthened local support for the militia and the regime. U.S. officials reported, “As a result of 
the labor factory in the disputes provoked…the militia–union leaders and President Duvalier 
have enjoyed a wave of popularity among the plantation employees.”71   Incidents such as these 
                                                                                                                                                       
Son Excellence le Docteur François Duvalier" (shoulder the politics of His Excellency the Doctor François 
Duvalier). See, Chèf d'Etat Major Général to François Duvalier, 26 June 1961, Rapport journaliers de différents 
militaires du pays, 12079, ANH, PauP. On 13 January 1962, l'Union des Travailleurs in Jacmel where it organized a 
mass rally in "l'honneur de son Excellence, le Président François Duvalier." See, "Meeting organise par l'Union des 
Travailleurs de Jacmel," 19 January 1962, Le Nouvelliste. Labor union activities began to depart from labor 
activism and resemble the activities of the tonton makout militia. Unions were beginning to utilize their privileges  
that were in many ways anti-state resembling the VSN militia. See,  Préfect Jean Valbrun to Collecteurs des 
Contribution en Ville, 8 August 1962, DGI in Acul du Nord. 
70The former sendika Élie Maslen of Camp Louise suggest that unionist were the underlings of the VSN militia. 
Both milisyen and sendika wore the same uniform. When I asked Maslen to describe the relationship between the 
tonton makouts and syndika, he replied “tankou chef seksyon te gen adjwen, makout te gen syndika.” Just like how 
the rural chief of police had an auxiliary force so did the makout have the sendika.  Marslen was suggesting that the 
sendika and militia were part of the same political force affiliated with dictatorship. Interview with Élie Marslen of 
Camp Louise in Acul-du-Nord, 22 September 2013. 
71 This U.S. report was prompted by makout-led labor strikes in the northeast that utilized terror tactics intimidate 
American plantation managers. On 26 May 1962, the Fédération de Travailleurs et Ouvriers du Nord-Est led a labor 
strike on the U.S.-owned sisal producing Dauphin Plantation located in Fort-Liberté. Yet the Fédération comprised 
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generated support for the makout militia and, by extension, for the regime as well; however, their 
actions were often independent of regime directives. Rather, many makout acts of protections 
extended to members of their community derived in part from ideas and customs of local 
solidarity that long governed social interaction in the Haitian countryside.    
          ****** 
 Peasants becoming makouts did not only entail defending communal interests, but also 
personal ambitions for power.  Peasants did not merely join the makouts to protect themselves 
and their communities from a repressive state. Makouts also endeavored to become local political 
bosses. Obtaining power for some makouts centered on geographic strategy. One former makout 
who lived in a rural section traveled to the nearest major city, Cap Haitien, to enlist into the VSN 
                                                                                                                                                       
members of the local makout militia.  Clubs and machetes in hand, members of the Fédération thronged the floors 
of the plantation and demanded that Dauphin managers pay their workers holiday-pay. The strike drew local 
political officials who were also members of the militia.  One such VSN was the local prefect Berthelus Pierre who 
arrived at the plantation and berated the manager connections to Washington. “You are not so powerful," Pierre 
reportedly shouted to American managers, "you couldn’t even get Castro out of Cuba.” Another 160 tonton makouts  
marched around the plantation’s airfield before a crowd of five to six hundred peasants. Negotiations among the 
Fédération, government officials, and plantation managers were undertaken within this hostile climate. Finally, the 
American manager conceded to the demands of the workers and implied that holiday pay might not be available 
next year.  But one tonton makout interjected “they would always get this holiday pay under any condition as Dr. 
Duvalier would be President forever.”  After these tonton makouts won subsequent labor disputes, the managers and 
foreign officers also recognized the political capital of this event for the Duvalier regime, “As a result of the labor 
factory in the disputes provoked…the militia–union leaders and President Duvalier have enjoyed a wave of 
popularity among the plantation employees.” See, “Labor Trouble at the Dauphin Sisal Plantation,” June 15, 1962, 
838.062/6-1562. Not all unions in the northeast were successful in winning over state support in their activism for 
better wages. Following the 26 May strike at Dauphin, labor union-militia of Trou du Nord threatened to strike in 
the neighboring American-owned plantation, Haitian Agricultural Cooperation (HACOR). The plantation manager 
Donald Marek reported that the magistrate of the town Morin Salvant and Prefect Pierre had been causing trouble on 
his plantation. In May, Salvant gave “Anti-American” speeches in the farming villages and began to make 
“exorbitant demands” on the company regarding wages. Marek would have none of it and “took a tougher line and 
made no concessions to the union.” Marek took his case directly to the Ministry of Labor, and consequently, both 
Marek and Salvant were summoned to Port-au-Prince. Salvant was the magistrate of the town and a recognized 
VSN. Salvant was perhaps expecting support from the government given the success of his VSN counterparts in the 
neighboring Dauphin plantation. But once in the minister’s office, Kersaint and Marek scolded Salvant for his 
actions. Kersaint read Salvant the “Riot Act” and sternly reminded the magistrate of the proper conduct of a civic 
official. The minister then warned Salvant, “this is the Republic of Haiti, not the Republic of La Trou.” In one 
breath, the minister admonished the tonton makout for not acting on behalf of the state, but acting in the interest of 
local politics in northeast Haiti. See, "Labor Trouble at the HACOR Sisal Plantation" 25 June 1962, 838.06/6-2562, 
RG 58, NARA, College Park, Maryland. In response to the what was probably independent makout labor activism in 
the northeast, beginning in August, Duvalier reorganized the hierarchy of the northeast VSN. See, "Political and 
Labor Developments in the Northeast," 12 August 1962, 838.062/87262, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, NARA, 
College Park, Maryland. 
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militia where political power was most concentrated in the region. The former makout reasoned, 
"I entered the militia in the city to be chèf over all the milisyen (militia person) in the 
backcountry."72  
 Makouts achieved the position of chèf or local boss by either replacing or joining the 
ranks of local leading figures. These figures were usually part of the militarized police state that 
preyed on peasants. Thus, makouts, who were already a contradicting body, moved with and 
against repressive state agents depending on the circumstances. For example, in order to 
establish local dominance, some makouts challenged the authority of the chef de section and 
rural police officers that were traditionally the most influential figures in rural districts. "The chèf 
seksyon [Fr: chef de section] did not want to see milisyen but milisyen had all the power," the 
former makout Tanis of Gotier boasted.73  According to Ton Tatou, "when I was a milisyen, my 
friend, we had power.... Whatever chèf comes here, it could even be an officer [he voiced with 
emphasis] that arrives that comes to do something... if their intentions were bad, beatings would 
fall upon them."74   In June 1962, the police chef de section Lunor M. Metellus of Brostage in 
Dondon took affront to local makouts arresting his brother. Metellus had his brother released 
and, according to a military report, arrested some "miliciens" in retaliation.  
 The militia was much too early in its development stages for Metellus to discern its 
growing power and reportedly scoffed at them during a related court case, "la Milice [militia] is 
not worth anything." Tonton makouts in the rural section of Brostage were beginning to see 
things differently. As tensions escalated, Metellus' brother was captured and roped by makouts 
                                                
72 Interview with Louis Nicolas in habitation Galmant du Plat, Quartier Morin, 23 May 2015. 
73 Interview with Tanis in the rural section Gotier, Jean Rabel, 29 November 2013. 
74 Interview with peasant in the rural district Camp Louise, Acul-du-Nord, 2015. 
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who "almost beat him to death."  By August, the military discharged Metellus "to restore calm in 
the section."75  
 In other instances, makouts simply collaborated with the rural police and the local 
political status quo. The former makout Camille remembered that he and fellow members of the 
local militia worked together with their local chef de section, Hèlvé Jean.76  Makouts held so 
much power that some got rural police officers off the hook in dire circumstances when it came 
to their superiors. For instance, the former makout Nicolas successfully ordered army soldiers to 
release two jailed rural police officers from the military prison in Quartier Morin.77 Whether 
makouts competed or collaborated with the police, becoming a local political boss held much 
more power.  
 When joining the ranks of oppressors, makouts became oppressors themselves.  For 
example, some makouts extorted fellow peasants to enrich themselves, which resembled the very 
abuses committed by state agents that some makouts claimed to be resisting. After Duvalier 
reinforced codes against tree cutting, for example, one makout peasant of Gotier, an area now 
nearly deforested, admitted that he charged peasants a fee to continue falling trees for charcoal to 
sell in urban centers.78   The former makout Coeur Aimable of Limbé remembers that some 
members of the militia in nearby rural districts charged peasants a fee for retrieving captured 
                                                
75 Commandant du Département to CHEMG in L’agent de la police Martin Lunor Metellus, Dossiers de renvoi de 
militaire (faut official) et de police rurale 1960-1977, 11942, ANH, PauP.  
76 Interview with Pere Camille in rural district of Ravine du Roche, Limbé, 9 June 2016 
77 Interview with Louis Nicolas in the habitation Galmant du Plat, Quartier Morin, 23 May 2015. 
78 Interview with Tannis of Gotier, 2013. Charged with falling trees without authorization could land peasants in jail 
and compelled to pay fines. n 1965, José of Acul-du-Nord , for example, was charged for violating Duvalier's code 
rural articles 79, 86, and 225 related to tree cutting. José was sentenced to one month in jail and had to pay a total of 
thirty gourdes in fines or face another month of imprisonment. 1965 Simple Police, 27 September 1965, TP, Acul-
du-Nord. 
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farm animals from the rural police – instead of freely helping a fellow peasant out of a jam with 
the authorities.79  
 Other makouts employed their authority to settle scores. In December 1961, the 
"milicien" Antoine Duvivier took the seamstress Noémie Homère to court in Borgne for "gravely 
insulting" him during a dispute over rumors. Duvivier recounted to the judge, "The last injurious 
words she launched at me [was that] if it were not for my role as milicien, we would be at serious 
odds [avoir de mailles à partir]." Duvivier politely threatened, “but in my kindness, I judged it 
good to formulate my complaint in front of the law." The makout Duvivier implied that he chose 
avenging his harmed ego through institutional means than more violent alternatives associated 
with the makouts. The accused Homère was fined four gourdes and sentenced to a month in 
prison.80 Even though no apparent life was taken, Duvivier employed other tactics that were 
nonetheless forceful, intimidating, and punitive—however more innocuous it may seem than 
violent terror.  
 These power trips were the product of political ambitions at the expense of local 
solidarities. Though a powerful ideology that brought peasants together, local solidarities did not 
serve as enough of a buffer to prevent makouts from turning their tactics of terror against those 
they lived nearby or knew intimately. These acts of terror, however, rarely appear random but 
rather linked to local conflict.  Local strife varied and so makout terror manifested in various 
ways according to circumstance. For instance, in Borgne around 1964, local officials gave the 
                                                
79 Interview with Coeur Aimable in Limbé, 10 June 2016. 
80 1961 Simple Police, 14 December 1961, TP de Borgne. And Duvivier seemed to prefer legal retribution over 
violent terror. Just thirteen days before, Duvivier was in court testifying against the peasant François Cadet. When 
Cadet was held under contempt in court for insulting a judge, Duvivier attempted to arrest him. But Cadet fought 
back and punched the Makout. Duvivier brought Cadet in court was recorded to have said, "Being a milicien in 
service of the Government, I demand that François Cadet be condemned conforming to the law for having 
committed an assault." Cadet was sentenced to a month in prison and had to pay fines. Duvivier was on a power trip. 
1961 Simple Police, 1 December 1961, TP, Le Borgne. 
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peasant Cherenfant Chérélus the task to eliminate undomesticated pigs roaming about Borgne. 
When he killed the pig that was owned by a person with ties to the makout, Chérélus was 
confronted by local makouts and a fight broke out.  On 5 November, Chérélus was dragged into 
court and accused of assaulting local "miliciens." But Chérélus asserted that he was merely 
defending himself against a merciless attack by his "milicien" accusers – an attack that lasted 
until the militia commander called off the beating. “If it weren't for the intervention of 
Dieudonné François Commander of the VSN,” Chérélus sighed in court, “I would have been 
found dead.”81  
 Other makout conflicts with ordinary peasants were related to disagreements regarding 
informal contracts that dealt with sharecropping. In May 1965, the makout Vilius Samour was 
supposedly bewildered when he discovered on his 3.15 acre farm Ephéner Vénelon harvesting 
malanga (taro root). Samour later testified in court that Vénelon was previously entitled to half of 
its harvest (a half and half sharecropping agreement called demwatye or de moitié), but his terms 
had expired by the time of harvest season. The makout Samour arrested Vénelon and had him 
jailed. In court, Vénelon acknowledged that his sharecropping term had expired by the time of 
harvest but he argued that he planted the malanga before the expiration and that sickness delayed 
him from reaping what he sowed on time. Thus, Vénelon had a legitimate reason, at least within 
the scope of peasant moral codes, to harvest his crops beyond the timeframe of his agreement 
with Vilius. 
  Nevertheless, Vénelon allowed Vilius to arrest and subjected him to multiple beatings 
because, as the former testified in court, "It is in his [Vilius'] role in Volontaire Milice Civil that 
he exercise against me: I found it impossible to disobey his orders." Although Vénelon was 
                                                
81 1965 Simple Police, 5 February 1965, TP, Le Borgne.  
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defenseless against Vilius' makout status, the courts deviated from notions of authority exercised 
by the Duvalier regime and ruled based on popular notions of community behavior. Dondon's 
judge of peace, ignoring the privileges of the makouts and probably more influenced by the 
moral codes of rural society, freed Vénelon and dismissed the charges.82  
 In other instances, intimate family conflict prompted makout terror. In October 1965, 
Saintalès Saimbert attempted to stop her sister, Dieusèlie Saimbert, from violently disciplining 
her nephew. Dieusèlie turned her violence to her sympathetic sister, Saintalès. Then, Dieusèlie's 
partner dragged Saintalès to the "V.S.N. Alphonse Pierre." Saintalès later testified in court that 
the makout Pierre, "bound my two hands and my two feet, thrust me unto to the ground, and 
administered a whipping...without concern of the wounds already caused by the mistreatment of 
my sister."83 All these instances show that the politics of makout terror, although powerful, did 
not necessarily defy local ideologies of solidarity; instead the two coexisted.  
 Indeed, terror sometimes rivaled moral codes produced over time by collectively 
"working the land." And some makouts could not circumvent local rules on how to live among 
their neighbors. Makouts caught stealing crops or farm animals from ordinary peasants, which 
theft being one of the most morally offensive crimes in the countryside, were arrested by fellow 
makouts. One Sunday night in February 1965, Adelka François of habitation Cadush spotted 
Hélvétus Jean in her garden stealing plantains. But Jean was no ordinary civilian but a member 
of the militia. So she proceeded to do the following: "I left my garden to search for a volontaire 
[VSN] in the area to arrest Jean." That is, she sought out neighboring makouts to arrest their 
                                                
82 "Ce sont ces qualités de Volontaires de la Milice Civile qu'il exerçait contre moi: Je me trouvais alors dans 
l'impossibilité de ne pas obéir à ces ordres." 1965 Simple Police, 20 May 1965, TB, Dondon. 
83 "Alphonse Pierre V.S.N. ayant ligoté me dieux mains, et me deux pieds , me jeter par terre et m'administra une 
volée à la aide d'un fouet... sans se soucier de la blessure que les maltraitements  
de ma sœur." 1965 Simple Police, 25 October 1965, TP, Dondon.   
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fellow makout for stealing. Adelka found two makouts to help stake out her garden that very 
night to see if Jean would return. He did at four o'clock in the morning. "Since the said Hélvétus 
Jean was a milicien," Adelka later testified in Quartier Morin's court of peace, "his brothers 
[meaning fellow makouts] Magloire and Richmond Mondésir arrested him and brought him to 
the VSN Bureau in Cadush."  Revealing what she actually meant by "his brothers," Jean stated in 
court: "two miliciens de Cadush proceeded with my arrest..." Jean was sentenced to five months 
in jail.84  In Cadush, moral disdain towards stealing united makouts and ordinary peasants against 
alleged thieves even if the accused was part of the powerful makouts.  
 In spite of makout tensions with the population, local solidarities remained constant 
because it was what Axel Honneth calls the “moral grammar” (or structure) of subjective and 
communal formation. Worked and reworked overtime, local rural solidarities were more present 
to peasants than the state itself.  Makouts as state actors could not merely impose themselves on 
this moral structure but had to work themselves into it.  And even so, makouts could never 
receive complete moral approval because makouts, though they sometimes defended peasants, 
were also tied to the central state which made them vulnerable to the corrupting, megalomaniac 
tendencies of power. In other words, makouts occupied a morally ambiguous position where they 
had one foot in local communities and the other in the realm of state power. This is why makouts 
received ambivalent support from peasants.  
 The elderly peasant Lemanoit “Zo” Pierre explained: “They had power. They were 
makouts. Those who were not good sided with the state and big elites. Those who were malere 
                                                
84 "Dimanche vers le sise [sic] heure du soir en arrosant mon jardin, j'entendis coupé une banane je m'approchais 
clandestinement pour voir qui travail dans le jardin brusquement j'apprenais le nommé Hélvétus Jean, tout de nuit 
je laisse le jardin, pour aller chercher  des volontaire de l'endroit pour procéder à l'arrestation du nommé Hélvétus 
Jean plus haut-cité. Immédiatement ils venaient a mon aides...Comme se nommé Hélvétus Jean était son milicien, 
ces [sic] frères...Magloire, Richard Mondesir procédèrent à son arrestation et le conduisaient au bureau des V.S.N 
de Cadush..." "deux miliciens de Cadush procéderaient à mon arrestation et me conduire au bureau des V.S.N. de 
Cadush..." 1965 Simple Police, 10 February 1965, TP, Quartier Morin. 
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had their own understandable reasons [gen rezon].”85 Zo saw malheureux peasants enlisting to 
defend their rights as a just reason for joining the makouts, whereas others who sought to reenact 
the power of local state agents and bosses were less credible.  Most dichotomies are unreliable 
for social analyses because they do not take into account the nuances of human action. The same 
goes for “the good makout” versus “the bad makout” model.  Yet, if dichotomies are limited to 
us as analyst than they also limited the peasant’s view. Instead of a more comprehensive 
understanding of Duvalier’s perverse system of control, peasants often reached for the more 
locally-based characterizations of a few bad rotten makouts. Who can blame them, peasants 
spent most their time knowing little about a state that did very little for them. All what peasants 
had was the makouts and, for good or bad, they joined or relied on the militia to scale back the 
repressive tendencies of the police state that was led by the U.S.-backed military. Thus, Duvalier 
and peasants shared a common interest in ameliorating the influence of the army. 
 
The Conclusion: The Continuity of the Makouts  
 By the late sixties, tonton makouts played a key role in curbing the political dominance of 
the military. Enjoying power beyond challenge since U.S. intervention, the military, under 
Duvalier and the makouts, found themselves in a very weak position. In 1968, a U.S. official 
reported, "the Haitian Armed Forces themselves no longer pose an institutional threat to the 
Duvalier regime as they did in the late 1950s when the president created the VSN as a 
counterforce to an unfriendly military establishment."86  Indeed, this meant that the makouts 
were the foundations of the regime’s power. "Duvalier has managed, sometime even by 
                                                
85Interview with Lemanoit “Zo” Pierre in rural section Lacoma, Jean Rabel, 27 November 2013. 
86"Recent Political-Military Developments in Cap Haitien," 10 November 1968, POL 2-1, Central Decimal Files, 
RG 59, HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
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accident," a U.S. official reported to Washington, after given a rare opportunity in 1968 to tour 
the northwest province, "a primitive polity of some political structures which serve as stabilizing 
elements."  Because given unusual access into the countryside, which foreign officers were 
rarely able to do, this U.S. official observed that the militia was fundamental to the regime's 
"stability."87 
  In addition, this U.S. official realized that local solidarities between makouts and 
peasants against the military played an important role in, simultaneously, providing the regime 
with popular consent and protecting the regime from military intrigue: 
The best example involves the VSN, popularly labeled Ton Ton Macoutes and believed to be 
thugs. While this description may be valid in Port-au-Prince, in the Northwest it is misleading. On 
the contrary, the regular army personnel on a short assignment in an isolated town tend more to 
be thugs. The militiamen are natives of the town in which they serve and do not happily watch 
army strangers abuse their fellow townspeople. In confrontation with the outside world, the 
Haitian's already extended concept of the family can easily be extended to include their entire 
town. For the most part, the VSN forms a buffer between a sort of occupying force and the 
townspeople and peasants. This is not to ignore that VSN members take advantage of their 
position vis-a-vis others in the town. It is worth emphasizing that the interaction of the Army, the 
Militia and the local political officials produces a definite if somewhat tenuous equilibrium 
between competing power groups in many localities with each group having at least one line into 
the [National] Palace. 88 
 
The fundamental insight of these remarks was correct, but did not emphasize enough the 
influential role of the militia in maintaining the regime. Tonton makouts did not merely function 
as one group on a terrain replete with other competing groups that offset each other to the 
detriment of collective struggles and to the advantage of sustaining the Duvalier state. Rather, 
enlistment of the rural masses into a large armed following helped extend the regime's influence 
into the quite remote northwest peninsula which was previously dominated by the local political 
elites and army soldiers. In this way, the presence of the militia made the local political structure 
                                                
87 "Trip Report: Northwest Department of Haiti," 29 December 1968, POL 2-1, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, 
NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
88 Ibid. 
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and the army more amenable to the central state. The Duvalier regime, above all, depended on 
the militia for centralizing control. Camille, a former makout, could not have not stated it more 
clearly when he declared, "la milice supervised Duvalier's power."89  In return, tonton makouts 
demanded political power that checked local state and military abuse. They also sought special 
privileges that depended upon their circumstances.  
 Some peasants become makouts to fend for their interests in everyday interactions and 
confrontations with elements of political, state, and class power. While involved in a court case 
over a dispute of a cow, one Torbeck peasant joined the militia to seek an advantage.90  This 
might explain why on 22 August 1969 the prosecutor in Jacmel, regarding an unspecified case, 
sent a memo to the judge of peace in Grand-Gossier to verify whether a certain Charles Pierre 
"c'est un VSN."91  Makouts utilized their privilege to illegally squat on the land owned by elites. 
On 3 December 1969, a tax agent complained to his superiors that land belonging to the elite 
Jean Dupuy was "Completely occupied by miliciens."92 Some makouts used privileges to obtain 
trade licenses without facing bureaucratic red tape. In the remote northern rural town of Grison-
Garde, Paulcius Demosthene and Lysiais Alce faced unspecified problems processing their 
application to obtain an artisan trade patent. On 24 July 1970, Emile Auguste, militia commander 
of the northern department and prefect of Cap-Haitien, came to their defense in a letter to the tax 
officer. "They are Miliciens, the supervisors of la Révolution Duvalieriste," Auguste asserted. "I 
would appreciate if you listen and do what is possible for them."93 Some makouts demanded tax 
                                                
89 Interview with Pè Camille in the rural section Ravine du Roche, Limbé, 9 June 2016. 
90 Interview with Adonat Touchard in Torbeck 2014. 
91 Commissaire Eften Célestin to Judge of Peace in Grand-Gosier, 22 August 1969, TB, Thiotte. 
92 Jacques Nicolas, Préposé to Collecteur des Contributions du Cap-Haitien, 3 December 1969 in folder Lettre de 
Renonciation, DGI-Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.  
93 “Mon bien cher Collecteur, Je vous envoie Paulius DEMOSTHENE et Lysias ALCE, de Grison-Garde qui ont un 
problème de patente à régler. Ce sont des Miliciens, les gérants de la Révolution Duvalieriste. Je vous saurais gré 
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exemption that militated against state profit. On 2 October, a local tax collector in Grison-Garde 
complained to his superiors regarding tax evasion by the makout commander and wealthy rural 
denizen Dorléan Sagesse. He refused to pay state fees for holding a rural party featuring the 
popular musical orchestra Tropicana. Sagesse's felt that his status as a volunteer for national 
defense deserved certain perks that included tax exemption. "I am Chef Milice, I don't get a 
wage, no person can make me pay for this spectacle," sneered Sagesse.94 He was expressing, in 
the most lucid of terms, the social contract between makouts and Duvalier that was the source of 
the regime's longevity: voluntary national defense in exchange for power.
                                                                                                                                                       
de les entendre et de faire pour eux ce qui ont possible.” From Prefect Emile Auguste to Collecteur Maurice 
Monereau, 24 August 1970, Lettre de Renonciation, DGI/Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.  
94 From Préposé G. Salomon to Collecteur des contributions de Cap-Haitien, 2 October 1970, folder Lettre de 
Renonciation, DGI/Impôts Locale, Acul-du-Nord.   
            















The Revitalized Haitian Military and Its Violent Conflict with the Makout Militia During 
the Rule of Jean-Claude Duvalier 
 
 François Duvalier died from natural causes in 1971, which, by then, everyone in Haiti 
knew who would inherit the presidency: his nineteen-year old son, Jean-Claude Duvalier.  Now a 
dynastic regime, the next issue at hand was assuring militia support for the new and terribly 
young dictator.  His father created the VSN/tonton makout militia to defend the regime from 
political attacks, to suppress political opposition, and to curb the influence of the U.S.-backed 
national army that was accustomed to overthrowing Haitian governments. Thus, under François 
Duvalier, the makouts were instrumental in buttressing the position of the regime. Now with 
Duvalier dead, the young Jean-Claude needed reassurance that makouts would remain loyal.  
Only some months in power, Jean-Claude chose the summer of July 1972 to hold his very first 
VSN militia parade where he would publicly explain what was expected of makouts.  
 In a speech during the parade, Jean-Claude urged makouts to stand firmly by his side: "I 
repeat anew that this Corps only has a single soul: Duvalier! only knows one Chef: Duvalier! 
only fights for a single destiny: Duvalier in Power!"  Thus, unsurprisingly, the Duvalier regime 
expected what it had always expected; it yearned makouts’ complete devotion to keeping the 
Duvalier government in power.  And Jean-Claude – or at least the cabinet members who likely 
instructed the adolescent leader – understood that militia loyalty came with terms involving 
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recognizing the political ambitions of its makouts, many of whom were previously ostracized 
peasants.  In his speech, Jean-Claude implicitly acknowledged this arrangement (loyalty for 
power) by reminding makouts that if his father had not organized the militia, they would still be 
marginalized in countryside.  He told them: "You are defenders of a just Cause that goes beyond 
the cause of Man. It is a Cause of Class – the Haitian Masses of the Backcountry – that François 
Duvalier took out of isolation and lethargy to project onto the scene of National History..."1 Long 
held by makouts that their loyalty to the regime was a bargaining chip to access power, Jean-
Claude himself was implying the same to inherit the sort of support that they gave his father.  
However, Jean-Claude proved significantly inconsistent in his loyalty to makouts that brewed 
uncontrollable conflict that contributed to the unraveling of the regime. 
 Instead of showing steady support to makouts, Jean-Claude wavered between checking 
independent militia actions and revitalizing the Haitian army. This approach did not appear 
supportive of makouts, but rather reveals a readjustment within the state’s separate branches of 
national security and a departure from its former practices. After his father spent time in power 
pursuing a different approach that instrumentally employed the militia to curb the army, Jean-
Claude changed course and brought the military back to its previous position of prominence as 
the leading force of national security.  For example, large sums of money were reinvested into 
the buildup of the army. Jean-Claude even reopened the military academy, which his father 
closed down, to train cadets.  And while propping up the army in a determined fashion, Jean-
Claude’s government was less invested in strengthening the makout militia.  
                                                
1 "Vous êtes les défenseurs d'une Cause juste qui est loin d'être la cause Homme ou d'un clan. C'est la Cause d'une 
Classe – les Masses Haïtiennes du Pays et l'Arrière Pays – que François Duvalier tira de l'isolement et de la 
léthargie pour la projeter sur la scène de l'Histoire Nationale dont il changea le cours." MESSAGE DU 
PRESIDENT A VIE DE LA REPUBLIQUE AUX VOLONTAIRES DE LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE A 
L'OCASSION DU 29 JUILLET 1972, Haiti Fights against Impunity, http://www.haitiluttecontre-
impunite.org/texts/148.  
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 Even though proven over the years to be the most loyal branch of national security that 
defended the regime from attacks, makouts also presented significant problems that undermined 
the regime’s authority. In the first place, makouts developed a reputation – in both local and 
global spheres – as terrifying and murderous bullies. The militia’s infamous reputation doubly 
had the effect of stirring local popular agitation and disrupting diplomatic ties with foreign 
nations and institutions that advocated for human rights.  Furthermore, the militia’s independent 
use of force often militated against the regime’s different levels of interests. Makouts, in efforts 
to defend individual and communal interests, obstructed tax collection and opposed the authority 
of other state agents.  In sum, the behavior of makouts made governing unwieldy; they got in the 
way of government control over the population, foreign diplomacy, and the extraction of internal 
revenues.  For the regime, the makouts grew into a nuisance that needed to be dealt with.  Instead 
of trying to professionalize the militia as a form of discipline, the regime moved against the 
makouts.  
 Appropriating local and international characterizations of the makouts as violent petty 
tyrants, the regime often admonished and even legislated against certain abuses related to makout 
activities.  The regime conveniently focused its rebuke on makout terror that targeted civilians. 
But the regime rarely denounced makout terror that was related to state repression of the political 
opposition or even anti-state violence employed by makouts to protect their communities from 
state police abuse and tax predation.  Ignoring the complexities of makout terror allowed the 
regime to scapegoat its own inadequacies in improving the underdeveloped conditions and 
political inequalities of the countryside. In reality, the regime’s denunciation of makout terror 
against civilians hid its practical motives that were related to foreign policy.   
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 After suspending crucial assistance to Haiti for several years, the U.S. began to negotiate 
the full resumption of aid on the condition that official measures were taken by the Duvalier 
regime to limit the influence of the tonton makouts.  The U.S. government would also provided 
military aid to the Jean-Claude's government to revitalized the national army whose influenced 
had been reduced over the years under the rule of François Duvalier.  The former dictator did not 
trust the army because of its ties to elements of the political opposition and U.S. government. 
Duvalier created the militia in part to check the influence of the army.   However, Jean-Claude 
did the opposite and curbed makout influence to receive financial assistance and military aid 
from the United States.  For these reasons, the U.S. backed Haitian army experienced a 
resurgence in prominence under the rule of Jean-Claude. This proved to be bad policy that led to 
the undoing of the Duvalier regime. Attempting to reconfigure its security forces that privileged 
the army over the makouts would result in violent conflict between the security forces as they 
tussled to monopolize force.   
 Perhaps even more important to the exacerbation of intra-security tensions was the 
reinvigorated military’s increased repression in peasant communities that were under makout 
protection. Makouts often utilized force to protect relatives and friends from arbitrary arrests by 
soldiers and military rural police chèfs that escalated violence between the security forces. 
Violent conflict between makouts and the military started to spiral out of control in the 1980s and 
contributed to the waves of social strife that eventually uprooted the regime from power.   
Demoralizing the Makouts and Revitalizing the National Military  
 
 To be sure, the regime’s policies directed at checking the activities of the makout militia 
started under François Duvalier. His approach to scaling back the influence of the makouts 
involved the return of U.S. aid to Haiti. However, the regime did not privilege the military over 
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the makouts. Rather, Duvalier prevented the growth of the army while legislating against the 
makouts.  His government presented its anti-makout action as a response to popular complaints 
regarding militia abuse.  As early as the mid sixties when U.S. aid started trickle into Haiti, 
Duvalier took bold moves against the makouts and presented his actions as an attempt to 
discipline makout abuses toward the population.  Some of these approaches included purging top 
militia leaders and passing anti-makout laws that U.S. officials were keen to document.   
 U.S. officials sent approving reports to Washington that the Duvalier regime legislated 
against makout abuses and interpreted these measures as curbing the militia’s privileges. On 26 
May 1967, U.S. officials reported that Haitian the Ministry of Interior decreed the registration of 
all arms by prefects and civilians whom U.S. officials suspected included the makouts that were 
technically civilians.2  Some days later, U.S. officials observed, the regime decreed that makouts 
could not serve as “notaries, public ministers, or surveyors, etc.”3  Around the same time, the 
Duvalier regime also discharged some of the most powerful regional makout commanders.  
 On 21 May 1967, U.S. officials reported that, after the militia committed intolerable 
violence against the population in Cap-Haitien when trying to quell an armed invasion, Duvalier 
sacked the town’s VSN top commander, Pierrot “Pèlota” Giordani and allowed the local 
inhabitants to beat and drive local makouts “out of town.”4  On 5 March 1969, U.S. officials 
reported that Duvalier relieved the VSN chief of Grand’ Anse, Sannette Balmir, after an 
investigation revealed her leading role in dispossessing peasants and committing other “revolting 
                                                
2 U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince to Department of State, June 24, 1967, POL 2-1, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, 
HAI, NARA, College Park, Maryland.   
3 U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo to State Department, May 5, 1968, POL 2-1, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, HAI, 
NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
4 American Embassy in Haiti to State Department, May 21, 1967, NARA, POL 2-1 HAI, Central Decimal Files,  RG 
59, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
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injustices.”5  For U.S. officials, anti-makout measures showed the determination of the regime to 
rebuke the militia that not only received international notoriety for terror, but also thwarted the 
U.S. from exercising influence in Haiti through the U.S.-backed army.  For Haitians, the 
regime’s anti-makout policies encouraged the population to take action against local abusive 
makouts. This grew more to be the case the moment Duvalier died.  
 Only several weeks after his death, segments of the northern rural population took action 
against certain makouts.  On 24 May 1971, the plaintiff Denise Lacarte took the makout Saintilus 
Louis to court and accused him and his fellow “miliciens” in her locality for having "the habit of 
causing pain."  Referring to makout terror, Denise’s statements in court were likely emboldened 
by state-sanctioned denunciations of militia abuse.  Standing as a defendant in court, the accused 
makout Louis admitted that his disagreement with Denise was the result of her anti-makout 
remarks.  "Denise Lacarte...declared in my presence that presently, the militia is not powerful at 
this moment," testified Louis.6   But the makout Louis must have known that the courageous 
Denise was part of a growing consensus that was prompted by the regime’s anti-makout policies.  
Dondon peasants, living only a couple hours away from Quartier Morin, shared the same anti-
makout sentiment.  In the same month, Dondon’s rural police stumbled upon a large crowd of 
people that fatally injured a local makout “Letéon Exantus V.S.N" and “made flee all the 
circulating miliciens."7 Anti-makout mob activities were not widespread, but it occurred enough 
to demonstrate that some northern rural denizens targeted makouts for retribution in response to 
the regime’s public denunciations. Jean-Claude would continue his father’s anti-makout policies. 
                                                
5 American Embassy in Haiti to State Department, May 21, 1967, NARA, POL 2-1 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 
59, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
6 "... quant à présent la Milice ne pas de pouvoir en ce moment." A transcript detached legal transcript dated on 25 
May 1971 in TP Quartier Morin. 
7 1971 Simple Police, 18 May 1971, TP, Dondon. 
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 Rooted in earlier attempts to curb the independent makouts, Jean-Claude purged 
influential militia leaders and legislated against their activities. For example, Jean-Claude 
discharged important makout leaders from the militia, even though his father chose them for their 
loyalty. In the 1960s, François Duvalier appointed Max "Rosalie" Adolphe as a leading militia 
commander and was his close confidant. However,  after Jean-Claude came to power, Adolphe 
was removed from her post that notably demoralized makouts (she returned to the militia by the 
1980s).8  Years later, Jean-Claude relieved militia commanders Robert Cox and Zacharie Delva 
who were both initially appointed by and had close relationships with François Duvalier.9  Jean-
Claude also decreed against makout abuse. For example, the U.S. took notice of the regime's 
1973 decree that denounced "arrests for personal reasons" and “invited the press to publicize any 
incidents of such abuses coming to its attention.”10  Indeed, Jean-Claude’s actions against the 
makouts resembled policies that originated from his father’s rule in the 1960s.  However, Jean-
Claude diverged from his father’s policies in one important way: the revitalization of the U.S.-
created national military.  
 The United States created the Haitian army during the invasion period to suppress 
peasant insurgents and popular traditions of revolt.  In the post-occupation period, the U.S. 
maintained ties with the Haitian army that was often behind military coups and political intrigues 
that overthrew governments.  When he became president, François Duvalier partly created the 
makouts to check the army’s interventionist tendencies, in turn, limit the U.S.’s influence in 
                                                
8 Rony Gilot, Au gré de la mémoire: Jean-Duvalier ou l'ingénuité captive (Delmas: Le Béréen, 2010), 114. 
9 Jean-Claude Duvalier to Prefects and Commandants des Départements, 4 February 1980; Jean-Claude Duvalier to 
Lieutenant-Colonel Gracia Jean, Box 1, folder Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
10 Aembassy Port-au-Prince to Department of State, 20 December 1972, POL 2-3 HAI, Central Decimal Files, RG 
59, NARA, College Park, Maryland. 
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Haitian national politics.  Under Jean-Claude, however, the regime agreed to curb the militia and 
revitalize the military in exchange for U.S. assistance.  
 Diminishing the influence of makouts and rebuilding the army were part of regime’s 
designs to receive aid from the U.S. government.  After serving in Jean-Claude’s government, 
Rony Gilot wrote a first-hand memoire of the president’s rule. In his book, Gilot mentions that 
the U.S. government pressured the regime to dissolve the militia in exchange for financial aid 
and military assistance that strengthened the position of the army.11  U.S. state department 
records can corroborate his remarks.  Indeed, U.S officials supported the idea of building up the 
Haitian military on the condition that the regime continued to minimize the militia's influence. 
After approving a $200,000 grant and a $500,000 credit to rebuild the Haitian military, the state 
department explained in a letter the first two objectives of the funding: 
 
(I) CONSOLIDATE USG INFLUENCE WITH HAITIAN ARMED FORCES, TRADITIONALLY A 
CRITICAL FACTOR IN HAITIAN POLITICAL STABILITY. REGULAR MILITARY IS 
GRADUALLY TAKING OVER INTERNAL SECURITY ROLE FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO 
MILITIA AND ASSOCIATED WITH IRREGULAR SECURITY UNITS CREATED BY THE 
LATE PRESIDENT FRANÇOIS DUVALIER.  
(II) RESPOND TO PRESIDENT JEAN-CLAUDE DUVALIER DESIRE TO IMPROVE 
PROFESSIONAL QUALITY OF HAITIAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP, WHICH ALSO SERVES 
US OBJECTIVE OF FURTHER DIMINISHING THE ARBITRARY ROLE OF MILITIA AND 
OTHER IRREGULAR SECURITY FORCES.12 
 
Jean-Claude accepted U.S. advances to strengthen the Haitian military and gestured towards 
curbing militia influence.  
 At first, Jean-Claude actually attempted to replace the makouts.  In his memoire on Jean-
Claude, Gilot tells us that the regime created a professionalized paramilitary force called the 
Corps des Léopards that operated under the control of the military.  But the Léopards, according 
                                                
11 Gilot, Au gré de la mémoire, 115.  
12 From Aembassy Port-au-Prince to Washington DC, 4 February 1976, Central Decimal Files, RG 59, NARA, 
College Park, Maryland. 
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to Gilot, constituted a small tactical team of five hundred soldiers that proved ineffective in 
combatting rebel attacks.  During a rebel invasion in the northern offshore island of La Torture, 
the Léopards reportedly fled at the sound of gunfire.13  By trial and error, the regime learned that 
the militia was a more reliable security force because it represented a vast loyal corp. "No 
military garrison could replace this vast vague and impetuous popular fervor," observed Rony in 
regards to the makouts.14 Indeed, makouts and peasant loyalists formed a "vast" and "vague 
popular fervor" that continuously proved to be an effective defensive force for the regime. And 
even though quite vast, they were often invisible to rebel groups plotting to overthrow the 
regime.   
 In 1981, peasants of Belladère reported to authorities that exiled rebels were organizing 
in their locality.  Soon after, peasants and makouts fought the rebels. In the midst of the conflict, 
the peasant Andréus Olive confronted the rebels with only stones in his hands but was killed by a 
hail of rebel gunfire.15  With the help of peasants, nevertheless, the authorities captured the rebels 
that included Vladimir Jeanty. Badly wounded and under military interrogation, Jeanty 
reportedly admitted his "proven surprise in finding that, far from siding with his movement, 
paysans would have rather lynche for the President."16 A couple years later, another group of 
rebels were spotted in the frontier town of Thiotte.  One military officer reported, "all the 
inhabitants of the zone participated in the search."17   The makout base and its peasant loyalists 
                                                
13 Gilot, 114. 
14 "La milice était moins une force militaire qu'un monôme imposant dans la vitrine fasciste des Duvalier. Aucune 
garnison militaire ne pourrait se substituer à cette vague immense et impétueuse de ferveur populaire mue par un 
fanatisme aveugle et sans bornes." Gilot, 116. 
15 Colonel Jean B. Valme to CHEF SUPREME, 18 January 1981, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL..   
16 Colonel Valme to CHEF SUPREME, 22 January 1981, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
17 Colin to COMDEP SUD-EST, 29 September 1983, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
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formed an invisible wall that thwarted rebel attacks and provided consent for the regime. 
 Peasants and makouts even prepared folk songs that transmitted ideas about makouts 
defending the regime from exiled rebels or kamoken. One makout shared with the author a 
popular song in his village: 
 
Si yon nòm milisyen, 
Fòw pa pè lan mò woy 
Si yon nòm milisyen  
Fòw pa pè lan mò woy, fòw pa pè maladi woy, 
Divalye pare sèkèy la pou mwe, 
Jan Clod pare kleron an pou mwe, 
Na’p manje kamoken yo. 
 
If a person is in the militia, 
You must not fear death, oh 
If a person is in the militia, oh 
You must not fear death ,oh,  
You must not fear sickness oh, 
Duvalier (the father) prepare a coffin for me, 
Jean-Claude prepare to sound the trumpet for me, 
We're going to eat the rebels...18  
 
These defensive forms of peasant loyalty were fundamental to keeping the regime afloat.  
Many peasants and makouts defended the regime in exchange for political power, which either 
meant a chance to become a local political boss; or meant the recognition of rights that were 
denied to them for half a century since U.S. intervention.  Whatever their reasons, makouts 
formed a powerful support base that buttressed the position of the regime. Realizing the 
importance of the makouts over time, Jean-Claude could not outright dissolve the militia.  But he 
continued to build up and strengthen the position of the military. This put makouts in a situation 
where they would have to share the use of force with army soldiers. Such conditions brewed 
violent tensions between the militia and the military.  
                                                                                                                                                       
  
18 Interview with André Georges in Limbé, June 2015. 
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 Internal security fighting was the result of emerging state policies in the Jean-Claude 
period that privileged the army over the makouts. Previously under François Duvalier, urban- 
based and formally educated soldiers were compelled to respect the status of the more numerous 
makouts that comprised a heterogeneous mixture of economic backgrounds, yet whose members 
usually hailed from humble rural backgrounds.  Jean-Claude, however, reconfigured the status 
positions between the militia and the army that caused much internal security fighting.  The 
eighties saw a remarkable increase in internal security conflict as the makouts and soldiers 
tussled for authority over the monopoly of force in their localities.   
 In 1983, the makout Prosper Jean and soldier Jean-Fritz Pierre got into a heated 
discussion that led to violent conflict. The makout Jean ransacked the home of Pierre's brother-
in-law.  In retaliation, the soldier Pierre dosed the makout's home with fuel and shot into the 
house to set it ablaze; one passerby was injured and a fourteen year-old named Fritznel Vincent 
was killed by the stray bullets.19 In another incident in the southern region of Fondes des Negres, 
an argument broke out between the makout Ronel Chacha and an unnamed army soldier. During 
the "lively discussion," the makout Chacha "assaulted" the soldier and his brother, Louiza 
Jacques, who was also a soldier and part of the presidential guard, retaliated by using his Uzi to 
“attack” the makout Chacha.20   
 In 1984, a soldier shot the makout Anivin Louis in Jean-Denis of the commune of La 
Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite.  Afterwards, the tonton makouts of Jean Denis began to gather in 
public, plotting to avenge the injured makout Louis. The prefect of the town had to plead with 
                                                
19 Capitaine Ruben Alexis to Chef d'Etat-Major Général, 21 September 1983; Désir to CHEMG, 23 September 1983, 
Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
20 Commandant District Medacier to Chef Supreme, 25 February 1985, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, 
HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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the local makout commander before calm was restored.21  In 1985, the military attachés of the 
prefecture in Cayes were in conflict with local makouts. One telegram to the Jean-Claude 
warned: "EVOLUTION OF A TENSE SITUATION BETWEEN MILICIENS AND ATTACHES 
OF THE PREFECTURE OF CAYES, CREATED BY THE BLUNDERS [MALADRESSES] OF 
CERTAIN ATTACHES OF THE PREFECTURE."22  Bloody clashes between soldiers and 
makouts were the product of the state policies favoring the former over the latter. Nevertheless, 
these conflicts had a socioeconomic dimensions to them. 
 For example, the military commander Henry Germain of Aquin warned his superiors that 
militia activities in Aquin were tied to the socioeconomic desperation of peasants. "There exists 
under my commandment an explosive situation susceptible of degenerating at any moment. The 
problem is posed by the lack of food crops, soil erosion in the mountains and the enormous 
difficulties cultivating the land," wrote the commander.  For Germain, many Aquin peasants 
joined the makouts to escape rural poverty: "The peasant is lost not knowing to which saint to 
turn to be delivered [and] quickly sell their scarce resources to pay the local militia leader a large 
sum for a VSN card hoping to benefit greatly."  In theory, enlistment into the makouts was 
supposed to be free on a voluntary basis, but Germain was suggesting that peasants needed to 
pay a fee to local militia leaders to obtain a VSN militia identification card as proof of their 
enlistment.  However, "the poor peasants were quick to become disillusioned because of the 
misery that is rife in these areas. So they meet in assorted bands [with] sticks weapons, stones 
etc., and install a terror allowing some of them to impose their will upon the community. They 
                                                
21 Prefect Thomas Andréville to FAD’H Isidor Jean Erick, October 5, 1984, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, 
HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
 
22 Commander of the South Jean to Chef Supreme, 16 June 1985, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL. 
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steal, loot and kill like highway bandits operating in disordered bands."23  Germaine’s warnings 
proved themselves to be partly true insofar as makouts activities would lead to violent tensions 
with the military.   
 Though conscientious enough to recognize the socioeconomic dimensions causing 
internal security conflict, Germain relied on traditional views (rural poverty breeds banditry) to 
explain makout terror and to justify his later actions to stamp it out. After an “innumerable group 
of Miliciens… surrounded and disarmed the soldiers" stationed in Aquin, Germain retaliated 
against local makouts.24 "HAVING THE HONOR TO INFORM YOUR EXCELLENCE ON 
THE INSTIGATION [OF THE] DISTRICT COMMANDER A GROUP OF SOLDIERS [IN] 
CAYES REINFORCED THOSE IN AQUIN ARMED WITH UZIS FIRED...PARTICULARLY 
AT THE VSN HEADQUARTERS. SOLICITING YOUR ENERGETIC INTERVENTION. 
CASES OF DEATH AND INJURIES REGISTERED," an official telegrammed Jean-Claude.25  
Even though Germain presented tensions with makouts as a socioeconomic problem, a perusal 
through volumes of military records reveals moral dimensions that involved peasant-makout 
solidarity against a military-police state structure. 
                                                
23 "Le paysan lâche à lui-même ne sachant à quel saint se livrer s'empresse de vendre ses maigres ressources pour 
payer chèrement une carte VSN du chef milice avec l'espoir d'en tirer largement profit." "le pauvres paysans, ont 
vite fait de déchanter compte tenu de la misère qui sévit dans ces zones. Aussi se réunissent-ils en bandes 
hétéroclites, armes de bâtons, de pierres etc., et installent une certain terreur leur permettant d'imposer leur volonté 
la communauté. Ils volent, pillent et tuent à l'instar des bandits des grands chemins opérant en bandes 
désordonnées."  Henry Germain to Commandant du Département Militaire Sud, 30 November 1982, Box 1, folder 
Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
 
24 Henry Germain to COMDep-Sud, 28 November 1982, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
25 Nold Rosor to Excellence Mr. Jean Claude Duvalier, 1 December 1982, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, 
HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
            









Figure 4.  Militia Identification Card. The VSN ID card was issued to makouts in the Jean-Claude 
period, perhaps in an attempt to make the militia more legible to the state. This card was issued to a 
"cultivateur" or peasant.26  
 Makouts utilized their status to protect peasants from police and military repression.  To 
be sure, both makouts and soldiers terrorized and bullied the civilian population. But makouts 
were distinctly part of a larger extensive network that penetrated rural communities and offered 
protection to relatives and friends from abuse.  Soldiers, on the other hand, resided in urban 
spaces and typically assigned to a post foreign to them. Thus, because soldiers were outsiders 
and makouts were insiders, the former's aggression toward the local population was not tolerated 
by the latter.  In addition, the military structure was designed by the U.S. in the occupation 
period to subdue peasant communities and remained ever since a very repressive organization in 
the Haitian countryside. When Duvalier created the militia, however, peasants join the makouts 
to not only check the army for the purpose of protecting the regime from coups and military 
intrigues, but also to protect themselves, relatives, and friends from the military and its rural 
police.   
 In 1980, for example, after being accused of striking the wife of a local police chef de 
section, a Kenscoff peasant was arrested. The peasant's uncle was a makout and demanded the 
release of his nephew from prison, but the chef arrested the makout as well.  Incensed that one of 
                                                
26 One former makout lent me his VSN card so that I could make a copy of it.  
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their own was arrested, makouts in Kenscoff rose up against the military.  "This discontent was 
manifested by a deployment of VSN on the periphery of the military barracks in Kenscoff, who 
wanted at all costs the agent of the rural police handed over [to them], and soon after many 
milice descended into the city...They wanted, they said, to go [complain] to the President." went 
one military report.  In order to calm the situation, the military released the peasant and his 
makout uncle from custody and had the police chef  "put in prison for indiscipline."27  
 Makouts attempting to prevent arrest of people that they knew intimately was likely an 
act to save their lives. Peasants arrested sometimes would end up dead in prisons. All across the 
Central Plateau near the Dominican-Haitian border, for example, military prison guards were 
reporting the mysterious deaths of incarcerated peasants.  After being arrested for stealing two 
mules, on 6 February 1980, the Dominican-born and forty year old Martino “Toyoye” Bicinto, 
living in the rural section Renthe-Mathé, died of a heart attack while spending two days in a 
Belladère prison.28 During the night of November 23, in the rural section de Hoye of Savonette a 
rural police agent (“maréchal”) arrested and jailed Mévilma Cébastien for allegedly stealing 
goats. Cébastien was sent to a prison in Source Rouge and on the next day had reportedly 
suffered from cardiac arrest, dying in custody at the age of forty-five.29 In 27 December 1982, 
the rural police of Lospalis in the region Hinche arrested Joseph Pierre for supposedly smuggling 
sugar from the Dominican Republic. Three days later, Pierre reportedly died in custody after 
falling into a coma and dying from a heart attack without explanation.30  In other words, military 
authorities were accustomed to executing prisoners and covering up the cause of death.  Aware 
                                                
27 Webert Jodesty to Commandant du District, 8 November 1980, Box 1, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL. 
28 Commandant S. Dimanche to CHEMG, 7 February 1980, folder 12023, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
29 Commandant du Sous-District Richmond JH. Raphael to Commandant du District Belladère, 27 November 1980, 
folder 12023, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
30 Commandant du Sous-District Gérard J. Georges to Commandant du District de Hinche, 12 January 1983, folder 
12023, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
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of such violent prison practices, makouts utilized forceful means to prevent the arrests of their 
rural kin and friends. Makouts and other rural denizens knew quite well that imprisonment was 
sometimes a sure death sentence, no matter how insignificant the charge. 
 In 1982, Marie-Jean Laguerre of Cavaillon was arrested and taken into custody for 
insulting and threatening an army-police sergeant. Herman Laguerre, her brother, was a makout 
and utilized violence to strike back.  On 28 February, the makout Herman and twenty of his 
associates took aim and fired two shots at the military barracks in Cavaillon where his sister was 
jailed.  The makouts took flight afterwards but showed that familial ties trumped inter-security 
loyalties.31  On 21 June 1982, in the southern coastal town of Arniquais, several rural inhabitants 
and makouts gathered in front of the military post “to trouble the public peace” in protest against 
the arrest of Lafontant Saintus after he made obscene remarks and threatened the rural police.  
The crowd of makouts was dispersed after a soldier let off several shots into the air outside the 
district post.32 On 6 November 1984, in the rural commune Montrouis in St. Marc, soldier Jean 
Ronald Plaisimond shot into the air to scatter a group of makouts who attempted to prevent the 
arrest of Micheline Dort.33  In Hinche, the makout Gabriel Olive "energetically and publicly 
opposed... the arrest of three guilty persons" who participated in a food riot where the population 
attacked the local storage center.34 Thus, the constant tensions between makouts and the army 
were not merely the product of the regime's efforts to revitalize the military as the supreme 
national force, but also reflects makout attempts to uphold their position as chèfs in their 
localities which included being protectors of the community.  Nevertheless, practices of makout 
                                                
31 Comm. Savage to CHEMG, February 31, 1982, Box 2, folder FAd’H Miscellaneous, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
32 COMDEP SUD. S/Desire to CHEMG, June 21, 1982, Box 2, folder Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
33 Commandant du Département Militaire de l’Artibonite Clerine to CHEMG, 7 November 1984, Box 2, folder 
Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
34 VSN Commandant Luc Audate to Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1 June 1984, Box 4, folder FAd’H June-August 1984, 
HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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protection also succumbed to internal communal conflicts where makout violence turned against 
the local population. 
  Military reports provide a rare archive that shows how makout terror was often wildly 
out of control resulting in fellow rural denizens falling victim.  In 5 October 1981, in the rural 
locality of Haut Limbé, a soldier reported that six “VSNs…brought on the death of Magloire 
Louis.”   Perhaps out of fear or out of protest, the parents of the victim “refused to receive the 
cadaver that lies on the ground.”   On 29 June 1982, in the rural village of Felix located in 
Cavaillon, “the VSN Basillio François brought about the death of Damarco Joseph… with the 
aid of a dagger.”   Makout terror ran so uncontrollably that some would turn their guns on each 
other.  On July 1982, a military officer reported “around 6am, in the village ‘RAPPON’ 3rd rural 
section of Grand Boucan, Commune de Mirebalais, the VSN Joseph Lafortune shot with the aid 
of his Mauser #-2697 the VSN Octoma Jn-Baptiste of Mirebalais.”  Others took their own life 
after carrying out terror on the population.  In the outskirts of Jacmel, the makout Jean-Jacques 
Louis, after gunning down and killing the two sisters Gertha and Jesula Pascal, turned the gun on 
himself and fired into his sternum that caused his death.    
 On the surface, these military reports make makout terror appear random and senseless. 
Such reports served the larger agenda of Jean-Claude’s regime and the revitalized military to 
check independent activities of the makouts. A more focused perusal through volumes of military 
records, however, illuminates the underlying nature of makout terror and reveal how they were 
often targeted and rooted in social-based conflicts. For example, these conflicts were often 
related to land conflict. Even after the court ruled against his land claims and was dispossessed, 
the makout Louisius Toussaint stubbornly clung to his farm in a rural section of Arcahaie where 
he continued to plant rows of beans. However, the new official proprietor dispatched a group of 
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"paysans" to reap Toussaint's harvest. According to a military report, "Alerted [to the collection 
of his harvest], Louisius TOUSSAINT (V.S.N.) armed with his revolver Cal. 38 69560 and 
accompanied by his son Legoise, who also had a Cal. 22 number 2223093, confronted the said 
paysans with the aim of opposing them." Ordinary peasants, makouts, and a proprietor caught in 
the triangulation of competition over landed interests, terror soon followed: "he [Louisius] did 
not wait to fire at the group and.. St-Hubert Alcineus was shot in the chest and expired on the 
farm."35  
 Land conflict even torn fellow makouts apart. During a land dispute between two parties 
of peasants laying claim to an irrigated farm in the Artibonite, the makout Notaire Augustin sided 
with one group of claimants and, in August 1984, was killed by another makout belonging to the 
opposing party.36  Terror was not merely carried out for terror sake, but often the product of 
social conflict from below. This reality, however, did not matter to the Jean-Claude regime. To 
address such complexities, in any case, would have unveiled the regime's inadequacies in 
mediating local conflict and its failures to sponsor policies that would ameliorate local tensions 
that derived from political inequalities.  In particular, the regime’s policies on revitalizing the 
military led to increase policing and arrests of civilians that only spurred social strife.   
 Indeed popular unrest in the 1980s were tied to increased military arrests – so much so 
that high-ranking military officers mentioned in their internal correspondences the problem of 
growing unrest related to incarceration.  In 1984, the military commander Williams Regala, who 
would later be part of the military junta that assumed power after the fall of the regime, sent out 
the following memo to military commanders throughout the nation:  "For some time, various 
                                                
35 Adjudant Pierre Antoine Alcy to Commandant Sous District, 2 September 1983, Box 1, folder Southern Military 
Districts, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
36 Sgt. Bordenau to CHEMG, 22 August 1984, Box 2, folder Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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organizational commanders report movements of crowds who take to the streets or who come 
just outside military posts shouting pretexts such as unjustified arrests…by the inappropriate 
intervention of agents of the public Forces."37  The problem of jailing was the problem of 
freedom in Haiti ever since the U.S. occupation stamped out popular traditions of revolt that 
previously checked authoritarian tendencies. However, tradition of popular revolt would return 
to Haiti during the 1980s.  In addition to seeking the protection of makouts to resist military and 
police abuses, peasants turned to collective forms of protests that confronted increased military 
repression and eventually dislodged the Duvalier regime.  Collective forms of protest, 
paradoxically, stemmed from the regime’s very designs to transform the makout base into a more 
benign rural grassroots organization called community council.  As we shall see, these plans 
backfired as makouts and peasants learned forms of political mobilization in community councils 
where laid the seeds of democratic revolution.
                                                
37 Asst. Chef d'Etat-Major Williams Regala' s Memorandum to Chef de la Police de Port-au-Prince et à tous Les 
Commandants de Départements Militaires, 18 June 1984, Box 4, folder FAd’H Sept-Oct 1984, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
            













Building Roads to Democratic Revolution: Reviving Development to Curb Tonton Makouts 





Figure 5. Roadwork by Community Councils. This is an image of one of the first community 
councils created in Haiti whose members built a road that directly connected the isolated northwest 
region to the capital in Port-au-Prince.1 
Nan lakou a, 
Li plante mayi a, 
Mayi a bèl, 
Li tounen wozo, 
Wozo sa tounen ponya, 
Ponya ki la, se nou pou ponya de yo! 
 
In the family courtyard, 
A corn is planted, 
                                                
1 Evaluation Report,1972 HACHO, Box 101, CARE RECORDS, Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, 
NYPL. 
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The corn grows beautifully, 
It turns into an unbendable reef, 
This reef turns into a dagger, 
This dagger is here for us to strike them! 
 
-Popular Vodou song in the Artibonite Valley 
  
 As the makouts and soldiers fought each other, peasant protests also exploded in the 
1980s. Popular protests originated from the regime’s policies intended to curb the tonton makout 
militia.  This included regime efforts to transfer peasant support from the makout militia into 
peasant-based conseil communautaires or community councils that were involved in 
development projects or devlopman.  This chapter argues that the regime urged tonton makouts 
to labor in devlopman as an implicit way to check makout independent activities, which often led 
to unsanctioned violent terror against peasants and agents of the state alike.   
 This chapter argues that devlopman was also a new social contract that the regime struck 
up with makouts and other peasant loyalists in order to reorient them away from independent 
forms of popular terror and towards more benign forms of political participation such as 
providing labor and mobilization for state-sponsored agricultural projects. Ordinary peasants and 
makouts joined community councils attempting to develop their communities and ease the 
hardship of travay tè or working the land. As members of community councils, peasants and 
makouts learned how to organize themselves and mobilize their communities toward goals 
related to improving their social conditions. Although initially done within the conservative 
politics of state-sponsored devlopman, the organizing efforts of peasants, over time, became 
subversive that contributed to the popular uprising which overthrew the Duvalier regime in 1986. 
Called the dechoukaj, this revolution was truly democratic and ushered in the presidency of the 
liberation theologian Jean Bertrand Aristide who abolished the military and rural police, which 
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finally ended the U.S.-created post-emancipation crisis in Haiti. Thus, although created to keep 
the regime in power, state-sponsored peasants groups including the makout militia and peasant 
councils reintroduced political organizing to the countryside and inadvertently revived popular 
traditions of revolt that led to democracy in Haiti.    
Community Councils, Roads, and the Formation of Collective Action 
 Aside from building up the military, the regime tried to create armless peasant groups 
that would absorb the "vaguely vast and impetuous popular fervor" that constituted the makout 
base.  This approach aimed to demilitarize the countryside while containing peasant support for 
the regime.  However, the demilitarizing aspect of this approach always failed.  François 
Duvalier was the first to experiment with this strategy.  In 1967, Duvalier published a decree in 
Le Nouvelliste that announced a new armless civil militia called the “Territorial Brigade” whose 
purpose was to "insure the peace, and security of families."2  U.S officials followed these events 
but remained wary of its applicability.3  Indeed, the realization of the armless militia never took 
place and efforts to demilitarize makouts and peasants failed. 
 The regime would later move to experiment with grassroots peasant groups to reduce 
makout influence.  Grassroots organizations had precedent in the early Duvalier era.  Starting in 
1958, before the proliferation of makouts, the Duvalier regime installed grassroots peasant 
organizations in the Artibonite valley that provided labor for the construction for a major 
irrigation system in the area.  In 1962, however, the U.S. cancelled aid to the Artibonite 
                                                
2 On decree, see 9 June 1967, Le Nouvelliste. Duvalier regime began legislating against abuses that the U.S. embassy 
interpreted as curbing the privileges of the tonton makouts. The Ministry of Interior decreed on 26 May 1967 that 
ordered the registration of all arms by prefects and civilians whom U.S. officials suspected included the tonton 
makouts who were technically civilians. U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince to Department of State, June 24, 1967, 
NARA (College Park, Maryland). RG 59, POL 2-1 HAI.  notaries, public ministers, or surveyors, etc.” American 
Embassy In Haiti to State Department POL 23-8. 
3 U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince to Department of State, June 24, 1967, NARA (College Park, Maryland). RG 59, 
POL 2-1 HAI. 
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irrigation project that led to the disappearance of these peasant organizations.  After years of 
absence, U.S. development agencies revived the concept of community grassroots organizing in 
the Haitian countryside.  
 In particular, a U.S.-based donor relief agency called Cooperative for Assistance and 
Relief Everywhere (CARE) reintroduced the concept of using grassroots peasant organizations 
for community development. CARE’s activities in Haiti were in violation of the U.S. ban on aid 
to Haiti, but the U.S. secretly approved and even released funding to support the project.4  With 
U.S. aid and private donor funds, CARE started a development program titled Haitian-American 
Community Help Organization (HACHO) that offered medical and nutritional relief to the 
impoverished northwestern peninsula.   
 More importantly, HACHO was the first to create peasant-based grassroots organizations 
called community councils through which peasants would learn about ideas of "self help."  
HACHO officials promoted "self-help" to rural communities that taught peasants to rely on their 
collective efforts for development, which probably contained the neoliberal aspiration of 
disassociating social service with the national state.  But peasants already knew a life of self-
help; they spent a century and a half hardly receiving state relief of any sort towards agricultural 
development, grooming them to depend on each other for survival.  HACHO, in reality, provided 
peasant councils with materials and resources from foreign sources that seem to only teach "self-
help" communities to become dependent on foreign relief.  Nevertheless, HACHO officials 
                                                
4US Aid resumed in Haiti by financially supporting HACHO but secretly at first. Duvalier attempted to publicize US 
assistance to Haiti for political capital, but the US publicly denied their involvement. CARE records reveal that the 
State Department wanted to keep it that way.  On 27 September 1966,  CARE's executive director wrote to other 
CARE officials, "The Department desires that we make no intimation of the connection between AID and 
HACHO...Whether the Department would deny it upon direct inquiry isn't clear. Certainly we could not do so. But 
in the circumstances it would seem wisest for us to keep our public traps shut on the subject so as not to invite a 
direct inquiry." "Duvalier Seeks Better Image in 'Lifetime' Job," 19 September 1966, The Washington Daily News.  
Lambie, 27 September 1966, CARE RECORDS, Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL. 
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followed self-help ideology strictly. One agent wrote: "I'm sure no one wishes to super-impose a 
program on HACHO. We should all agree that it should fit the basic needs as closely as possible. 
But, it would not hurt to place strict limits on [the] kind of effort and then let local ingenuity and 
imagination do the best job possible within those financial and categorical limits."5  
 Local "ingenuity" was supposed to emanate from the community councils in the 
northwest rather than the state. "Community Councils decide on projects," one U.S. official 
remarked in 1968, "and make their wishes known to HACHO community development 
specialists, and experts assigned from the Haitian Department of Agriculture, who aids their 
deliberations."  Peasant members in community councils often communicated to HACHO 
personnel their desire to build infrastructure that would improve their conditions. This included 
requesting materials to construct schools, potable water pumps, wells, latrines, and roads. 6  Self-
help combined with giving the bare minimum was the ideology of the day for development 
agencies and infused other community councils in Haiti. The small level activities reflected the 
dire circumstances of the peasantry and the small-mindedness of foreign donors.  Roads in 
particular preoccupied the energies of all parties involved in rural development.  
 HACHO, CARE, and peasant councils focused on the construction and upkeep of roads 
in the northwest. Each had a stake in it.  For the regime, roads signified the reach of the state. For 
HACHO, better roads meant easier travels for the mobile health program and officials. Peasants 
found roads quite important as well. Roads had a special place in the peasant mentalité and their 
views of progress. Dr. Carlo Boulos, the technical director of HACHO and close confidant of 
                                                
5 From Joseph Steele to James Lambie, 25 April 1967, Box 101, CARE Records, Manuscripts and Archives 
Division, SASB, NYPL. 
6 Community councils in Jean Rabel, for example, largely focused on building access to clean water, healthy 
hygiene, flood control, soil preservation, and reforestation; in nine months, community councils built 676 public and 
private latrines, 291 roadside benches, 222 home improvement in kitchens and homes, planted 19,251 tree seedlings, 
cleaned 9 springs, and capped 1 water source. See, Evaluation Report in folder J-Rabel Activities during the Last 9 
Months, 1971, Box 101, CARE Records, Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL. 
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Duvalier, understood this very well and remarked, "For we must not loose sight that the Haitian 
Rural People are very mobile and the feet of the peasant and his donkey are his more sure 
vehicle."7  Records ranging as far back as the nineteenth century demonstrate peasant obsession 
over the construction of roads that connected rural districts with urban towns. Roads facilitated 
the transmission of agricultural crops from the countryside to the city and urban merchandise 
moving the other way round. Put simply, roads improved peasant commerce. 
 HACHO’s peasant councils undertook road construction and repairs to connect their 
marginalized world to markets in urban centers. Previously, good roads or roads at all were 
absent in the northwest. For example, one HACHO agent reported that Jean Rabel peasants, prior 
to the installation of peasant councils, historically marketed corn, beans, peanuts, bananas, 
legumes, coffee, tobacco, and castor oil beans to Nassau, which was located in the neighboring 
island-nation of Bahamas that required peasants to cross the high seas rather than taking bad 
roads to nearby towns in Haiti. Road improvement was good for the peasant economy. 
Community councils in the rural section of La Croix St. Joseph built roads on which "farmers are 
sending produce to Port-de-Paix by truck in a matter of minutes, rather than the long, slow 
uneconomic trip on animal back that was previously necessary."8 Between 1968 and 1969, 
peasant councils built or repaired about 175 miles of roads webbing the northwest communes 
together and linking them to roads that went through the Artibonite department and all the way 
down south to the capital of Port-au-Prince.9  
                                                
7 Carlo Boulos to the Directors of CARE, New York, 28 April 1967, folder 5, Box 101, CARE Records, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL.  
8 “Report on HACHO Activities, October and November 1968 and Recommendations or Program Expansion,” 30 
November 1968, in folder HACHO Administrator, Box 101, CARE Records, Manuscripts and Archives Division, 
SASB, NYPL.  
9 Ibid. 
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 Not paved roads, but graveled roads which enough rainfall rendered muddied – trapping 
the tires of medical trucks providing health services, the hoofs of mules saddled with agricultural 
merchandise, and the feet of desperate peasant women seeking to convert the yields of farming 
labor into some cash. Rain sometimes stopped everything moving on roads. HACHO reported in 
1968, "rain has taken its toll on all the roads" in St. Michel de l'Attalaye. Gonaives was the town 
through which northwestern goods passed in order to reach the capital, but not when the roads 
melted apart.  The report complained, "because of the conditions of the roads, the town [of 
Gonaives] has been virtually cut off from commercial traffic since the middle of September." 
The roads – and everyone who depended on it – were at the mercy of nature. "The work of years 
can be wiped out in a day, and frequently is."10 Sometimes the lack of funding and materials 
compounded the already bad situation. "Gonaïves-Gros Morne road is terminated...due to lack of 
gravel which we had anticipated," went one monthly HACHO report in 1973.11 Despite the 
constant struggle, roads remained the preoccupation of community councils and the expansion of 
roads meant the multiplication of community councils in the northwest.   
  As roads spread so did council membership. The most remote rural sections in the 
northwest claimed council membership. Each of the fourteen rural sections of Bombardopolis 
established councils with section Nan Soufrance boasting the largest membership of 177 
peasants; eleven rural sections of Anse Rouge with Soucrces Chaudes boasting the highest of 82 
members; eight rural sections of Cabaret with the section that went by the same name boasting 
the highest of 41 members; and the forty-seven rural sections of Jean Rabel with Bassin Bleu 
boasting the highest of 112 members. And these community councils by 1969 built 247 
                                                
10 Ibid. 
11 “HACHO Administrator’s Report July 1973-Sept 1973,” in folder HACHO Contract 1972-3, Box 101, CARE 
Records, Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL.  
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kilometers of motorable roads and 116 kilometers of "penetration routes" in the impoverished 
southern half of the northwest peninsula. In total, early community councils in the northwest had 
a membership of 4,339.12  Later, membership experienced a drastic upsurge.  Jean Rabel, alone, 
had sixty-five community councils with a total membership of 7,680 peasant members.13  
 HACHO and CARE encouraged road labor through supplying community councils with 
food obtained from foreign donors, including the international Food for Work (FFW) program. 
Although a foreign program, the idea food for work resembled kombit traditions in the 
countryside. Since the nineteenth century, landed peasants invited other peasant neighbors to 
help them farm in exchange for food and collective festivities. The practice continued well into 
the Duvalier period. Thus, the FFW translated well into the moral economy of the countryside. 
Peasants joined community councils for various reasons but the most salient attraction was 
access to foreign food relief in exchange for their labor.  The link between the spread of councils 
and food was direct.   
 As one U.S. official pointed out, "through food-for-work programs a growing 
infrastructure of community councils is being developed."14 By 1972, FFW provided $126,230 
worth of foodstuff to construct hundreds of miles of roads throughout the northwest.15  To be 
sure, the expansion of roads was also precious to peasants because roads improved the 
circulation of their agricultural production. Nevertheless, foreign food dumping ensured active 
participation. For northwestern peasants, the incentive was a matter of starvation because the 
                                                
12 “Report on HACHO Activities October and November 1968 and Recommendations or Program Expansion," in 
folder HACHO Administrator, 30 November 1968, Box 101, CARE Records, Manuscripts and Archives Division, 
SASB, NYPL.  
13 “Evaluation Report, 1971,” in folder J-Rabel Activities during the Last 9 Months, Box 101, CARE Records, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL. 
14Analysis of Regular and Emergency Food Programs, 22 March 1968, AID 15-9 HAI, NARA, College Park, 
Maryland. 
15 Milo Kamstra to Merto Cregger, 13 April 1972, in in folder Evaluation Report 1972,  Box 101, CARE Records, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL. 
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southern half of the northwest peninsula was the most arid and impoverished zone in Haiti.  
Peasants joined community councils and labored hard to get imported sacs of food. "The road 
between Gonaives and Anse Rouge improved spectacularly thanks to CARE emergency food 
program," reported HACHO officials in 1973.  When the road connecting Anse Rouge to the 
out-of-the-way commune of Antwel needed repair, "120,000 pounds of emergency food was 
approved for work on the road."16 The experiment of HACHO was successful for meeting most 
of its already limited goals, but its long lasting legacy was the formation of peasant community 
councils and making the construction of roads the fundamental basis of development in Haiti by 
the late sixties. A few years after some of the first community councils were established in the 
northwest, the regime extended the practice throughout the country to reduce makout influence. 
         ***** 
 Beginning in 1967, the regime appropriated HACHO’s concept of community councils 
and established state-sponsored councils throughout Haiti. According to state statistics, each 
rural section possessed a council and Haiti had about 550 rural sections. As a scholar who studies 
community councils in Haiti, Glen R. Smucker tells us, "even the most conservative figures 
suggest that community councils have been organized throughout most of rural Haiti.  From the 
standpoint of institutional development the sheer number of peasant councils constitutes a 
significant innovation without precedent in Haitian rural life."17 The Duvalier regime expanded 
peasant councils to check makout independent activities.  The timing provides a good clue.  
  Indeed, the juncture in which the regime expanded councils suggests that peasant 
councils were intended to reorient peasants away from makout and popular terror and towards 
                                                
16 “Evaluation Report, 1971,” in folder J-Rabel Activities during the Last 9 Months, Box 101, CARE Records, 
Manuscripts and Archives Division, SASB, NYPL. 
17 Glenn Smucker, "Peasant Councils and Politics," in Politics, Projects, and People: Institutional Development in 
Haiti, ed. Derrick W. Brinkerhoff and Jean-Claude Garcia-Zamor (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 100. 
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more benign forms of political participation such as roadwork.  Take for example the fact 
councils expanded in Haiti while the global trend was moving in the opposite direction. When in 
vogue internationally, the concept of community development served the interests of foreign 
policymakers.  They utilized community development to offer populations in the Third World an 
alternative to revolutionary doctrines.18  However, starting in the early sixties, foreign 
policymakers turned away from ideas of community development. In 1963, for example, U.S. 
AID closed down its own Community Development Division.  And yet, as the international 
community reduced efforts to promote community development groups throughout the Third 
Word by the mid-1960s, community-based organizations were revived in Haiti. "The history of 
this movement in Haiti is a singular case," observed Smucker.  As ideas of community 
development dwindled in the world, this defunct practice was brought back to life in Haiti to 
demilitarize the countryside.19  
 Seeking to redirect peasants away from makout terror, the Duvalier regime installed 
councils in every rural section in Haiti to provide labor for, among other development projects, 
road construction.  Peasants in councils also yearned the construction of roads and organized 
                                                
18 Smucker, "Peasant Councils and Politics,” 96-97. 
19 The regime even revived ideas of justice sociale. One prefect of Thiotte named Michel Craan, who could have 
also been a member of the militia, pursued pro-peasant polices in the name of carrying out justice sociale. Craan 
ordered the local court to settle legal disputes between peasants over land inheritance by equally subdividing land 
among the peasant plaintiffs on the basis that such a ruling was in virtue with "la Justice Sociale encouraged 
[préconisée] by the Chief Supreme for life of the Nation S.E. [His Excellence] Doctor François DUVALIER." 
Michel Craan, 21 July 1969, 1970 Simple Police, TP, Thiotte. Crann, generally, pursued pro-peasant policies. On 25 
May 1968, Craan, for example, overruled a local court case dispossessing peasants Lauditer Faustin, Café Cadeau, 
and Mérigène Magloire. “Veillez pour notre Gouvernement nous informer la décision de justice qui a permis à notre 
tribunal de déguerpir les paysans Lauditer Faustin, Café Cadeau, Mérigène Magloire sur leur habitation situes à 
Mare-Mirande commune de Grand Gosier, Veuillez demander en autre aux bénéficiaires de la décision extra Légale 
de votre tribunal de sursoir sur autres activités sur ces dites habitations." Michel Craan to Juge de Paix Thiotte, 31 
May 1968, folded inside the1970 Simple Police, TP in Thiotte.  Duvalier himself, during the later period of his 
reign, began gesturing towards justice sociale. On 28 November 1970, the newspaper Haiti-Journal reported that 
three days ago, Duvalier gave away twenty-one acres of land in Torbeck to the descendants of the nineteenth-
century peasant rebel leader Jean-Jacques Accau. The report claimed that Duvalier's effort meant to explain "la 
politique de justice sociale du gouvernement du Président DUVALIER." Le Président Duvalier réintègre dans leurs 
biens les héritiers de Jean-Jacques Accau," 28 November 1970, Haiti-Journal. 
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their rural communities to meet and discuss how to bring roads into their communities. In the 
Duvalier years, peasants rarely gathered publicly in large numbers unless during state rallies. 
Thus, council meetings gave peasants the opportunity to discuss devlopman that included a 
gamut of small projects. Mérigène Gé of Jean-Rabel remembers that the council "gave us advice, 
met with us every eight days, we dialogued about arranging ourselves (aranjman), how to lache, 
how to farm (travay), how to prepare the earth and stuff (bagay), do all what's possible."20 
Among the various issues discussed, building roads was often a priority for councils. Also from 
Jean Rabel, Divèsè Divino expressed pessimistically, "They used to do nothing on days we met 
(fè reyinyon). We got together to talk a lot. We didn't do anything. But it was these very same 
community councils that built roads. You see all these roads that go to Port-au-Prince, which go 
all around the country; it was the councils. This is really the only thing that councils did...This 
was how the backcountry (andeyò) became a city (lavil)."21  For Divino and most peasants, roads 
accelerated the transportation of crops to markets, improved mobility, and allowed access to the 
urban centers where state and economic power were concentrated. Furthermore, as indicated in 
Divino's remarks, peasants saw roads as evidence of progress that placed the countryside and 
urban spaces on equal footing in terms of road construction.  
 What Divino describes as useless collective talking may have indeed led to the realization 
of unsustainable roads. Peasant-built roads were not sustainable and required continuous labor. 
But road construction still drove peasant conceptions and volition to move collectively towards a 
better future for the countryside. Continuous meetings compelled peasants to organize 
collectively for particular projects, especially for roads. "We made a lot of effort to open up this 
little whole," boasted the community council president Joseph Derosier of the southern region of 
                                                
20 Interview with Merijen Gé, rural section of Lacoma, Jean Rabel, October 2013. 
21Interview with Divèsè Divino, rural section of Lacoma, Jean Rabel October 2013. 
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Mackary. Derosier pointed to the penetrating roads as some of the major accomplishments of his 
community council.  Still the unpaved roads, Derosier admitted, kept easily falling into to 
disrepair and needed continuous work.22  So roads needed to be constantly worked.  Even so, 
mobilizing for road construction inadvertently revived peasant traditions of collective political 
protest that was previously suppressed during the occupation. Imagine, what would become 
widespread collective rural protests were partly resuscitated by the tedious work of road 
construction.  
 Indeed, road construction preoccupied peasant councils and they organized frequently for 
the matter. On 2 April 1969, the Haitian newspaper Haiti-Journal informed its readers, "the 
Community Council of Pignon has built 8 kilometers of road" that connected to the neighboring 
commune of Ranquitte.23  When the community council of rural section Duval met on 7 
February 1970, they talked of accessing credit, potable water, and, of course, "le problème de la 
route avec ses tournants malaisés, presque dangereux, les multiples raidillons qui surplombent 
les basfond."24 On 3 March 1971, a reunion of 200 members of the community councils around 
Fort-Jacques met with state specialist to learn about rational methods of animal husbandry, 
farming, and ways to prevent soil erosion, but the meeting extensively covered the problems of 
roads.25  In Lamothe, peasant council leaders Edmond Parent, Bien-Aimé Israel, Mme. Andre 
Toussaint, Dautruche Narcisse, and Joseph Garcia complained to state agricultural officials that 
their communities lacked, "roads, drywalls, a school, and a dispensary."26 On the same day 
peasants in Hatte Dufort in Léogane formed a community council on 15 December 1970, they 
                                                
22 Interview with, Joseph Derosier, third rural section in the commune Mackary, 25 February 2015. 
23 "NOUVELLES DU NORD," 2 April 1969, Haiti Journal. 
24 Victor Bastien, En Haiti dans la vie rurale (Port-au-Prince: Presses de l’Imprimerie), 155 
25 Bastien, En Haiti, 157-160 
26 Bastien, 181. 
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organized a meeting where they discussed building roads, potable water sources, rural schools, a 
literacy center, and even irrigation27; a year later, however, Dupuy councils neglected to mention 
irrigation in their list of needs.28 Intended to distract them from independent actions of violence, 
peasants often engaged in minor projects that barely lasted without sustained economic support. 
In the process, they reconstructed traditions of collective action that would transform to protest. 
But why were the minor projects the goal of development projects? The answer is not yet clear. 
 Gone, nonetheless, were the plans of major agricultural projects of the late 1950s and 
early 1960s that were evinced by the construction of the large irrigation systems such as the 
Artibonite project. The shift from thinking big to thinking small likely reflects how foreign 
agencies turned away from New Deal inspired policies and towards more neoliberal approaches 
of servicing the international poor. By the 1980s, development progress in Haiti meant small 
projects that included having schools, dispensaries, and especially roads in villages without a 
sustainable national economy to replenish these projects. Community councils spent much of 
their energies and labor on these unsustainable projects, while the regime seemed to yearn for 
devlopman to disrupt the influence of the makouts. Distracted by labor, the regime hoped, 
peasants would be less inclined to engage in violent makout activities that were independent of 
the regime's agenda.  However, the collective activities of councils would turn peasants and 
makouts into instruments of revolutionary change.  
            ***** 
 Unable to outright disband the makout militia, the regime under Jean-Claude encouraged 
makouts to lend their labor to developman projects and assist community councils. By publicly 
                                                
27 "Le Mouvement Communautaire a La Hatte-Dufort," 15 December 1970, Haiti Journal. 
28 In 1971, the peasant elder Félix Auguste was recorded to have declared to 200 Dupuy peasants during a council 
meeting, "Si des routes, des écoles, des dispensaires, des ponceaux se construisent, si une lutte est menée contre les 
insectes ou les maladies des plantes, si l'on créasse des puits, tout se faire avec l'homme et pour l'homme." Bastien, 
185 
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urging the militia to assist councils, Jean-Claude was concealing the regime's hidden agenda to 
curb makout influence. During the 1972 militia parade, he announced that makouts should now 
orient themselves toward the regime's new "evangelism" that involved the state mobilizing 
peasant labor for "développement."29  In the 1970s, one U.S. official quoted Jean-Claude and 
makout leaders to have mentioned the following during a press interview, "THE PRESIDENT 
AND OTHER VSN LEADERS SPOKE OF THE VSN'S NEW ROLE IN ASSISTING HAITI'S 
'ECONOMIC REVOLUTION' ON ALL FRONTS: PROFESSIONAL AND HANDICRAFT 
ACTIVITIES, MANUAL LABOR, AND ASSISTANCE TO PEASANT FARMERS."30   
 Encouraging the militia to join devlopman, the regime endeavored to utilize labor as a 
way to curb makout influence.  But by the late 1970s, the U.S. realized that makouts remained a 
force to be reckon with. During a militia parade in the capital, U.S. officials were astonished by a 
great show of makout force whose members exploded their arms around the city.  This made the 
State Department doubt the regime’s efforts to reorient the militia's new role as agents of rural 
development. One U.S. official remarked, "DESPITE PERIODIC EFFORTS TO ENTICE 
THEM INTO ROAD MAINTENANCE, REFORESTATION, OR DEVELOPMENT WORK -- 
EFFORTS WHICH THE GOH [Haitian Government] EVIDENTLY WANTS TO INTENSIFY -
- THE VSN REGARD THEMSELVES AS THE PRIVILEGED GUARANTORS OF 
DOMESTIC PEACE AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE DUVALIERIST ORDER."31  
Frustrated at what seem like a resurgence in makout morale, another U.S. official remarked, "I 
FEEL THAT PRESIDENT DUVALIER WAS CONVINCED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY 
                                                
29 “MESSAGE DU PRESIDENT A VIE DE LA REPUBLIQUE AUX VOLONTAIRES DE LA SÉCURITÉ 
NATIONALE A L'OCASSION DU 29 JUILLET 1972, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, 
Maryland.   
30 “VSN ANNIVERSARY GIVEN BIG PLAY: ROSALIE ADOLPHE NAMED VSN SUPERVISOR GENERAL,” 
2 August 1976, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, NARA, College Park, Maryland.   
31 “Outbursts of Shooting Incidents Mars VSN Celebrations,” July 1979, RG 59, Central Decimal Files, NARA, 
College Park, Maryland.   
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TO GIVE THE VSN A BOOST AND TO LET IT BE KNOWN HE STILL APPRECIATED 
THEIR LOYALTY AND SUPPORT.” The U.S. report went on: “OBVIOUSLY, THE VSN IS 
ESSENTIALLY AN UNDISCIPLINED, ILL-TRAINED, PEASANT-BASED PARA-MILITIA 
WHICH HAS NO COMPREHENSION OR RESPECT FOR LAW AND ORDER. THEY ARE 
A DANGEROUS FORCE WHICH COULD TURN AGAINST THE PRESIDENT IF THEY 
FELT BEING SOLD [DOWN] THE RIVER."32 By the late seventies, Jean-Claude realized that 
his regime relied on the makouts as a popular base of loyal defenders against rebel attacks. Thus, 
instead of outright dissolving the militia, the regime developed an ambivalent discourse that 
praised makout loyalty to defend the regime but also urged them to assist peasant community 
councils as a way to curb their independent activities.  
 During a VSN militia parade on 29 July 1979, Jean-Claude gave a speech that conveyed 
the ambivalent message.  On the one hand, Jean-Claude reminded makouts that he still counted 
on them to defend the position of the regime: "The Militia was created to be vigilant, to defend 
the Duvalierist Revolution, to obscure mean eyes awaiting disorder, who want to see the nation 
become anarchic." On the other hand, he announced: "It was created to help the population in all 
development activities... in all the rural sections for national development."  As a way to curb 
makout influence, the regime contrived this dual role for the militia.  "They are soldiers of 
development. Gun in one hand, tool in the other hand," asserted Jean Claude.33  The regime 
made sure to constantly remind them of this.  In the eighties, the regime dispatched a central 
makout figure to the town of Mirebalais with instructions "on the role of la Milice” in which 
                                                
32 “Meeting with Foreign Minister Dorcely on VSN Shootings,” 1 August 1979, RG59, Central Decimal Files, 
NARA, College Park, Maryland.  
33 BWA CHANDEL: Tronpet Janklodis, July 1979, in my possession. 
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Jean-Claude “insists that the Milicien is and remains an agent of development in the good 
economic fight that carries out the continuity of the government."34   
 Heeding the regime's call, many makouts joined and even led peasant councils that were 
organized for development projects. In Lacoma, the wealthy farmer Florantin Louisaint was 
simultaneously the commander of the local militia and the president of a local community 
council.35  During an oral interview, the makout Pè Camille of Ravine du Roche spoke proudly 
about helping to establish, in 1976, the first community council in his locality of which he 
became its vice-president; the council's president, Willy Ajenor, was also a makout.36 Other 
community councils and makouts fused together to create a single organization.  "The VSN 
Community Council of Kenscoff" was formed and professed to be fulfilling the regime's 
objective of "a great combite."37 Combite was a peasant custom of providing labor to fellow 
peasants in exchange for food and gifts. The regime often distributed FFW foreign foods to 
peasant councils in exchange for labor. Kenscoff’s makout council and other seemed to be in line 
with the regime’s plan of integrating makouts into devlopman projects.     
 Indeed, many makouts and peasant councils were either one in the same, or worked hand-
in-hand for devlopman, which usually involved road construction. In a letter to supervisors dated 
on 28 September 1981, for example, one state agent reported that peasant councils were carrying 
out a development project in the rural section of Camp Mary in the Artibonite.  And "with the 
                                                
34 Préfect Lionel Bissainthe to Son Excellence Monsieur Jean-Claude Duvalier, 14 May, 1984, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
35 Interview with Desilien “Tonde” in rural section of Lacoma, Jean-Rabel, 13 June 2014. 
36  Joining these multiple state-sponsored peasant organizations brought peasants into closer proximity to central 
power. Camille recalls with delight how his council petitioned Jean-Claude to come to Ravine and bear witness to 
the work of the local council. But Duvalier sent his sister in his stead, Camille was honored nevertheless.  Interview 
with Pè Camille in Ravine du Roche, Limbé, 9 June 2016. 
37 Madame Vve. Horace Coriolan, Présidente du Conseil Communautaire des V.S.N. de Kenscoff to Son Excellence 
Monsieur Jean Claude Duvalier, 11 April 1980, Haitian Military Collection, the Manuscripts, Archives and Rare 
Books Division at Schomburg, NYPL. 
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corps des VSN we have dugout [ombragé] one part of the national road from Camp-Mary to 
Morne de Perice."38   
 Believing to be good policy at the time, Jean-Claude essentially banished the militia to 
labor alongside peasant councils in mainly roadwork. The regime was compelling makouts to 
labor as a way to control and distract them from actions of indiscipline and terror.   It almost 
seemed as though the regime was attempting to transfer peasant support from the makout militia 
to the more benign community councils.  Put simply, the regime wanted peasant councils to be 
like the makouts – but without guns.  As the regime attempted to ooze independent violence out 
of the militia, makouts, in turn, began to acquire ideas of collective organizing associated with 
community councils.   
 On 24 May 1985, the makout commander of Anse-à-Galets Carment Normil 
telegrammed Jean-Claude to highlight the local growing sense of collective action derived from 
makout-led development. "We sincerely hope everyone appreciates," wrote Normil, "the just 
value of these many achievements in service of collectivity to the action of development under 
the sign of solidarity."39  Jean-Claude thought that this approach would solve the problem of 
checking the influence of the makouts.  He neither fathomed, nor predicted that councils and 
actions centered on development would be the sources of popular revolt that undermined the 
                                                
38Jeune Fritz, Resp. de Agence de Camp-Mary, 28 September 1982, in folder titled "Extension," District Agricole de 
Saint Marc (DASM). 
39 "Nous souhaitons ardemment pour tout un chacun apprécie à leur juste valeur ces nombreuses réalisation au 
service de la collectivité à l'action du développent placé sous le signe de la solidarité." Carment Normil, 
Commandant VSN Anse-à-Galets to Son Excellence Monsieur Jean-Claude Duvalier, 24 May 1985, Box 1, folder 
Southern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
. 
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regime and contributed to its eventual downfall. 
  
Figure 6. Comic of Militia (1). This comic shows a tonton makout telling another peasant about 
receiving instructions from a regime representative. The peasant on the left declares, “Bravo, this is 
good news!” The makout continues: “He also said, if a militiaperson has a gun in one hand, this 
militiaperson must have a working tool or a tree-plant in the other hand. The gun is for protecting 
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Figure 7. Comic of Militia (2). Makouts, armed with revolvers, join peasants at community council 
meeting.  Leaders of the peasant councils announce to the peasant-makout crowd: “On Friday, 
we’ll put our hands together [to labor]. Everyone come with your working tools: pikes, shovel, 











            
             
 189 
 
Figure 8. Comic of Militia (3). Makouts and ordinary peasants labor on a development project, 
while another makout, at the far right, guards the guns of the peasant-makout laborers.40 
      **** 
                                                
40 BWA CHANDEL: Tronpet Janklodis, July 1979, 19-24, in my possession,. 
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   Jean-Claude had few reasons not to predict that his undoing would partly originate from 
peasant councils. They were deeply part of the regime's patronage.  A striking illustration took 
place in 1980 when peasant councils supported the regime's decision to arrest Sylvio Claude who 
advocated for democracy in Haiti.  Between the late seventies and early eighties, the U.S. 
government, under President Jimmy Carter, encouraged the Duvalier regime to open up the 
country to democratic forms of expression and governance. The Duvalier regime grudgingly 
complied and began to allow local elections and forms of popular dissent.  The regime permitted 
Sylvio, for example, to establish an independent democratic political party. But Sylvio's was 
jailed for criticizing the regime. As Sylvio sat in prison for testing the limits of democracy, 
peasant councils throughout the country sent letters to the president that endorsed the arrest of 
Sylvio.   
 Located in the remote northern half of the southwest region of Arbicrot, peasants 
telegrammed the president: "COMMUNITY MOVEMENT OF SPEACK 4TH RURAL 
SECTION OF ABRICOTS, WE VOW THAT WE ARE GLAD FOR THE MEASURE OF 
FORCE OF ORDER FOR THE ARRESTS OF MISTER SIVIVIO CLAUDE WHO WAS 
WORKING AGAINST PEACE AND SECURITY OF OUR GOVERNMENT."41  Living in 
Chardonnieres, located on the bottom half of southwestern peninsula, peasant councils asserted, 
"EVERY MEMBER URGES YOU TO GOVERN THE NATION FIRMLY, THEY LEARNED 
THAT THE MAN CALLED SILVIO CLAUDE WAS ARRESTED FOR CREATING 
DISORDER. WE APPLAUD WHAT YOU HAVE DONE."42 In the northern region of Milot, 
                                                
41 Prezidan Daniel Alexandre, Vis-Prezidan Brivy St-Louis, Sekrete Rouzier Baseneuve to Jan-Klod Divalye, 18 
October 1980, FAd’H-Miscellaneous1975-1985,HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
 
42 Thomas Jean, Velius Charles, Jolette Andre, and Lelio Azor, Jean-Claude Duvalier, 17 October 1980, FAd’H-
Miscellaneous1975-1985,HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
            
             
 191 
peasant councils "WERE INFORMED BY THE PRESS OF THE DISPOSITION TAKEN BY 
THE FORCES OF ORDER AGAINST THE CITIZEN SYLVIO CLAUDE, PLEASE BELIEVE 
WE FIRMLY AGREE."43 From the northwest, peasant councils lauded, "COMMUNITY 
ACTION COUNCIL OF MARE ROUGE SEND YOU MANY COMPLIMENTS AND 
CONGRATULATIONS FOR ARRESTING THAT MAN... YOU DO NOT NEED TO BE 
AFRAID WE SUPPORT YOU FIRMLY."44 Despite being initially conservative, many peasant 
councils grew into subversive organizations.  This process started with council's quotidian efforts 
to mobilize their communities for a better future.  
 Membership in a community council was an apprenticeship of sorts where peasants 
learned to identify local issues and convey them to state officials. The organizational structure of 
community councils was typically hierarchical. A committee board usually composed of a 
president, vice-president, secretary, under-secretary, delegates, and selected advisors. The origins 
of this particular structure remain unknown. But the adoption of such an executive organizational 
structure has been common in social, musical, mutual-aid, and religious societies in the 
countryside. Some community councils claimed to be institutionally democratic by which its 
committee boards were elected by its peasant members, while other councils merely stated their 
formation without explaining the mechanism by which its leadership was formed.45    
 Community councils were often connected to multiple chains of hierarchies that linked 
their communities to various elements of the state, foreign development agencies, and Christian 
missionaries. Each of these institutions provided respective agents and resources for community 
                                                
43 La Fédération des Conseils Communautaires de Milot to Jean-Claude Duvalier, 21 October 1980, FAd’H-
Miscellaneous1975-1985,HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
44 President Bolivra Cherizol and Secrétaire Alberon Dervil to Jean-Claude Duvalier, 19 October 1980, FAd’H-
Miscellaneous, 1975-1985, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
45 In the Artibonite valley, one federation council claimed that its council was popularly elected.  "Le Conseil est 
formé de treize (13) leaders choisis dans les différentes zones d'activité du District. Ils sont élu par les paysans eux-
mêmes." Status du Conseil Consultatif Régional, 26 March 1980, in folder titled A Classe, DASM.  
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councils. And each organization hired and trained intermediaries and spec  ialists to provide 
technical support to peasant councils. State agents, political elites, missionaries, lay clergy, and 
representatives of foreign agencies often patronized these meetings. But peasant councils 
remained state-sponsored organizations and maintained close ties with the Haitian state. 
 No longer marginalized in the countryside, peasants had easier access to multiple 
representatives of the state and they utilized these figures for claims making.  State agents 
designated as animateur or encadreur were intermediaries between peasant councils and state 
agencies associated with agricultural development.  This meant that as long as community 
councils established themselves in any given region, its members were now directly linked to the 
national state and political elites.  Peasants often met with agents and this established frequent 
dialogue between state and rural villages, no matter how remote.  One state agent's report shows 
his scheduled meetings in the barely known rural section Medòr of Petite Rivière de l'Artibonite. 
In June 1980, for example, the agent planned to hold meetings throughout Médor's peripheral 
villages that probably only he and its inhabitants knew by name, including Férier, Potemeau, 
Jacquot, Bessandière, Manuel, Caspin, Bazin, and Marinette.46  
 These meetings taught peasants to organize themselves and convey issues to the state.  To 
be sure, state agents sometimes exploited community councils. Peasant labor was utilized not 
only for development public work projects; they were employed to labor for the personal 
advancement of the very local agents who were supposed to help peasant councils.  But 
organizing often taught peasants how to petition the state when these intermediaries failed in 
their assignments. On October 1980, the community council of Fiefie wrote to the supervisor of 
agricultural agents in Artibonite valley. "You sent Exalem Besi as an encadreur to work with us 
                                                
46 Joanès Jerôme, Encadreur de Médor to l'Agronome du District de St. Marc, 22 August 1980, DASM. 
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– in Fiéfié," council leaders Rosiéna Joséné, Conessance Lundigène, and Ocène Dorval 
reprimanded, "this person has done nothing with us."47  
   By that juncture, peasant councils acquired a technique of writing collective signed 
petitions to address local issues. Aside from accessing the state through intermediaries, peasant 
councils drafted petitions that communicated their interests directly to the state. To be sure, 
peasants writing letters to the state was nothing new; this was part of their political tradition 
since the nineteenth century.  Relatively new during the Jean-Claude period, however, were 
signed petitions that councils adopted to convey collective concerns to the state.  In the Jean-
Claude period, one sees the growing preponderance of collectively signed petitions that suggests 
the spread of organizing influence that derived from council activities. 
 Strangely, council mobilization and collective action was partly the byproduct of 
roadwork. Peasants organized themselves for something so innocuous as roadwork, but learned 
to petition the state to obtain tools and materials for roadwork. Community councils were 
becoming politically empowered but power was emanating from seemingly laborious work that 
rarely saw sustainable results. Despite it all, they learned that the state was chiefly responsible of 
their wellbeing and began to press for their needs.  Roads were often a top priority. In a letter 
undated but probably written in 1984, the community council in Sonyin in the Artibonite valley 
wrote a petition in Haitian Kreyòl to local state agronomist about the lack of local roads. "Dear 
agronomist it is with great pleasure that I lower my head before you to tell you the problem in 
Sonyin," council leaders Robert Céphacile, Oksidan Dort, and Wilner Céphacile wrote 
deferentially. The local road was falling apart and the council requested pikes and machetes to 
"open the route."  They pleaded, "for we have made several requests already we have not 
                                                
47 Rosiéna Joséné, Prezidan; Conessance Lundigène, Vice Prezidan; Ocène Dorval, Secrétaire, 1 October 1980, in 
folder Animateur Rurale, DASM. 
            
             
 194 
succeeded in anything, we put this before you as well. Because now we will be in the rainy 
season there is no road at all again this is why we profit from this occasion to write you, Oke 
Mèsi."48   
 Years of keeping their grievances to themselves, peasants were now collectively 
complaining to the state. The community council representing localities of Grand-Fond and 
Bedène also in the valley of Artibonite complained of local problems, "we are in need of a 
communal school, a domestic economic center, we are in need of some metal pipes to place in 
the irrigation canals whose [water] has cut our road."49 On 2 April 1984, council leaders Madame 
Vilnac Civil, Anulus Chanilus, Thomas Elvius, and Stalictos Carlil wrote to local agricultural 
agents, “Monsieur le Direteur of the District, We the members of the Community Council of 
Damier 5eme section Verettes, expose to you what follows, my Directeur we come to solicit a 
small demand of collection [cotisation] concerning a road that we want"50  
 Sometimes community councils built roads for the state and requested favors in return. 
On 9 September 1985, the "Fraternité" community council in the section Carrefour La Mort, 
located right outside Cap-Haïtien, wrote to President Jean-Claude demanding about 645 hectares 
of state-owned land. "Excellence, we have already made many strides, the road of Carrefour La 
Mort, Haut Du Cap is in the process of being decongested," bargained council members. And 
they also utilized the occasion to form a closer bond with the regime, "For more details, we will 
                                                
48 "Chè d'agonòm se avek yon gran plezi kem bese tèt mwin devan ou pou di ou poblèm kiginyin non Sonyin...konsèy 
kominotè zon nan nou ta vle ouvri rout la min nou manke zouti. tètkòm pikwa pèl manchèt...kòm nou fè plizie 
demach deja  nou pa reyisi anyin nou mete sa devan-ou tou. paske kounye a nou pral nan epòk de lapli pap gin rout 
di tou  Oke Mèsi." From Robert Céphacile, President; Oksidan Dort, Vice Pres; Wilner Céphacile, Secrétaire to 
Monsye d'agonòm Lésly Matély, undated but in a folder with documents all dated in 1984, in folder  
Correspondences Locales, DASM. 
49 From Martin Pelisien, President to Lesley Mathely, Mme Vital, and Roumain Aphine, 22 June 1984, in folder  
Lettres Reçue, DASM. 
50 Madame Vilnac Civil, Stalictos Carlil, St. Anulus Chonilus, and Choman Elvius to Directeur du District St. Marc, 
2 April 1984, in folder Lettres Reçue, DASM.   
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like to form a delegation of four persons to make contact with You."51 And we can see why this 
bond meant the world to Carrefour's community council. Only a couple of months later, they 
were employing their bond with the regime to protect a member from the harsh penal system. 
"The President of Council Mr. Phillebert J. Botex sends a cordial salutation to you, he asks you 
to please render la justice to their member Jonson Lubin being a delegate of this council because 
we are all brothers of  Jn-Claudist," the councils pleaded the local judge of peace.52   Building 
roads for the state and for the peasant economy did not depart from the conservative politics of 
the regime. In so doing, however, peasants were empowered by engaging the state.  
 Collective petitions to build roads and for other development projects taught peasants to 
forge new networks with the state to take action against the injustices of the police and the penal 
system, which was installed by the occupation. Relying on the makouts and now councils, 
peasants collectively took action against the police state.  In the seventies, CARE reported that 
community councils around Jean Rabel and Anse Rouge were subverting the authority of the 
rural police.53 The catholic priest Père Frantz Grandois was the president of a federation 
organization that united the community councils in the rural sections of Desarmes of Artibonite 
to collectively labor on development projects. This federation also helped council members in 
                                                
51 "La marche de son activités dont le principal but est de pratiquer l'agriculture, sur une grande échelle soit sur 
1,500 carreaux de terre. Dans les 1,500 carreaux, nous avons besoin 500 carreaux en attendant. Les cultures qui 
seront exploitées sont: pistache, manioc, patate, figue-banane, tomate, chadèque, orange, piment, tabac, choux, 
pomme-de-terre, oignon, carotte, aubergine, melon et l'établissement d'un endroit pour l'élevage. Les conditions 
climatiques de la zone seraient favorables à l'exploitation de ces cultures s'il vous serait possible de mettre  à la 
disposition du Conseil Communautaire un terrain pour entreprendre ces activités: le terrain envisage a été occupé 
par l'état depuis 1930. Excellence, nous avons déjà fait beaucoup d'efforts, la route de Carrefour La Mort, Haut du 
Cap est un en marche pour décongestionner la ville du Cap avec les poids lourds. Nous avons besoin du concours 
d'un poste de police à Carrefour La Mort. Excellence, nous comptons beaucoup sur Vous pour la réussite de tous 
ces projets et Vous pouvez toujours placer votre confiance en nous, parce que nous sommes vos fidèles sincères. 
Pour plus de détails, nous aimerions former une délégation de quarte personnes pour prendre contact avec vous."  
See, President Fondateur Philbert Botex and Vice President Claude Davilmar to Jean-Claude Duvalier, 9 September 
1985, no folder, TP, Quartier Morin. 
52 Unrecognizable name to Tribunal de Paix de Quartier Morin, 11 November 1985, TP, Quartier Morin. 
53 “File Evaluation Report Haitian American Community Help Organization (HACHO),” April 13, 1972, CARE 
Records, MssCol470, Box 101, SASB, NYPL. 
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matters related to local injustice.  When a local community council sought the "unjust arrest" of a 
peasant in 1978 to be rightfully addressed, they complained to the judge of peace in Desarmes. 
But the judge reportedly turned them away, "Committees are not chef, you can go [complain] on 
the national radio."54 The council and Grandois promised to take their complaints wherever until 
justice was found. The archival record goes cold. But we do know there were instances in which 
the state responded favorably to council complaints.  
  One Verrettes community council compelled agricultural agents to convey their 
complaints of an abusive local police chef de section. In a letter of complaint dated on 10 
November 1978, agents wrote to the military chief in the capital, "this Agent of Rural Police 
constitutes an obstacle to the action of the community council that is victim... of abuse of all 
sorts [and the police agent] equally perpetrates against certain honest citizens of the localities of 
the section." Several months later, the military responded with good news, "we have received 
your letter of complaint...related to the abuse of which certain paysans of the 6eme Section 
Rurale of Verrettes, on the part of the Agent of Rural Police of this locality." The letter went on 
to state: "In response, we inform you that the investigation carried out in this case has revealed 
your grievances are founded. Instructions have been passed that the appropriate disciplinary 
measures be taken against the guilty." On 10 May 1979, the Verrettes chef de section Morel 
Lanis Dorilus was discharged for "undesirable" behavior (though, as we shall see, he will make a 
comeback after Aristide was forced out of power).55  Indeed, peasants learned that their 
collective action could result in retribution. 
                                                
54 Cepha Celestin to Directeur du Service de l'Administration, 9 January 1978, untitled folder, DASM.  
55ODVA to  Chef d'Etat-Major Roger St. Albin, 10 November 1978;, Assistant Chef d'Etat-Major Mercius Rivière 
to Directeur Générale ODVA, 20 April 1979; Lettre Renvoi, 10 May 1979; all documents in CS Morel Lanis 
Dorilus dossier, folder 12035, FAd’H, ANH, PauP. 
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 Living in the adjacent villages of Cassé-Peieds and Petite Place de Golatha, council 
members were threatened with dispossession because of non-payment for rented land on which 
they squatted. Members of the council invited the local tax officer to a meeting where they all 
could discuss a late payment plan. But the tax officer did not reply to the council's invitation and 
was in the process of renting the said land to a local elite figure. On 8 November, over twenty 
council members signed a petition that deplored the actions of the tax officer.  Written in the 
popular language of Haitian Kreyòl with a mix of French orthography, peasants decried, "how 
can you rent this land to a powerful person (gran nèg). Where will you send us because we are 
pauvre." With a growing sense that they had ties to the central government, these peasants 
threatened to take their complaint to the capital. "If you don't give us a response, because the day 
has arrived for us to travail, we will be obliged to go to Port-au-Prince on foot so we can know," 
they asserted.56 The tax collector finally responded to their letter of complaint but was 
unsympathetic.57 No other records could be found to know how this conflict transpired.  
However, we do know that traveling on foot from Jean-Rabel to the capital of Port-au-Prince 
would have taken a couple of days. Still, such a journey was made possible and passible because 
of the very roads the councils had built.  Furthermore, peasants marching to the capital became 
conventional in the era of peasant councils. For example, Beauséjour (in Léogâne) peasants Jean 
Jovain, Charine St. Lot, Itana Dentica, Louis Geneus, Jean-Claude Jovain, and Louis Menelas 
traveled approximately 18 miles to the National Palace in Port-au-Prince to make a complaint 
against their local police chef de section, Mercy Rogene.  Peasants utilized the roads, which they 
built, to transport themselves to centers of power in order to make claims.  
                                                
56 Les Conseils Communautaires Cassé-Pieds, Petite Place, and Golatha to Arsène Roche, 8 November 1981, folder 
titled Tarif Communal, DGI/Impôts Locatif in Jean-Rabel.  
57 Arsène R. François to Conseil Communautaire de Cassé Pieds, Petite Place de Golatha, 19 November 1981,folder 
titled Tarif Communal, DGI/Impôts Locatif in Jean-Rabel.  
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 Community councils were acquiring different tactics of collectively engaging the state. 
Petitioning the state was initially the most favored. To be sure, peasant letters to the state had 
always existed since the nineteenth century. But during the Duvalier period, soon after councils 
began to proliferate, collectively signed petitions appear in great numbers in various Haitian 
archives. In other words, collectively signed petitions can be read as barometer of peasant 
political action. Sometimes, peasants collectively signed petitions without mentioning any 
council influence. Nonetheless, collective petitions became in vogue and appear in greater 
frequency during during the era of councils. Thus, the practice had spread throughout the 
countryside. 
 After a series of hurricanes devastated the southwestern peninsula, various state officials 
received collectively signed petitions by peasants requesting state assistance. In 1981, fifty-five 
peasants from Roseau, located in the southwest peninsula, signed a petition to their local tax 
collector asking that land taxes for the year be postposed because the natural disaster had 
prevented them from paying. "My good chers authorities," the peasants urged, "we paysan 
brothers we signed [this letter] to make this demand regarding the situation of this Hurricane...we 
are in the impossibility to pay."58  A couple of years later, a hurricane compelled another letter in 
which peasants asked the local prefect of Jérémie to deliver news to Jean-Claude that their 
peanut, plantain, coconut, and sugar cane harvests were swept away by a hurricane. "The 
weather caused much devastation...This is why we ask the [prefect] of Jérémie to intervene in 
our favor," signed Lestage Auguste, Jean Reynald Pierre, Jean Richard, Rosie Auguste, Cériane 
Louis, Oferne Augusta, Elie Etienne, Antoine Pierre, Villfranche Antoine, Jonny Paul, Mona 
                                                
58 2ème section Commune Roseaux to Direteur Projet de Jérémie and Direteur Général des Contributions de Port-
au-Prince, 10 March 1981, in folder Formule BC-114 Renouvellement de Tickets Ex 84-85, DGI, Jérémie. 
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Paul, Jeannine Juste, Marc Pacaud, Jean Gérard Richard, Anon Boyer, Mme. Paul Dorestant, 
Dieuseul Auguste, and Serge Auguste.59 
 The growing number of collectively signed petitions, whether identifiably endorsed by 
councils or not, were most likely connected to council organizing activities. In Cotelette of 
Sainte-Suzanne, for example, peasants signed a petition against their local police chef-de-section, 
but made no mention of their membership in the local community council. The facts came out 
during a military investigation. On 20 May 1983, pesants Essaie Pierre, Hercul Charles, Auguste 
Augustin, Steril Pierre, Alexis Augustin, Dessalines Exantus, Rosemar Cherivière, Decimé 
Joseph, Enos Joseph, and Marcel Jean-Almonord signed a letter of complaint to the military 
commander of the northeast department. The letter complained that the presence of a reputed 
thief had always led to the disappearance of cattle in Cotelette. Their local chef, according to the 
letter, was to blame because he failed to apprehend the suspects.  
 In a subsequent military investigation, the police chef admitted that he thought the entire 
affair was unrelated to his performance, but tensions were a manifestation of a power struggle 
between the police and the local community council. "During my incorporation in the Armed 
Forces of Haiti, I was supported by the committee of the community council of the area, after my 
engagement, they remained persuaded that I would be at their caprice," the police chef declared 
to investigators.  The signees of the petition were members of the local community council, but 
neglected to mention their council ties in the letter.  In any event, the regime's creation of state 
sponsored peasant-based organizations helped foster new peasant subjectivities. The historian 
David Nicholls acknowledged, "Community Councils were also set up to give the appearance of 
                                                
59  Lestage Auguste, Jean Reynald Pierre, Jean Richard, Rosie Auguste, Cériane Louis, Oferne Augusta, Elie 
Etienne, Antoine Pierre, Villfranche Antoine, Jonny Paul, Mona Paul, Jeannine Juste, Marc Pacaud, Jean Gérard 
Richard, Anon Boyer, Mme. Paul Dorestant, Dieuseul Auguste, and Serge Auguste to Préfet de Grand' Anse et de 
Tiburun, 8 February 1984, Box 4, folder FAd’H Various Reports, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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local democracy. Most of these controlled by Duvalierists and had little effect. Others, however, 
grew teeth and became centres on which significant demands for change were focused."60  They 
also became organizations of peasant protest and revolt that would overthrow the Duvalier 
government. 
         ***** 
 What Haitians came to refer as the dechoukaj or uprooting, which forced the Duvalier 
regime out of power in 1986, was not merely a movement against explicit forms of state 
repression as many scholars have argued. It was not simply Haitians acting out against the 
brutality of the tonton makouts. The dechoukaj was also not set off by a single event in 1986 
where soldiers killed two schoolboys in Gonaïves that prompted protests. Rather, beginning in 
the 1980,  popular protests, sparked by various motives, were already percolating throughout the 
countryside. The nature of peasant protest was collective and derived from community council 
activities. Thus, in effect, the dechoukaj comprised a number of various protests between 1980 
and 1986 that the regime could no longer contain. It was, in part, a multitude of scattered, but 
communal peasant protests that the regime failed to mediate. And these acts, sometimes 
intentionally subversive and sometimes not, converged and weakened the position of regime to 
allow its fall from power.  It is noteworthy to mention that Haitians not witnessed widespread 
rural protests since the U.S. occupation. However, the spread of councils helped liberate subdued 
rural traditions of revolts that convulsed the state into disrepair. Ironically, the fight against the 
regime came from those complicit in its formation. 
 Some peasant councils protested for conservative reasons. On 29 June 1982, the 
presidents of a federation of community councils in Cerca-la-Source organized 150 council 
                                                
60 David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti, New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press (1979), xiii. 
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members to protest publicly the replacement of the coordinator of a local literacy coordinator. 
The local military commander of Cerca reported to superiors, "to a rhythm [played] on drums, 
bamboo trumpets, and conch shells all exhibited placards with the prescription 'Vive Jn-Claude 
DUVALIER Président to all,' down with abuse, down with injustice."61 Cerca peasants and their 
council leaders wanted the old literacy coordinator back, but the record does not explain why. In 
any case, Cerca peasants experienced public protest while approximating themselves with the 
Duvalier regime and drawing upon its sanctioned discourse of injustice against peasants to 
achieve a political goal. This form of protest was an early sign of what recurred frequently 
throughout the eighties that helped delegitimized the regime.  
 Christian missionaries and radical priests also played a role in influencing peasant 
councils to recognize their organizational potential to mobilize collectively and protest 
exploitation and abuse. Indeed, many politicized lay priests associated with Christian missions 
involved in development have often been accredited in the literature for creating independent 
peasant grassroots organizations called groupement or gwoupman. Indeed, some gwoupmans and 
priests led protests against the regime.  However, scholars have argued that these gwoupman, 
under the influence of priests, were diametrically opposed to the conservative politics of peasant 
councils and gwoupmans –not councils– were largely behind the political revolution that 
overthrew the Duvalier regime in 1986. To be sure, priests played a part in galvanizing the 
masses and the state was aware of their radical influence.62 But the regime was, paradoxically, 
                                                
61 Cazeau, COMDEP CENTRE to CHEMG,  1 August 1982, Box 2, folder Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL. 
62 By 1985, military records demonstrate state surveillance of radical priest activities. In Cayes, clergy and lay 
priests (twelve Haitians and two foreigners) held mass which included Jean Bertrand Aristide on 13 May 1985 and 
protested an incident "qui a eu lieu à l'archevêché de Port-au-Prince entre le milicien et le prêtre Emile Joseph." See 
Préfet Farnès Raymond to Jean-Claude Duvalier, 14 May 1985. In the region of Baradères, "The Commander of the 
VSN of Azile and the municipal council of Baradères signaled in their reports the attitude of certain hostile Curés to 
YOUR government in my prefectural conscription. (Le Commandant des VSN de l'Azile et le conseil municipal des 
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responsible for establishing the necessary organizational framework from which the revolt had 
sprung. The supposed dichotomy between state-sponsored community councils and priest-led 
gwoupman was all but a fiction.   
 Gwoupmans were initially tied to peasant councils. In fact, many gwoupman 
organizations originally emerged out of community councils – quite literally in some cases. In 
the early 1980s, the leftist priest Père Jean-Marie Vincent, under the direction of l’Equipe 
Missionnaire, transformed northwestern peasant councils into a peasant organization called 
Gwoupman Tèt Ansanm (GTA) or Heads United Group that participated in the dechoukaj 
revolution and helped draft Haiti's first democratic constitution in the post-Duvalier period.  But 
GTA derived from state designs.  
 Père Vincent, GTA's leading priest, was initially an amateur for peasant councils, a 
function that put him under the patronage of the state. In the late seventies, for example, Père 
Vincent wrote to the state requesting available land for peasant councils.63  Père Vincent 
transformed the councils into GTA. Or as the leftist peasant Tonde put it, "Tèt Ansanm came out 
of the stomach of community councils."64  This contrasts with the predominant view that 
gwoupman were independent of the regime and pushed for democratic change, whereas 
community councils pursued more conservative goals because they operated under the aegis of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Baradère on signalé dans les rapports l'attitude hostile de certain Curés de ma conscription préfectorale à Votre 
Gouvernement."   The brave Père Valléry Rédécat of the Azile parish reportedly declared to armed officials of the 
regime, "No armed Authority is authorized to enter this church. (Le Prêtre Valleéry Rédécat chargé de la paroisse 
de l'Azile a déclaré: Aucune Autorité armée n'est autorisée à pénétrer son église)." See, Préfet Werner Gauthier to 
His Excellence Monsieur Jean-Claude Duvalier, 15 May 1985, Haitian Military Collection, the Manuscripts, 
Archives and Rare Books Division at Schomburg, NYPL. 
63 Vincent's letter quoted in full: "Je sollicite par la présente de pouvoir affermer 50 ha de terre du domaine de 
l'Etat, situé le long de la route départementale, reliant Jean-Rabel au Môle St. Nicolas à partir Bord de Mer, au fins 
d'agrandissement la surface cultivé par les Conseils Communautaire de la Rivière Bourra qui irrigue une trentaine 
d'hectares dans la zone. Je présente cette demande au nom des Conseils en tant qu'animateur et comme responsable 
des l’Equipe Missionnaire qui collabore à la formation de ces Conseils." Administrateur Jean-Rabel, Jean-Marie 
Vincent to Collecteur des Contributions de Port-de-Paix, 1 October 1979, in folder titled Société Réveil, DGI/Impôts 
Locale, Jean Rabel.   
64 Interview with Desilien “Tonde” in rural section of Lacoma, Jean-Rabel, 13 June 2014. 
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the Duvalier state.  This dichotomy has been misleading. In reality, gwoupman organizations 
were never entirely independent of the state. Instead, gwoupman, similar to councils, reported to 
the state and received resources from the regime and operated under its patronage.  
 Moreover, they were all bound up together in a complicated popular movement that 
contributed to the downfall of the Duvalier regime. In some cases, priests swayed both peasant 
councils and gwoupmans to organize and protest state injustice. On 14 October, a military 
official reported that a lay priest led both peasants groups in rural section Rivière-Mancelle of 
Gros Morne to protest market taxes that harmed the peasant economy.  The officer complained, 
"A great disorder had exploded at the public market in Rivière-Mancelle...The Reverend Père 
Roger Guasdon Curé of the Parish of Rivière-Mancelle accompanied by a group of faithful, of 
gwoupman and community councils of this section, went to the public market of this locality to 
make paysans rise up concerning taxes."  These peasant councils and gwoupmans were not 
divided in their protest against the state but rather "organized by the Révérend Père Roger 
Guadson and these [peasant] groups."65 Efforts by peasant councils and gwoupmans fostered a 
culture of collective peasant protests that appear frequently in the military records.   
 Military reports show crowds of peasants protesting and revolting everywhere in Haiti 
but often neglected to mention their organizational ties. Given the fact that the provinces were in 
revolt for the first time since U.S. intervention indicates that councils and other peasant groups 
were behind the political tumult in the countryside. Jean-Claude and political elites of his 
generation never witnessed collective peasant protest or revolt. Large numbers of peasants had 
not been so openly subversive since the occupation that stamped out rural traditions of peasant 
                                                
65Prior to the spread of councils and gwoupman, members of the tonton makouts resisted market taxes. Jean-Claude 
abolished the dreaded tax in 1973. However, the tax was reinstated  in the early 1980s. Commandant du Sous-
District Prophete Richecor to Commandant of Département Militaire de l'Artibonite, 16 October 1984, Box 2, 
Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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revolt.  By the eighties, however, the Haitian countryside exploded in protest and political 
conflict.  Police brutality and the harsh penal system were chief among the complaints by the 
rural population.   
 In 23 September 1980, one Haitian officer reported that twelve "paysans" of Jacmel 
publicly protested their harsh arrest and forced to pay bribe to the rural police to be released. In 
order to "avoid conflict," the officer discharged the two police agents and transferred a soldier 
involved in the case.66 On 11 June 1984, three soldiers arrived in a rural village in Saint Raphael 
and let off warning shots in the air to disperse "a group of individuals who threw rocks at them, 
in protest of the arrests" of local peasants.67  The tide of collective peasant protests against 
imprisonment reached high levels to the extent that the military became gravely concerned. The 
dechoukaj or uprooting of the regime was being generated by collective peasant protests.    
 The Artibonite valley, in particular, erupted in protest and conflict.  The nature of the 
protests often involved large numbers of peasants in the Artibonite where many local peasant 
councils and gwoupmans labored on irrigation maintenance.  The regime's revitalization of the 
Artibonite irrigation system in the seventies prompted the proliferation of peasant groups but 
also conflict around land ownership and the distribution of water throughout the valley.  For 
example, peasants collectively organized to protest unfair litigation of land disputes.  After the 
prosecutor performed land speculation on a portion of litigated land in the locality of Petite 
Rivière de l'Artibonite, a "group of peasants" of the region marched to the municipality of Saint-
                                                
66 Jean Enock Cleraine to Commandant du Département Militaire de l'Ouest, 28 October 1980, Box 2, HQ North-
West Dept. HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL..   
67 Figaro to CHEMG, 11 June 1984, Box 1, folder Northern Military District, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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Marc and "threw rocks and chunks of wood at the prosecutor's office."  Soldiers had to let off 
two shots in the air to disperse the crowd of peasants.68  
 Other Artibonite peasants organized against the ODVA that was previously co-managed 
by the Haitian state and U.S. development agents in the 1960s, but solely administered by the 
Haitian state officials in the Jean-Claude period. By that juncture, the ODVA suffered from 
serious corruption. On 6 June 1984, peasants "armed with rocks" attacked ODVA's rice factory 
and the army arrested twenty-six peasants. The twenty-six peasants arrested were taken to Port-
au-Prince for interrogation. Those arrested included Jean-Pierre Noël, Saint-Pierre Thélusma, 
Roland Voltaire, Célavy Dasulma, Selondieu Darius, Elias Philémond, Lorcilia André, Lévius 
Dasulme, Ducheine Tasul, Dieseul Estimé, René Pierre-Antoine, Antoine Thelemarque, Joseph 
Florival, Dieufort Pierre-Charles, Robert Clervoyant, Luckner Exil, Dieunord Charles, Immacula 
Méthus, Pikee Jean, Laramartine Clerjuste, Augulus Myrthil, Michel Myrthil, Waney Saint-
Fleur, Fervéus Pauléus, Tagrace Estimé, and Séide Hugette.69 The record does not mention 
whether these peasants ever returned home, but their coordinated attack suggests an 
organizational nature that stemmed from council mobilizing activities, though the records do not 
explicitly state the case. More importantly, makouts could also have been among the peasant 
protestors arrested given that makouts were also bound up in council activities.  
            ***** 
 In the late seventies, Jean-Claude Duvalier urged tonton makouts to join development 
projects and collaborate with councils and gwoupmans.  In a state sponsored magazine written in 
Haitian Kreyòl, the regime published one of its speeches where it exhorted, "[makouts] were 
created to put their heads together [met tèt yo ansanm] with ... local committees, community 
                                                
68 Clerine to COMDEP ARTIBONITE, 2 April 1984, Haitian Military Records (FAd'H), Schomburg, NYPL 
69 Prefect Thomas Anderville to President Jean-Claude Duvalier, 6 June 1984, Box 2, folder Department HQ 
(Artibonite, South), HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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councils, and all the community groupman in all the rural sections to work for development."70 
Many makouts heeded his call.  Makouts were likely the signees of many petitions since many of 
them were also council presidents. But council presidents hardly mentioned their status as 
makouts when signing petitions. Still, as we have seen, oral sources and primary documents 
show us that makouts joined councils and constituted both the leadership and rank-and-file. 
Makouts and ordinary peasants together formed the membership of community councils where 
they learned organizing for local development and were probably included in the many nameless 
crowds of peasants described in official reports of peasant protests. 
 However, military records sometimes acknowledged that even tonton makouts led 
collective peasant protests. In 1983, a local court in the Artibonite valley returned 500 acres of 
land to the aristocratic family of Attié, which was previously nationalized by François Duvalier 
in the sixties. The peasants organized an attack on the associates of the Attié family situated on 
their land and makouts were behind the collective action.  On 4 December, a military officer 
reported that "a group of paysans unhappy about the [court's] decision...armed with guns, 
machetes, stones, and clubs attacked representatives of the Attiés who fled after being shot at." 
And most importantly, "The majority of the assailants were headed by the VSN."71 Indeed, 
makouts were bound up in the tide of collective protests because they often had deep ties with 
peasants and community councils. Although the regime encouraged makouts to integrate with 
councils as a way to curb their independent activities, these attempts obviously were 
counterproductive because makouts learned to mobilize with ordinary peasants that widened the 
peasant coalition which uprooted the Duvalier regime.   
                                                
70 “BWA CHANDEL: TRANPET JANCLODIS,” July 1979, p. 10, in my possession. 
71 S/Clerine to COMDEP ARTIBONITE, 4 December 1983, Box 2, folder Department HQ (Artibonite), HMDC, 
SCRBC, NYPL. 
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 Makouts joined both councils and gwoupmans that exposed them to ideas of political 
organizing to achieve political goals. This was especially the case when makouts joined councils 
and gwoupmans influenced by radical priests who were infusing peasants with political 
discourses that inspired political agitation.  On 25 May 1985, the makout commander Fritz 
Phillipe reported to President Jean-Claude that Père Jean-Marie Vincent and missionaries were 
spreading "ANTIGOVERNMENT" propaganda in Lacoma that lured "CERTAIN NAIVE 
VOLUNTEERS OF NATIONAL SECURITY" who had been "CORRUPTED."72  Oral tradition 
affirms this makout-radical priest connection. Père Vincent has been remembered to have a close 
relationship with the makout commander and communal council president Florantin Louisaint. 
During the last hours of the regime in 1986 as it succumbed to popular revolt, Père Vincent 
dissuaded a mob of protesters from killing a local makout commander named Germain who was 
locally known as a genial figure but who failed to control some of his unruly makout 
underlings.73  Germain connections with the Gwoupman Tèt Ansanm and Père Vincent saved his 
life as the regime fell from power. Many makouts became part of the agitated multitudes that 
uprooted the regime. By early 1986, makout loyalty to Jean-Claude waned.  After a spokesperson 
of the Regan administration prematurely announced the departure of the president amidst popular 
protests, Jean-Claude, however, defiantly reasserted his position as president and ordered the 
army and makouts to suppress protests. Yet many makouts were part of the crowds protesting the 
regime, while others simply abandoned the militia.   
 On 2 February 1986, five days before the Jean-Claude finally announced his departure, 
for example, the army commander of Gonaïves reported that local "Miliciens deserted the 
                                                
72 Fritz Phillipe, Prefect-Commander of the Volunteers of National Security of the Northwest to His Excellence 
Monsieur Jean-Claude Duvalier, 25 May 1985, Box 2, HQ North-West Dept., HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
73 Interview with Desilien “Tonde” in rural section of Lacoma, Jean-Rabel, 13 June 2014. 
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General Headquarters of the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale."74  Others abandoned their 
weapons and uniforms. One makout in Lacoma, remembers throwing his pistol into a nearby 
river, disposing of his uniform, and going into hiding as crowds targeted many makouts for 
retribution.75 The makout Georges of Limbé simply put his makout items aside and continued his 
life as an ordinary peasant. When I asked him why he did not bolt during the dechoukaj, he 
simply stated, "I did not utilize my position to do harm, only those who did harm were 
uprooted."76  The makout lost their loyalty for the regime and, on 7 February, Jean-Claude 
Duvalier and his family finally abdicated from power and boarded a cargo plane that left Haiti 
which ended the twenty-nine year reign of the Duvalier dictatorship. 
  Makouts disappeared with the regime, but the militia would forever become associated 
with legacies of the regime's repression. Although accounts of makouts protecting them from tax 
agents in the Duvalier period, some market women accused tax agents as makouts to avoid 
paying taxes. On March 1986, for example, the tax director in Gonaïves reported that he 
"received numerous complaints related to the refusal of marchands and marchandes of small 
commerce in the Public Markets...abandoned the said tax… refusal justified by the presence of 
certain tax collectors who were volunteers of national security."77  Market women associating the 
tax agents with makouts, though traditionally opposed to each other in the Duvalier period, were 
strategically employed to link tax collection with the fallen regime, and thus should be annulled. 
The military junta that Jean-Claude appointed to power before leaving Haiti would finally 
eliminate the market tax. The popular practice of naming state repression and exploitation as 
                                                
74 Commandant Benaud Monpoint to Chef Suprême 2 February 1986, Box 2, folder Department HQ (Artibonite), 
HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
75 Interview with Pè Camille in the rural district of Ravine du Roche, Limbé, 9 June 2016. 
76 Interview with André Georges in Limbé, June 2015. 
77 Directeur Général Raymond Fourreau to Collecteurs des Impôts, 17 March 1986, in file Correspondence, 
DGI/Impôts Locale, St. Michel de l’Attalaye.  
            
             
 209 
makout tendencies have rightfully preserved the nefarious legacies of the Duvalier regime, but 
also has obscured the history of the militia and subsequent social conflicts in the post-Duvalier 
period. 
  In July 1987, for example, peasant members of the Gwoupman Tèt Ansanm (GTA) in the 
northwest were victims of a violent conflict that came to be known as the Jean-Rabel Massacre. 
Leaders of GTA, including the radical leftist Père Vincent, portrayed the massacre as a result of 
a political attack led by former Duvalierists, local landed elites, and tonton makouts who were 
attempting to suppress popular movements in the northwest.  Although originating from state-
sponsored peasant councils that included a number of makouts, GTA, by the post-Duvalier 
period, grew into a leftist organization and opposed landed aristocrats and state predation.  They 
were known for seizing elite-owned land, for occupying tax offices to stop unfair taxation, and 
for thwarting court judgments against peasants.  But the Jean Rabel massacre was specifically 
tied to the politics of foreign food dumping. GTA and Père Vincent opposed foreign food 
dumping with its imperialistic implications, whereas other peasant groups relied on food 
dumping for nutritional intake and for resale to obtain cash. Indeed, GTA's politics were good 
intentioned but undermined the peasant economy that desperately needed assistance.  
 On July 22, GTA members in Lacoma mobilized many of its members to visit peasants 
living the village of La Montagne where they planned to hold a "dialogue" over concerns related 
to “manje sinistre” or foreign food. Lacoma GTA members insisted in interviews that they were 
merely going to La Montagne for peaceful talks. Non-members such as Madam Jean-Gilles, on 
contrary, argue "They [GTA] went there to fight and they lost." Hundreds of peasants on both 
sides lost their lives, but reports suggest that GTA carried heavier losses.   
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 GTA held the former makouts and authorities as responsible for the Jean Rabel Massacre. 
The military junta formed a commission to investigate the massacre and observed that the 
massacre, at its core, was tied socioeconomic issues nurtured in the Duvalier period. "The 
ultimate example of all the social and economic contradictions generated by the medievalo- 
capitalist means of production which characterizes the current stage of development of Haitian 
society." However, the commission also criticized narratives of the massacre as the result of  
makout-based repression. The report asserted, "the easy theories about Jean-Rabel... are 
simplistic and not supported by facts. There was simply no sign that the large landowning 
families played a role, and 'Macoute' had no real meaning, since Ex-Macoutes were found to be 
included in both 'Tèt Ansamb' and its antagonists." Indeed, as I have pointed out earlier in the 
chapter, GTA had makouts among its ranks.  Placing the blame merely on the makouts for the 
massacre was a strategy to associate food dumping, the true source of the conflict, with the 
legacies of the Duvalier dictatorship. However, another legacy of the Duvalier regime included 
organizations such as the GTA, councils, and makouts that ultimately brought democracy to 
Haiti. These complexities explain why so many peasants played a large role in the democratic 
transition after the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship.  
Conclusion: The Democratic Revolution and Military Repression 
 
 Before fleeing Haiti, Jean-Claude's last action as dictator was appointing a military 
National Governing Council (CNG) with Lieutenant- Major Henri Namphy as its president. As 
president of the CNG, Namphy promised to oversee the national transition to a democracy. On 
27 February 1986, the CNG announced plans to hold a constitutional convention as proof of its 
democratic intensions.  Meanwhile, the CNG violent repression of popular protests and 
movements threatened to stall the transition. Although supporting human rights and democracy 
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in Haiti,  the U.S. strengthened the position of the repressive the military regime.  On the 
condition that the CNG support democratic progress, the U.S. sent the CNG $400,000 in riot 
control equipment and $4 million for military training.78 However, with U.S. equipment and 
resources, the CNG continuously violated human rights and carried out violent repression that 
attempted to thwart popular democracy that evolved out of the popular protest in the Duvalier 
period.  Despite the counterrevolution of the U.S.-backed military, protestors continued to 
confront the military authoritarian government and call for real democracy.  
 Between 31 January and 3 February 1987, in honor of the one-year anniversary of the 
dechoukaj uprising, grassroots organizations met in the capital to form a coalition that would 
advocate for democratic change and to design ways to influence the drafting of the constitution. 
The conference centered on finding ways to ascribe on the constitution protections for 
democratic representation and measures to defend national interests against foreign interloping. 
The coalition named itself Premye Kongre Nasyonal Mouvman Demokratik Yo or First National 
Congress of Democratic Movements (PKNMD). PKNMD was made up of about 800 delegates 
that represented over 320 organizations.  The organizations represented feminist, human rights, 
and educational groups. PKNMD also invited international organizations such as Council Office 
on Hemispheric Affairs, Bread for the World, Coalition for Black Trade Unionists, National 
Emergency of Haitian Refugees, Society of Missionaries of Africa, Washington Office on Haiti, 
and etc.    
 Despite a show of locally urban-based and international organizations, peasant groups 
were overwhelmingly represented during the PKNMD meeting.  According to PKNMD's press 
                                                
78“A Democracy Through Terror: Chronology of Recent Events in Haiti and the U.S. Responses, January 1988” 
(Haiti 1987 Election Watch),  folder Political Parties and Organizations, Dechoukaj Collections, HMDC, SCRBC, 
NYPL. 
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announcement,  "The 310 organizations that participated in the vote came from the majority of 
provinces representing 75% of paysans who form the Haitian population."79 For the first time in 
Haitian history, the rural masses were given the opportunity to directly participate in the 
formation of national policy and politics. During the conference, peasants helped draft PKNMD's 
resolution that included calls for rural representation in national politics, a fair judicial system, 
and state assistance for the improvement of small farming. The resolution also included a 
condemnation of the CNG military government by calling it "a byproduct of the Duvalier regime 
and that it has clearly demonstrated its willingness to continue the same 'Tonton Macoute' 
regime."  
 In one workshop, PKNMD advocates took notes and printed partial quotes by peasants  
that served to strengthen the narrative that tied the CNG to the repression of the Duvalier regime 
and the makouts. "The Children of Duvalier  are the CNG," one peasant was recorded to 
mention.  Another peasant quote asserted, "Not only is Duvalierism is not finish but there is a 
whole aspect that's continuing to grow." "The rich people, military, and Macoutes have the land," 
went another peasant quote. One quote stated, "Peasants expropriated of land to give to 
Macoutes and Army People. It's a slavery system we've been in.  We have smaller parcels of 
land." Personal memories of repression were also quoted. One quote stated, "They killed my 
father in 1966. they killed a lot of people in my region. What we must do is take out the roots." 
One somber quote read: "I was arrested twice by Jean Claude. I come here with hope."80 These 
quotes affirm the atrocities of the Duvalier regime and gives voice to some of its peasant victims. 
Furthermore, these quotes form a narrative that sees the CNG as a continuity of the Duvalier 
                                                
79 Note de Press, 1 February 1987, PREMYE KONGRÈ NASYONAL MOUVMAN DEMOKRATIK YO, folder 
Political Parties and Organizations, Dechoukaj Collections, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
80 Note de Press, 13 January 1987, PREMYE KONGRÈ NASYONAL MOUVMAN DEMOKRATIK YO, folder 
Political Parties and Organizations, Dechoukaj Collections, HMDC, SCRBC, NYPL. 
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regime and, therefore, delegitimizing the military as a supervisor of democratic transition. 
Nevertheless, the simplistic representations of the Duvalier regime obscures its complex legacies 
tied to the democratic transition.  Or as one peasant quote put it, "The process of dechouke 
[revolt] needs to continue."  
 Indeed, some quotes reflect the complex interpretations made throughout this 
dissertation. Perhaps alluding to peasant access to state owned land under the rule of François 
Duvalier, one quote stated: "Under Papa Doc everything was owned by the state. Under the Jean-
Claude, we started receiving foreign aid and came under the control of other countries." Another 
quote comes close to how makouts comprised the population, "Infiltration of the Macoutes was 
so thorough and complete that the people were thoroughly divided by suspicion." Finally, one 
peasant quote suggested that the dechoukaj revolt came out of peasant councils, "Movement 
came from the community base churches where people learned to speak." This last quote 
concedes that the dechoukaj was the byproduct of peasant community organizations but 
emphasizes under the tutelage of radical priests. Indeed, church organizations played an 
influential role, but were part of a convergence of processes that involved the regime's peasant 
policies and network of patronage. Even church organizations with ties to peasant councils 
operated under the aegis of the Duvalier regime, including the radical GTA led by Père Vincent 
in the northwest.  Furthermore, peasant councils were the product of state plans to curb the 
makouts and church organizations profited from this approach by patronizing peasant councils 
and exposing them to radical ideas. Put simply, the regime provided priests with the instruments 
to influence peasants for political struggle and democratic change.  
 Furthermore, the regime reintroduced political organizing to peasants so that the regime 
could withstand attacks from the political opposition, but peasants also utilized organizing 
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themselves to first make claims and eventually strike the regime, causing it to fall. Ever since the 
occupation in which U.S. forces stamped out peasant traditions of revolt and mobilizing in the 
countryside, it was only not until the rise of Duvalier regime that we see the proliferation of 
peasant organizations in Haiti. After they were long disempowered, peasants were provided with 
the instruments to empowered themselves by the Duvalier regime bent on protecting its authority 
to rule. Paradoxically, this process was one of the lasting legacies of the Duvalier regime that has 
been hidden in conventional representations of the regime.  After overtaking the state, peasants 
intended to turn Haiti into a democracy that was evident in their participation in drafting the 
national constitution. 
 In fact, peasants constituted the backbone of the democratic transition. After being 
invited to observe PKNMD meetings, the American Friends Service Community (AFSC), a U.S. 
based Quaker activist organization, seemed almost surprised at the substantial participation of 
peasant groups. During a PKNMD meeting held in March, the AFSC reported, "Another 
significance of the Kongre [PKNMD] is it represents the coming together of many of the groups 
for the Duvalier's leaving... The fact of the Kongre has given impetus to the calling of a meeting 
in mid-March of over 2,000 peasant groups in the country.”  Then, the AFSC report announced, 
“It is possible that a national peasant structure will emerge from the meeting."  These peasant 
organizations were rooted in peasant-based groups created in the Duvalier period and, after Jean-
Claude fled, formed a democratic political structure that influenced the drafting of the national 
constitution and kept up pressures for free elections.  Throughout the rule of CNG, successive 
military juntas, and aborted provisional civilian presidents, peasant groups continued to organize 
for democracy. With Père Vincent's GTA playing a leading role, thousands of peasants finally 
helped elect in 1991 the populist and leftist  priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide who won 67% 
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majority.  However, the military general Raul Cédras, who was secretly supported by the CIA, 
overthrew Aristide and carried out a bloody campaign against rural leaders of democracy. 
 Cédras's military repression successfully extinguished the bright flame of what was 
Haiti's truly second democratic revolution that encompassed a majority of its rural citizens.  
Thousands of Haitians were killed including activists in the countryside that were part of the 
bourgeoning grassroots political structure, advocating for democracy.  Astrel Charles, the deputy 
of the northern town of Pignon and member of the National Agricultural and Industrial Party 
(PAIN), was murdered in December 1991 by police chef Illium Pierre.  
 In the mountaintop village of Plaisance, also located in the north and on the very day 
Charles was murdered, a police chef de section, serving under military authority, burned the 
homes of Deputy Jean Mandénave, a member of the National Front for Democracy and Change 
(FNCD), and sixty of his constituents who supported Aristide’s candidacy. In Rossignol of 
Artibonite, the local police chef persecuted followers of FNCD’s Deputy Samuel Milford.81 Ever 
since Cédras-led military repression, the countryside has not recovered its rural democratic 
structure. One international observer remarked, "And far worse was the willing destruction of the 
nation's basic institutions such as political parties, labor unions, grass-roots organizations, 
cooperatives, community groups, and local government. These institutions were weak before, 
were knowingly emasculated or eviscerated."82  The U.S.-backed Cedras and Haitian military, as 
the activist Jean Dominique once put it, "killed democracy."83  
                                                
81 Anne Fuller and Amy Wilentz, Return to the Darkest Days: Human Rights in Haiti Since the Coup: America 
Watch, National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Physical for Human Rights (Boston: Physicians for Human Rights, 
1992), 12. 
82 "Strategy of Aristide for Social and Economic Reconstruction" (University of Kansas, 1994), iv. 
83 The Agronomist, directed by Jonathan Demme (2003; New York: ThinkFilmUSA), DVD. 
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 Nevertheless, in this world of increasing violent repression, some peasant groups 
preserved tactics of organizing from peasant councils and protested local abuse by police chefs.  
In July, choosing to sign their names in Kreyòl, Verrettes pesants (in Artibonite) Chal Petijan, 
Jan Wobè Pòl, Fenel Jan, Josèf Siyon, Bobrun Sail, Jak Piè, Tousen Ogé, Lucius Vilus wrote a 
petition requesting the discharge of chef Morel Lanus (or Lanis”) Dorilus from the rural police.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, Verrettes peasant councils had previously revoked Lanis in 
1979, but he was apparently let back into the military rural police when Cedras seized power.  
 Thus, in 1993, Verrettes peasants combined tactics of peasant councils learned in the 
Duvalier period with tactic of open revolt learned in from dechoukaj period to run Lanis out of 
town. In a letter to Cedras, Verettes peasants explained their actions: “The last thing he did that 
made us send him away was when Mesye [Mr.] Lanis made mad-am Arius Henrius remove sheet 
metal [tòl] from the roof of her home to cover his house under the pretext that her husband had 
died which angered the population that stoned Lanis’ home."  In response to the petition, General 
Cédras ordered, in August 1993, the removal of police chef Lanis from the police rurale.84 The 
removal of Lanis evidently drew upon a recent tradition of dechouke, but also from collective 
activities of peasant-based groups during the Duvalier period.  This might be more evident when, 
in 1993, Hinche peasants who were members of the Council Committee Federation—a 
seemingly byproduct of community councils—sent Cedras a letter of complaint. They decried 
                                                
84 Chal Petijan, Jan Wobè Pòl, Fenel Jan, Josèf Siyon, Bobrun Sail, Jak Piè, Tousen Ogé, and Lucius Vilus to 
Lieutenant General Raul Cédras, 19 July 1993, in dossier of Morel Lanus Dorilus, D'agents de la Police Rurale 
(1971-1993), folder 12035, ANH, PauP. 
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against a local police chef named Louis Missionnaire and had him revoked for illegally extorting 
the local population.85   
 After negotiations between the U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration and Cédras, 
the military government dissolved. In addition, Aristide was permitted to return and resume the 
remainder of his presidential tenure. Upon his return, Aristide abolished both the national 
military and rural police in 1996. His move finally ended years of militarized oppression that 
targeted peasants since the occupation. Thus, Aristide’s return led to the realization of some 
peasant grievances.  However, the impact of Cédras' violent repression and U.S. meddling 
curbed the once populist agenda of the returned Aristide and suppressed nationwide enthusiasm 
for democracy. Nevertheless, everywhere in Haiti still lie peasant associations that, even though 
they are now lackluster as a mobilizing force and once more marginalized from national politics, 
remain vestiges of the Duvalier dictatorship, popular democracy, and U.S. intervention.
                                                
85 Commandant District Jacques Clément to  Commandant du Département Militaire du Centre, 10 May 1993, in the 
dossier of L’agent de la police Louis Missionnaire, Dossiers de carrière militaire (1982-1994), folder 12051, FAd'H, 
ANH, PauP. 
            





Danticat, Edwidge. The Dew Breaker. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.   
 
___. Brother, I'm Dying. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007. 
 
Dash, Michael. Literature and Ideology in Haiti, 1915-1916.  London: The Macmillan 
Press, 1981. 
 
Diederich, Bernard and Burt, Al. Papa Doc: Haiti and Its Dictators. Oxford: Markus 
 Weiner (1990). 
 
Dubois, Laurent. Haiti: Aftershocks of History. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012.   
 
Duvalier, François. Ouvres Essentiales. Port-au-Prince: Port-au-Prince: Presses Nationales  
 d'Haiti, 1966. 
 
Herskovits, Melville J. Life in a Haitian Valley, New York: Anchor Books (1971). 
 
Fatton, Robert. Haiti’s Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy.    
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 
 
Ferguson, James. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers. New York: Basil  
Blackwell, 1987.  
 
Ferrer, Ada. Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868-1898. Chapel Hill: The 
  University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
 
___. Freedom's Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution. New York: Cambridge  
 University Press, 2014.   
 
Heinl, Robert Debs and Heinl, Nancy Gordon. Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian  
 People. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978. 
 
Holt, Thomas C. The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and  
 Britain, 1832-1938.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.  
 
Honneth, Axel. The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict.   
 Translated by Joel Anderson. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.  
 
James, C.L.R. The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo   
 Revolution.  New York: Vintage Books, 1989.  
 
Johnson, Christopher. “Secretism and the Apotheosis of Duvalier,” Journal of the  
 American Academy of Religion, Vol. 74, No. 2, June 1, 2006. 
 
            
             
 219 
Leyburn, James G. The Haitian People. Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1941. 
 
Lundahl, Mats.  Peasants and Poverty: A Study of Haiti.  New York: St. Martin’s Press,  
 1979. 
 
___. Politics or Markets?: Essays on Haitian Underdevelopment, New York: Routledge  
 (2002 
 
Madiou, Thomas. Histoire D’Haïti.  Port-au-Prince: Editions Deschamps, 1988. 
 
Millet, Kethly. Les paysans et l’occupation américaine d’Haïti (1915-1930). La Salle. 
 
Mintz, Sidney.  Worker in the Cane: A Puerto Rico Life History. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960. 
 
___.  Caribbean Transformations.  New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.  
 
Moral, Paul. Le paysan haïtien: étude sur la vie rurale en Haïti, Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve 
 &Larose, 1961. 
 
Nicholls, David. From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour, and National Independence      
in Haiti. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1979. 
 
___. Haiti in Caribbean Context: Ethnicity, Economy and Revolt. London: The 
Macmillan Press, 1985. 
 
Plummer, Brenda Gayle. Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988. 
 
___. Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment.  Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1992. 
 
___. In Search of Power: African Americans in the Era of Decolonization, 1956-1974. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
 
Rodney, Walter Anthony. A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881-1905. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.  
 
Schmidt, Hans. The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934. New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1971.  
 
Scott, James C. Seeing Like The State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press (1998). 
 
___. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985. 
            
             
 220 
 
___.  Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts.  New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1990. 
 
___.  Seeing Like The State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press (1998). 
 
___.  The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009 
 
Sheller, Mimi. Democracy After Slavery: Black Publics and Peasant Radicalism in Haiti 
and Jamaica. Gainesville: The University of Florida, 2000. 
 
___. Citizenship from Below: Erotic Agency and Caribbean Freedom. Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2012.  
 
Smith, Matthew J. Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 
1934-1957. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.  
 
Turits, Richard Lee. Foundations of Despotism: Peasants, the Trujillo Regime, and  
 Modernity in Dominican History. California: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 
____.  "A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the  
 Dominican Republic" Hispanic American Review 82, no. 3 (2002): 600-601.  
 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. Haiti, State Against Nation: Origins and Legacy of Duvalirism. 
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990.  
 
___. Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History. Boston: Beacon Press, 
1995.   
 
Weber, Eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of the Rural France, 1870-
1914.  California: Stanford University Press, 1976.  
 
Wolf, Eric. Peasants Wars of the Twentieth Century. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 
1968.  
 
 
 
